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9 
Enhancing clarity of the strengthened fiscal (and economic) governance toolbox is among the actions set 
out in the 21 October 2015 Communication by the Commission On steps towards Completing Economic 
and Monetary Union.(
1
) This document is the second issue of the Vade mecum, published for the first 
time in May 2013 with the aim of improving transparency of the way the Commission applies the rules of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Its annual update was called for by the Communication On steps 
towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union with a view to further increasing transparency and 
explaining rules in a structured and hopeful pedagogical way. It is a manual prepared by, and under the 
responsibility of, the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) of the European 
Commission. It presents the relevant procedures and methodologies designed for implementing the SGP. 
These are either enshrined in the EU legislations (Treaty, SGP regulations, delegated acts) or stemming 
from the interpretation of general provisions of the legislation by the Commission and Member States, in 
the context of the work of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) of the Council, or specific 
interpretative Communication by the Commission. This technical document is primarily aimed at experts 
and organisations working on public finance issues in European Union (EU) countries, but should be of 
interest for anyone wanting an in depth understanding of the SGP's functioning or searching for details on 
its implementation.  
The Vade mecum is a compiled-style document that brings together all the elements relevant to the 
implementation of the SGP. The reader should see it as a compendious encyclopaedia with stand-alone 
articles digging into specific dimensions. Therefore, given the necessary repetitions entailed by this 
format, it is not meant for linear reading. While each Section strives for a comprehensive presentation of 
relevant technical and legal aspects, the main text aims to remain broadly accessible for non-specialists. 
In this respect, the relevant economic concepts and historical background underlying the procedure have 
been systematically recapped, while a load of technical details was put in annexes (17 in total). The Vade 
mecum describes the working of the SGP step by step at the time of writing (with 15 February 2016 as a 
cut-off date). It should not be considered to be definitive, since it presents in several parts the currently 
agreed or historic interpretation of a feature of the SGP, which might evolve as the need arises. The Vade 
mecum will be updated annually to timely reflect any significant change in the evolution of the rules and 
surveillance practice.  
With respect to the previous (and first) issue of May 2013, the current version has been updated to reflect 
requests of clarification received since the first publication, and i) the changes to the surveillance 
procedures resulting from the entry into force of the legislative package known as the Two Pack on 30 
May 2013,(
2
) ii) the current operationalization of the preventive arm also in light of the "Commonly 
agreed position on Flexibility", endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 12 February 2016,(
3
) which builds 
on the interpretative Commission's Communication on Flexibility within the SGP of January 2015,(
4
) iii) 
the improvements to the methodology for assessing effective action under the corrective arm of the SGP 
as endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on 20 June 2014,(
5
) as well as iv) the introduction of 
                                                          
(1) Communication from the Commission On steps towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union, COM(2015) 600 final of 
21.10.2015: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/single-market-strategy/communication-emu-steps_en.pdf 
(2) For a non-technical overview of the changes, see Part II of Report on Public Finances in EMU 2013, European Economy 4/2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee-2013-4.pdf. 
(3) http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14345-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
(4) Communication from the Commission  Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, COM(2015) 12 of 13.01.2015: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-
13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf 




Vade mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact 
 
10 
macroeconomic conditionality linked to the economic surveillance procedures to all the European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF).  
The SGP is rooted in the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU), in particular articles 121 
and 126, and the Protocol 12 annexed to the TFEU (Box 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2). Article 136 indicates measures 
specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro (Box 1.2). The SGP is implemented through 
secondary legislation in the form of Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and 
Regulation (EC) 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure. These two regulations respectively specify the so-called preventive arm and 
corrective arm of the SGP (with the latter being also known as the Excessive Deficit Procedure). Further 
details for the SGP's implementation are published in a Code of Conduct on the SGP(
6
), entitled 
“Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and 
content of Stability and Convergence programmes”, agreed by the ECOFIN Council. The SGP has 
evolved over the years through amendments to the legislation. Box 0.1 and Graph 0.1 present a short 
overview of its history. 
This Vade mecum covers the preventive and the corrective arms of the Pact in Parts I and II respectively. 
Part III presents the institutional context – both European and national – in which European budgetary 
surveillance operates.  
Part I focuses on the preventive arm of the Pact and contains four Sections. Section 1.1 provides the 
necessary background and is followed by Section 1.2 that elaborates on the role and assessment of the 
medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs). Section 1.3 sets out how the assessment of the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes and, more in general, of compliance with the preventive arm should be 
undertaken and Section 1.4 describes the conditions and procedures linked to the observation of a 
significant deviation (from the requirements of the preventive arm)  and the introduction of sanctions for 
euro area Member States. 
Part II, on the corrective arm of the Pact, is structured on the basis of the successive steps under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). Section 2.1 provides the background. Section 2.2 explains how an 
EDP is launched and Section 2.3 considers the actions to be taken after a Council recommendation to put 
an end to excessive deficit is issued. Section 2.4 explains the actions to be taken after a non-effective 
action following a Council EDP recommendation or decision to give notice, respectively. Section 2.5 
explains how an EDP is abrogated.  
Part III, on the institutional context is divided into two Sections. Section 3.1 considers the institutional 
dimension of the European side of budgetary surveillance, placing the SGP in the context of not just 
budgetary but also wider economic surveillance. Section 3.2 discusses the obligations on Member States 
in terms of their own budgetary processes, stemming from the Six Pack, the Two Pack, and the Fiscal 
Compact established by the inter-governmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). 
BOX 0.1: THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT SINCE ITS INCEPTION  
The secondary legislation governing the SGP was adopted in 1997, as the budgetary pillar of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, applying for the whole EU without exception. The first amendment of 
the SGP occurred in 2005 and involved changes to both the preventive and the corrective arms. The 
main aim was to take economic circumstances and country-specific characteristics better into account. 





In the preventive arm, the horizontal requirement of achieving a budgetary position of close to balance 
or surplus in nominal terms was replaced by a country-specific objective set in structural terms (net of 
cyclically-driven expenditure and revenue and of one-offs). These objectives take Member States' 
gross government debt level and the magnitude of the fiscal challenge posed by population ageing into 
account. In the corrective arm, the possibility of extending the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 
deadline was introduced for countries that had taken effective action but were faced with unexpected 
adverse economic circumstances with a significant impact on their public finances – a principle 
labelled “conditional compliance”. For both arms, the legislation indicated a benchmark adjustment for 
the size of the correction to be made for countries either not at their medium-term budgetary objective - 
MTO (preventive arm) or with an excessive deficit (corrective arm). Furthermore, in order to enhance 
the growth-oriented dimension of the Pact, the adjustment path to the MTO could take the 
implementation of major structural reforms into account, provided that they have a verifiable impact on 
long-term public finance sustainability, either directly (such as for pension reforms) or by raising the 
growth potential (and thereby lowering the level of public debt as a percentage of GDP). 
Following the onset of the economic and financial crisis in 2008 and the further experience with the 
concrete implementation of the Pact, the SGP was amended for a second time in 2011, as part of a 
package of legislation known as the Six Pack. A schematic overview of these reforms is presented in 
Tables 0.1 and 0.2. The package amended both Regulations and added a system of graduated 
enforcement mechanisms (financial sanctions), to address the weaknesses in the surveillance 
framework that the crisis exposed. In particular, the changes strengthened the preventive arm of the 
Pact to ensure that good economic times were used to pursue policies leading to healthy public 
finances. A new expenditure benchmark was added, involving an analysis of government expenditure 
net of discretionary revenue measures, as a complement to the change in the structural balance. 
Moreover, a key innovation was the specification of when deviations from the adjustment path to the 
MTO are deemed to be significant, making them a trigger for a corrective mechanism (within the 
preventive arm) which could lead to sanctions. The corrective arm was changed by putting the debt 
requirement on an equal footing to the deficit one, in light of the damaging impact of sovereign 
sustainability concerns during the crisis. The sanctions for the euro area Member States were 
strengthened and frontloaded (and also extended to the preventive arm in case of significant deviation, 
as mentioned above). Complementing the SGP Regulations, the Six Pack also contained a Directive on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks in the Member States, imposing certain institutional 
requirements on domestic budgetary arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions, to better ensure 
that national budgetary positions are in line with the EU fiscal framework.  
The amendments to the key regulations have increased both the economic credibility and the flexibility 
within the rules of the Pact. At the same time, these have led to make the rules more complex and 
introduced some necessary room for judgement, so as to adapt to ever-changing and complex 
economic reality, while avoiding an ex ante over-specification. This inevitable need for discretion 
within the rules calls, as a necessary counterpart, for further transparency. In this respect, the 
"Commonly agreed position on flexibility", endorsed by the ECOFIN Council (February 2016), 
building on the interpretative Communication on flexibility within the SGP (January 2015), has 
provided guidance for implementing the flexibility of the revised framework. 
In March 2012, twenty-five EU countries(
7
) signed the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), which contains the fiscal 
                                                          
(7) All except the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. Croatia, which was not member of the European Union at the time, is 
also not a signatory of the TSCG. 
European Commission 





). Building on the directive for national budgetary frameworks, it includes provisions to 
ensure that the national processes are able to fulfil European obligations and that national policy is in 
line with the requirements of the SGP. Its main features are also set out in Table 0.1. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 0.1: Changes to the preventive arm of the SGP from the Six Pack 2011 reforms (in *bold) and the specifics 
of the  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG – in italics) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
 











in structural terms: 
- Provide a safety margin 
with respect to the 3% 
deficit limit 
- Ensure rapid progress 
towards sustainability 
- Allow room for 
budgetary manoeuvre 
For euro area and ERMII 
MS: limits of -1% of 
GDP 
(TSCG: limit is -0.5%, 
unless debt <<60% and 




expenditure net of 
discretionary measures 
should grow ≤ medium-
term potential GDP 
0.5% of GDP as a 
benchmark: 
- More in good times 
- Less in bad times 
Possible temporary 
deviations from the MTO 
or the adjustment path 
towards it: 
- Implementation of 
major structural reforms 
which have a verifiable 
impact on the long-term 
sustainability of public 
finances – emphasis on 
pension reform 
- *Unusual event 
outside the control of 
the MS concerned 
which has a major 
impact on its financial 
position 
- *Periods of severe 
economic downturn for 
the euro area or the 
Union as a whole 
provided this does not 
endanger fiscal 




deviation (0.5% in one 
year or cumulatively 
over two years from the 
MTO or the adjustment 
path towards it) 
(TSCG: Automatic 
correction mechanism in 




*For euro area: 
financial sanctions in 
case of repeated non-
compliance (interest-







                                                          





Table 0.2: Changes to the corrective arm of the SGP from the Six Pack 2011 reforms (in *bold) and the specifics 
of 2013  Regulation on the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF – in italics) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 







- Deficit of 3% of 
GDP 





= respect of debt 
reduction benchmark 
*Debt reduction 
benchmark = reduction 
of 5% per year on 
average over 3 years of 
the gap to 60% taking 
the cycle into account 
or respect in the next 
two years. 
*Transition period for 
MS in EDP in Nov 2011 
for three years after the 
correction of the 
deficit.  
Minimum annual 
improvement of at least 
0.5% of GDP as a 
benchmark in structural 
terms 
Possible extension of the 
deadline:  
- If effective action has 
been taken and 
unexpected adverse 
economic events with 
major unfavourable 
consequences on its 
financial position  
 
- *Periods of severe 
economic downturn in 
the euro area or in the 
Union as a whole 
provided this does not 
endanger fiscal 
sustainability in the 
medium-term 
 
*For the euro area: 
early and gradual 
sanction system to be 
activated at each stage 
of the EDP procedure 
ESIF: Suspension of 
commitments or 
payments under the 
European Structural and 
Investment Funds (UK 
excluded) 
 
Two further regulations on enhanced surveillance and monitoring in the euro area – known as the Two 
Pack – were adopted and entered into force on 30 May 2013. Regulation 473/2013 of the Two-Pack 
includes common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and for ensuring a 
timely and effective correction of excessive deficits for the Member States of the euro area. Regulation 
472/2013 streamlines the requirements placed on financially fragile countries and embeds these 
provisions in the Union framework for policy co-ordination and surveillance, suspending the reporting 
requirements under the SGP for countries under a macroeconomic adjustment programme. The Two 
Pack regulations do not change the budgetary policy requirements for euro area Member States. A 








Table 0.3: The main features of the Two Pack 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Regulation on enhanced monitoring 
(473/2013) 
Regulation on enhanced surveillance 
(472/2013) 
Applies to All euro area Member States, with 
special provisions for those in EDP 
Euro area Member States experiencing 
severe difficulties with regard to their 
financial stability (defined by a 
Commission decision), receiving 
financial assistance on a precautionary 
basis or subject to a full macroeconomic 
programme 
Main provisions 
Member State provide draft 
budgetary plans to the Commission 
by 15 October. 
Commission issues an opinion on the 
plan to inform the national debate. 
Commission can request a revised 
draft if particularly serious breach of 
SGP.  
National independent bodies monitor 
national fiscal rules, including a rule 
to implement the MTO at national 
level. They provide assessments 
linked to an automatic correction 
mechanism. 
Closer monitoring for countries 
under EDP: countries submit 
Economic Partnership Programmes 
with details of their programme to 
correct their EDP, regular reporting 
on budgetary execution and 
associated measures. Commission 
can request any information it 
requires. 
Enhanced surveillance means countries 
must adopt measures to address their 
weaknesses, in cooperation with the 
Commission (and ECB). 
The Commission implements a closer 
fiscal monitoring and may request stress 
tests, detailed data on the financial 
institutions and an assessment of the 
supervisory capacities. 
Council can recommend (on a 
Commission recommendation) that a 
country adopt a precautionary 
programme or prepare a draft 
programme. 
Streamlining of reporting requirements 
for countries under programme. 
Special provisions for the post-
programme period, when countries 
remain under enhanced surveillance 
until 75% of funds repaid. 
 
Finally, in 2013 Regulation 1303/2013 on the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) 
extended the possibility of sanctions following a decision on a lack of effective action under the 
corrective arm of the SGP to all Member States except the United Kingdom. The spirit was to reinforce 
the economic conditionality for granting the benefits of these funds to Member States, by checking if 
they comply with their fiscal obligations at EU level, in order to ensure that the effectiveness of ESIF 
is not undermined by unsound macroeconomic and fiscal policies. The provisions of this regulation 
apply under the 2014-2020 programming period and increase both the automaticity and the scope of 













This Part focuses on the preventive arm of the Pact and contains four Sections. Section 1.1 provides the 
necessary background and is followed by Section 1.2 that elaborates on the role and assessment of the 
medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs). Section 1.3 sets out how the assessment of the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes and, more in general, of compliance with the preventive arm should be 
undertaken and Section 1.4 describes the conditions and procedures linked to the observation of 
significant deviation (from the requirements of the preventive arm) and the introduction of sanctions for 
euro area Member States. 
1.1. LEGAL BASIS, RATIONALE AND MONITORING 
The objective of the preventive arm of the SGP is to promote sound public finances and to ensure the 
sustainability of public finances of the Member States. Compliance with the preventive arm should lead 
to sound budgetary positions so as to avoid the occurrence of excessive budget deficits (and debts). The 
preventive arm is based primarily on Article 121 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) on multilateral surveillance and its operation is set out in Regulation (EC) 1466/97 and its 
subsequent amendments. 
At the core of the preventive arm is the country-specific medium-term objective (MTO) which 
corresponds to the structural budgetary position that Member States should achieve, and maintain, over 
the cycle, in order to ensure sustainable public finances and provide a safety margin to safeguard respect 
of the Treaty reference values for the deficit and the debt at times of negative output gaps. The SGP sets 
out certain rules that Member States have to respect when drawing up their multi-annual budgetary plans, 
in order to progressively reach their MTO. These rules were strengthened with the 2011 reform of the 
SGP – commonly referred to as the Six Pack – by the introduction of an expenditure benchmark, which 
sets an upper limit for the net growth of government expenditure(
9
) thereby providing more operational 
guidance, and by the possibility of financial sanctions for euro area Member States in the case of a 
repeated failure to comply with the recommendations under the preventive arm, namely when the steps 
set out in article 121(4) TFEU and articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Regulation 1466/97 (hereafter Significant 
Deviation Procedure) have been launched.  
In order to enable the Commission and the Council to assess budgetary plans and outcomes against these 
rules, regular reporting obligations apply to all Member States as part of a multilateral surveillance 
framework. Member States provide information on their plans for the coming years to attain their MTO 
(in the form of Stability or Convergence Programmes (SCPs) – see Section 1.3). The surveillance starts 
with the European Semester, which broadly corresponds to the first six months of every calendar year. In 
this time-period, compliance with the preventive arm is assessed on the basis of Member States' medium-
term plans, in time to allow them to take on board the conclusions of the European Semester, in the form 
of Country-Specific Recommendations, when preparing the budgets for the next year during the second 
half of the year. 
The assessments of the SCPs cover both the preventive and the corrective arms of the Pact depending on 
the circumstances of each Member State. Nevertheless, according to Regulation (EC) 1466/97, the SCPs 
                                                          
(9) The growth of government expenditure which is not financed by corresponding changes to revenue measures. 
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play a specific role under the preventive arm, as they serve as the means for assessing ex ante compliance 
with the preventive arm. 
Since the entry into force of the Two Pack in 2013, the surveillance cycle is completed in autumn with an 
assessment of euro area Member States' Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs) for the next year (see Section 
3.1).(
10
) The Commission adopts an Opinion on each DBP which focuses on the (ex ante) assessment of 
compliance with the respective obligations under the SGP. In this way, guidance is provided to the 
Member States throughout the whole budgetary cycle. At the same time, the Commission also presents an 
overall assessment of the budgetary situation and prospects in the euro area as a whole, based on the plans 
submitted.(
11
) Graph 1.1 gives an overview of the annual cycle of surveillance. 
 
Graph 1.1: The annual cycle of surveillance 
 
Note: All euro area Member States are bound by a common budgetary timeline introduced by the Two Pack, and should adopt 
their budgets for the forthcoming year before 31December, unless for reasons beyond the control of the government. 
                                                          
(10) Euro area Member States under a macroeconomic adjustment programme are subject to a regular monitoring in the terms of 








1.1.1. Legal basis of the preventive arm 
Article 121 TFEU (see Box 1.1) is the primary legal basis of the preventive arm of the SGP. This Article 
states that Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and that 
they shall coordinate them. It establishes a multilateral surveillance procedure based on the broad 
economic policy guidelines – discussed at European Council level and adopted by the Council – which 
set out the overall context against which Member States' policies will be assessed. The Council monitors 
the developments in the Member States, based on reports prepared by the Commission. Economic 
policies that are assessed as inconsistent with the broad guidelines or which risk jeopardising the proper 
functioning of Economic and Monetary Union can lead to steps set out under art. 121(4) TFEU – 
hereafter Significant Deviation Procedure. Detailed rules governing this multilateral procedure may be 
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, using ordinary legislative procedure. The secondary 
legislation, which implements the preventive arm of the Pact, has been adopted on this basis – as per 
Article 121(6) of TFEU. 
BOX 1.1:  ARTICLE 121 OF TFEU  
1. Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall 
coordinate them within the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article 120.  
2. The Council shall, on a recommendation from the Commission, formulate a draft for the broad 
guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, and shall report its findings 
to the European Council.  
The European Council shall, acting on the basis of the report from the Council, discuss a conclusion on 
the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union.  
On the basis of this conclusion, the Council shall adopt a recommendation setting out these broad 
guidelines. The Council shall inform the European Parliament of its recommendation.  
3. In order to ensure closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the 
economic performances of the Member States, the Council shall, on the basis of reports submitted by 
the Commission, monitor economic developments in each of the Member States and in the Union as 
well as the consistency of economic policies with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2, and 
regularly carry out an overall assessment. 
For the purpose of this multilateral surveillance, Member States shall forward information to the 
Commission about important measures taken by them in the field of their economic policy and such 
other information as they deem necessary.  
4. Where it is established, under the procedure referred to in paragraph 3, that the economic policies of 
a Member State are not consistent with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2 or that they risk 
jeopardising the proper functioning of Economic and Monetary Union, the Commission may address a 
warning to the Member State concerned. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, 
may address the necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned. The Council may, on a 
proposal from the Commission, decide to make its recommendations public.  
Within the scope of this paragraph, the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the 
member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.  
A qualified majority of the other members of the Council shall be defined in accordance with Article 
European Commission 




5. The President of the Council and the Commission shall report to the European Parliament on the 
results of multilateral surveillance. The President of the Council may be invited to appear before the 
competent committee of the European Parliament if the Council has made its recommendations public.  
6. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of Regulations in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure 
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4.  
 
The actual implementation of the preventive arm of the Pact is governed by secondary legislation in the 
form of Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, as amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 and Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament 





Regulation (EC) 1466/97 states that “The exact nature of the information [to be provided by Member 
States under the preventive arm of the Pact] shall be set out in a harmonised framework established by the 
Commission in cooperation with the Member States”. This harmonised framework is part of the Code of 
Conduct on the SGP,(
14
) whose Section 2 presents the specifications of how the information requirements 
under the SGP Regulations should be fulfilled by the Member States.  
In addition, Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area added a system of graduated 
enforcement mechanisms to the Pact for euro area Member States. This Regulation governs procedures 
under both the preventive and the corrective arms of the Pact, including the introduction of sanctions in 
the preventive arm on the basis of Article 136 (see Box 1.2) for euro area countries only.  
BOX 1.2: ARTICLE 136 OF TFEU  
1. In order to ensure the proper functioning of Economic and Monetary Union, and in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Treaties, the Council shall, in accordance with the relevant procedure 
from among those referred to in Articles 121 and 126, with the exception of the procedure set out in 
Article 126(14), adopt measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro:  
(a) to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline;  
(b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them, while ensuring that they are compatible with those 
adopted for the whole of the Union and are kept under surveillance.  
                                                          
(12) Annex 1 contains links to all relevant legislation. The consolidated text is available under:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1997R1466:20111213:EN:PDF.  
(13) The Amsterdam European Council Resolution on the SGP of 17 June 1997 and the Report of the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council on “Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”, endorsed by the European Council in its 
conclusions of 22 March 2005, also form part of the preventive arm of the Pact, but do not contain additional operational 
requirements. 






2. For those measures set out in paragraph 1, only members of the Council representing Member States 
whose currency is the euro shall take part in the vote.  
A qualified majority of the said members shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a). 
3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required 
financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.(
15
) 
Moreover, as part of the November 2011 legislative package that amended the Stability and Growth Pact, 
the Council adopted Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary 
frameworks of the Member States, which had to be effectively incorporated into national budgetary 
processes following a two-year transposition period.(
16




The objective of ensuring that national decision-making processes are set up with a view to achieving 
budgetary positions in line with EU requirements is also at the heart of the intergovernmental Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), signed by all EU 
countries, except the Czech Republic and the UK,(
18
) in March 2012 and which entered into force on 1 
January 2013. Euro area signatory countries have committed themselves to integrate the core principles of 
the preventive arm of the SGP straight into their national legal framework, through provisions of binding 
force and permanent character, preferably constitutional or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and 
adhered to throughout the national budgetary process. The provisions specifically related to budgetary 
surveillance are also known as the “Fiscal Compact”.(
19
) These provisions include a national correction 
mechanism supervised by an independent monitoring body to ensure compliance with the budgetary 
targets. These ones, while being defined nationally, should be consistent with the targets set in the 
preventive arm of the Pact. Box 1.3 provides an overview of the key features of the TSCG, while Section 
3.2.1 discusses provisions of the TSCG which affect the national decision-making processes in more 
detail. 
BOX 1.3: KEY FEATURES OF THE TSCG  
The TSCG commits the signatories to greater budgetary and economic coordination, and signals their 
commitment to abiding by the rules of the SGP. The provisions on the budgetary side are contained in 
the fiscal compact, which covers articles 3 to 8 of the TSCG. The fiscal compact (see Annex 8) aims to 
complement European budgetary surveillance through the following provisions: 
• Contracting Parties commit to translating the MTO concept into their national law, through 
provisions of binding force and permanent character. If their debt level is significantly below 60% of 
                                                          
(15) Paragraph 3 was added to Article 136 from 1 May 2013, following a Treaty amendment under Article 48(6) TFEU. 
(16) By virtue of Protocol 15 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland annexed to 
the TFEU, chapter IV of the Directive, which concerns numerical fiscal rules, does not apply to the United Kingdom. 
(17) The 2012 Interim Progress Report on the implementation of this directive is available here: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0761:FIN:EN:PDF, the accompanying Staff Working Document here: 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2012:0433:FIN:EN:PDF  
(18) Croatia is also not a signatory of the TSCG, as it was not a Member of the European Union in March 2012. 
(19) Non-euro area signatories may also declare themselves bound by the provisions of the fiscal compact. This is the case for 
Denmark, Bulgaria and Romania. On the other hand, Hungary, Poland and Sweden ratified the TSCG but did not opt in to the Fiscal 
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GDP and there are low risks to sustainability, their MTO should not be below a structural balance of -
1% of GDP, otherwise a tighter constraint of -0.5% of GDP applies. A temporary deviation from the 
medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it will only be possible in exceptional 
circumstances, as defined in the SGP. In case of significant observed deviations from the MTO or the 
adjustment path towards it – the SGP concept – correction mechanisms will be triggered automatically 
at the national level.  
• In addition, independent bodies will be in charge of monitoring compliance with the balanced-budget 
rule – defined as a country attaining its MTO – at the national level. 
• The contracting parties commit themselves to supporting Commission recommendations at all stages 
of deficit EDPs, unless a qualified majority of Member States is opposed. This mimics the so-called 
reversed qualified majority voting that applies to the imposition of sanctions under the sanctions 
regulation for the EDP.  
• Finally, Contracting Parties subject to an EDP will have to present an economic partnership 
programme detailing the structural reforms that are deemed necessary to support an effective and 
durable correction of the excessive deficit. 
• The Contracting Parties will report ex ante on their debt issuance plans to the Council of the EU and 
to the European Commission, to enhance the coordination of national debt issuance. 
• Contracting parties that do not adequately enshrine these provisions in their national law may face 
financial sanctions of up to 0.1% of the Member State's GDP, imposed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. 
In 2013, two Regulations based on Article 136 (see Box 1.2) applying only to the euro area entered into 
force. Although these Regulations – commonly referred to as the Two Pack –do not add to the SGP policy 
requirements, they bring about changes to the surveillance cycle. For this reason, a large part of their 
requirements has been incorporated seamlessly into the operation of the SGP.  
Regulation (EU) 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability(
20
) streamlines the 
requirements placed on financially fragile countries and embeds these provisions in the EU framework for 
policy co-ordination and surveillance. In particular, for countries under a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme, it suspends the reporting requirements under the SGP and integrates the budgetary targets of 
the programme into the applicable recommendations and decisions under the SGP. Regulation (EU) 
473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit for the 
Member States of the euro area(
21
) complements the surveillance cycle for all euro area countries and 
increases the reporting and monitoring requirements for countries under EDP. Building on Directive 
2011/85/EU, this Regulation also gives independent fiscal institutions a key role in preparing and 
monitoring macroeconomic forecasts and budgetary decisions and in supervising the operation of national 
fiscal rules. 
Regulation 473/2013 states that “The specification of the content of the draft budgetary plans shall be set 
out in a harmonised framework established by the Commission in cooperation with the Member States”. 






This harmonised framework is the Code of Conduct on the Two Pack entitled “Specifications on the 
implementation of the Two Pack and guidelines on the format and content of draft budgetary plans, 
economic partnership programmes and debt issuance reports”.(
22
) 
1.1.2. Rationale behind the preventive arm  
The fundamental idea behind Article 121 TFEU is that in an increasingly integrated EU, and particularly 
in the euro area, the interdependence between Member States means that their interests are best served 
through the co-ordination of their economic policies. Therefore, this Article constitutes the legal basis of 




The preventive arm of the SGP endeavours to ensure that fiscal policy is conducted so as to lead to 
healthy public finances over the short and longer terms. It requires that Member States attain a country-
specific MTO for their budgetary position, which is set in structural terms. For Member States that are not 
at their MTO, an appropriate adjustment path towards it should be defined and adhered to. By setting a 
budgetary target in structural terms – i.e. cyclically adjusted and net of one-off and other temporary 
measures (see Box 1.4) – the preventive arm of the Pact aims to ensure that the underlying fiscal position 
of Member States is conducive to medium-term sustainability, while allowing for the free operation of the 
automatic stabilisers. The country-specific MTOs are set taking into account their respective debt levels, 
the country-specific sustainability challenge posed by the costs of ageing population and the specific 
dynamics of the automatic stabilisers. Section 1.2 presents a detailed guide to the MTO. 
Since the Six-Pack reform of the SGP, compliance with the requirements of the preventive arm is 
assessed using a two-pillar approach. The assessment of the structural balance, which constitutes one 
pillar, is complemented by an analysis of the growth rate of an expenditure aggregate net of discretionary 
revenue measures (i.e. an assessment of compliance of the expenditure benchmark), which constitutes the 
other pillar. Compliance with the preventive arm is assessed through an overall assessment which takes 
both these elements into account. 
The expenditure aggregate is comprised of overall government expenditure net of interest payments, 
spending on EU programmes paid for by EU funds and cyclical elements of unemployment benefits, 
while investment spending is smoothed over four years. The underlying rationale is to focus on 
government spending (i) that is independent of cyclical conditions (by netting out the cyclical elements of 
unemployment spending), (ii) within the government's control (by netting out interest expenditures) and 
(iii) has to be paid for out of tax revenues (by netting out spending on programmes directly funded by the 
European Union) (iv) without penalising peaks in investment (by averaging investment over a number of 
years).  
Member States at their MTO must ensure that government expenditure grows at most in line with a 
medium-term rate of potential GDP growth – which is the rate which ensures adherence to the MTO over 
time – unless any excess growth is matched by discretionary revenue measures yielding additional 
revenues (see Section 1.3.2.6). Member States on the adjustment path to the MTO must ensure that their 
expenditure grows at a rate below this medium-term rate of potential GDP growth – the difference in 
growth rate is known as the convergence margin – unless the excess growth is matched by additional 
                                                          
(22) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/2014-11-07_two_pack_coc_amended_en.pdf  
(23) Regulation (EU) 1176/2011: 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011R1176&from=EN  
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funds from discretionary revenue measures. This does not limit or in any way determine the size of 
government spending. All that is required is that any expenditure growth is funded by equivalent 
discretionary revenue measures. 
Over the economic cycle, Member States at their MTO whose net government expenditure grows in line 
with potential GDP will remain at their MTO. Member States on the adjustment path will keep their net 
expenditure growing at rate below potential GDP, set according to a methodology agreed with the 
Member States and defined in the Code of Conduct on the SGP so that the difference – the convergence 
margin – brings a correction that is equivalent to that required by the appropriate adjustment path to the 
MTO. Graph 1.2 summarises the average dynamics over the cycle in terms of compliance with the MTO. 
Graph 1.2: The expenditure benchmark as an instrument to reach or stay at the MTO 
 
 
1.1.3. Bringing the economic policy advice together – the European Semester  
Since 2011, the preventive arm of the SGP is part of the European Semester for economic governance. 
The European Semester was introduced in 2010 and was revised and streamlined in 2015. It aims to 
ensure that the surveillance of budgetary and economic policies takes place in parallel so as to allow for 
consistent policy guidance at European level according to a timetable so that this guidance informs the 
national setting of policy in opportune time.  
The European Semester is launched each year by the presentation of the Annual Growth Survey 
(AGS)(
24
) by the Commission at the end of the previous year. In this document, the Commission presents 
its assessment of the economic situation in the European Union and sets out its priorities for the coming 
year in terms of the economic and budgetary policies and reforms to boost growth and employment. Since 
the European Semester 2016, the Commission produces the recommendations for the Euro area at the 
same time as the AGS. This common timing reflects common challenges of the Euro area ahead of 
country specific discussions. In addition, an Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) is published under the 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure (MIP). The AMR identifies which countries deserve closer 
attention. The start of the European Semester is therefore marked by the discussion of the AGS and the 
Euro area recommendations in the Council which then reports on its conclusions to the European Council. 
The March European Council subsequently issues general, policy guidance for Member States. At the end 
of February, the Commission releases Country Reports, for all Member States. These reports, in the form 
of Staff working documents, analyse Member States' economic and social developments. They identify 
                                                          
(24) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/annual-growth-surveys/index_en.htm  
Member State at MTO Member State not at MTO 
Net expenditure growth in line with the reference 
potential growth rate 
Net expenditure growth in line with a rate below 
the reference potential growth rate 
% government expenditure in potential GDP 
constant in the absence of revenue measures 
% government expenditure in potential GDP 
decreases in the absence of revenue measures 
Structural balance constant over time Structural balance strengthens 






key macroeconomic and structural challenges and assess progress in advancing reforms. They also 
analyse more specifically the existence and the extent of possible macroeconomic imbalances for those 
Member States which have been selected as requiring an in-depth review based on the reading of the 
Alert mechanism Report, which is published in the context of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. 
Following the publication of the Country Reports and the adoption of the European Council conclusions, 
Member States submit their Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) in April – see Section 1.1.4. 
These outline the public finance plans of Member States and are submitted alongside the National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs) which outline economic plans and report on progress made over the past year. Based 
on the Country Reports and upon examining the NRPs and SCPs, the Commission proposes Country 
Specific Recommendations in the relevant policy areas. The Commission proposal includes its opinion 
for relevant Member States (all except Member States subject to a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme) on their Stability or Convergence Programme. At the same time, the scope of 
recommendations is larger than fiscal policy and shall provide guidance to Member States on how to 
increase growth and jobs, including by removing bottlenecks preventing growth and job creation, and to 
promote sustainable public finances.  
Based on the Commission's proposals, the ECOFIN Council then adopts, for each Member State, the 
Country-Specific Recommendations. The Council opinions on the Stability or Convergence Programmes 
are usually reflected in the recitals and the recommendation n°1 of the Country-Specific 
Recommendations. The recommendations for each Member State are discussed and are endorsed by the 
European Council in June. In line with Article 2-ab of Regulation 1466/97 the Council is “expected to, as 
a rule, follow the recommendations and proposals of the Commission or explain its position publicly”. 
This is known as the “comply or explain” principle and is not just confined to the European Semester. It 
creates a strong presumption in favour of the Council's opinion following the Commission's line, unless 
any divergence from it can be backed up by strong public explanations. 
1.1.4. Monitoring under the preventive arm - the role of the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes 
In accordance with Regulation (EC) 1466/97, Member States are required to submit annually Stability or 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs) to the Council and the Commission in April. Countries in the euro area 
submit Stability Programmes while countries outside the euro area submit Convergence Programmes.(
25
) 
While the assessments of the SCPs cover both the preventive and the corrective arms of the Pact 
depending on the circumstances of each Member State, according to Regulation (EC) 1466/97, the SCPs 
play a specific role under the preventive arm, as they serve as the means for assessing ex ante compliance 
with the preventive arm. 
The function of the SCPs is to allow the Commission and the Council to assess compliance with the MTO 
and the adjustment path towards it, including compliance with the expenditure benchmark. In order for 
this to be possible, a range of economic and budgetary data must be included in the SCPs, as set out in the 
tables annexed to the Code of Conduct on the SGP, which have been jointly agreed by the Member States 
and the Commission in Council committees. These tables are replicated in Annex 3.(26) The forecasts 
contained in the SCPs must be prepared in a sound and realistic manner, consistent with the requirements 
of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on the requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, 
                                                          
(25) This requirement applies to all countries, except euro area countries under a macroeconomic adjustment programme as per 
Regulation (EU) 472/2013. 
(26) The annex includes also the additional table to be filled to request the structural reform clause (section 1.3.2.3). 
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and should therefore be based on the most likely macro-fiscal scenario or a more prudent one. With the 
Two Pack, euro area Member States have to base their Stability Programmes on macroeconomic forecasts 
produced or endorsed by an independent body. Section 3.2.2 discusses this in more detail. For all 
countries, as part of the SCPs, both the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts must be compared with 
the most recent available Commission forecasts and, if appropriate, those of other independent bodies. 
Member States' programmes must be consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines adopted at 
European Council level and with the National Reform Programmes, which focus on structural and 
employment policies. Section 3.1.2 discusses the interaction between the monitoring of budgetary policies 
with that of other aspects of economic policy.  
The main economic and fiscal data presented in the SCPs should cover the year that just ended (year t-1), 
the current year (year t) as well as at least the following 3 years (year t+1 to t+3). Compliance with the 
MTO or the adjustment path towards it is the cornerstone of the budgetary analysis and this is assessed on 
an ex post basis for the past year, an in-year basis for the year that is underway and on an ex ante basis for 
the following three years. If the Council considers that the objectives and the content of the programme 
should be strengthened with particular reference to the adjustment path towards the MTO, it shall invite 
the Member State concerned to adjust its programme on the basis of a Commission recommendation 
(article 5(2) and 9(2) of Regulation 1466/97).  
The ex ante (and in-year) examination of the programmes presented by the Member State is 
complemented by a risk assessment as embodied in the Commission forecasts, on which basis the fiscal 
Country-Specific Recommendations are built. On the other hand, the ex post assessment of the 
implementation of the plans is based on outturn data (as available in spring of year t+1) and centres on 
whether there have been significant divergences from the MTO, or the required adjustment path towards 
it, in the preceding year or in the last two years. If a significant deviation from the adjustment path 
towards the MTO (including the assessment of compliance with the expenditure benchmark)  is observed, 
the Commission will address a warning to the Member State concerned, thereby launching the procedural 
steps under Article 121(4) of the Treaty ( Significant Deviation Procedure -(see Section 1.4).  
1.2. THE MEDIUM-TERM OBJECTIVE (MTO): CONCEPT AND ROLE 
The country-specific MTOs are at the centre of the preventive arm of the SGP. The legal basis is Article 
2a of Regulation (EC) 1466/97 which sets out how MTOs are to be defined, while the other Articles 
elaborate on the role of MTOs. 
1.2.1. Defining the Medium-Term Objective  
The MTOs are defined in structural terms, meaning that they represent the cyclically-adjusted general 
government budget position, net of one-off and other temporary measures (see Box 1.4 on the calculation 
of the structural balance).  
According to Regulation (EC) 1466/97 the MTOs should be set so as to: 
(i) provide a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit limit. For each Member State, this safety 
margin is estimated in the form of a minimum benchmark (see Annex 2) which takes past output volatility 




(ii) ensure sustainability or rapid progress towards sustainability. This is assessed against the need to 
ensure the convergence of debt ratios towards prudent levels with due consideration to the economic and 
budgetary impact of ageing populations. 
(iii) in compliance with (i) and (ii), allow room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into 
account the needs for public investment. 
The Regulation further specifies that euro area and ERM2 Member States must have an MTO that 
corresponds to at least -1% of GDP. Signatories to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), inter alia all euro area Member States, have further 
committed themselves to MTOs of at least -0.5% of GDP,(27)  unless their debt ratio is significantly 
below 60% of GDP and the risks in terms of the long-term sustainability of their public finances are low. 
In those cases, the lower limit for the balance remains at -1% of GDP.  
The MTOs are updated every three years, taking into account the latest economic and budgetary costs of 
ageing as published in the triennial Ageing Report (see Section 1.2.1.2 for more details on the revision of 
the MTOs). 
BOX 1.4: CALCULATING THE STRUCTURAL BALANCE 
The structural balance is defined as the cyclically-adjusted general government balance (CAB) net of 
one-off and other temporary measures.  
In algebraic terms CAB = (BAL/Y) – ε*OG where BAL stands for general government balance, Y for 
GDP and the cyclical component, ε*OG, for the product of the semi-elasticity of the budget balance to the 
cycle, ε, and the output gap, OG. The output gap, which measures the cyclical position of an economy, is 
defined as the difference between actual and potential output. The latter is estimated by the Commission 
using a production function method, endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on 12 July 2002, which allows 
identifying the different components of potential output.(
28
) All methodological improvements are agreed 
by the Member States and discussed in a dedicated forum, the Output Gap Working Group (OGWG) 
within the EU's Economic Policy Committee.  
The semi-elasticity of the budget balance to the cycle (ε) measures the effect of output movements on the 
general government balance, when assuming the economy is running at its potential (i.e. in the absence of 
the business cycle). This cyclical effect captures the impact of the output gap both on the numerator of the 
ratio (the budget balance per se) but also on the denominator of the ratio (GDP). This parameter is 
estimated on the basis of a methodology developed by the OECD and agreed by the OGWG.  
The budgetary semi-elasticity is equal to the difference of the semi-elasticity of revenue and the semi-
elasticity of expenditure. On the revenue side, the elasticities of individual revenue items are estimated by 
the OECD (personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect taxes, social security contributions, 
non-tax revenue). They correspond to the percentage change in a particular type of revenue associated 
with a percentage change in output. They are then aggregated using the share of each in total revenue as 
weights, so as to derive the elasticity of the level of total revenues (in monetary terms) with respect to 
output. Subtracting one from the value of the revenue elasticity gives the value of the elasticity of the 
                                                          
(27) This applies also to those non-euro area signatories that have declared themselves bound by the provisions of the Fiscal 
Compact ( Denmark, Bulgaria and Romania).   
(28) For more details, see K. Havik, K. McMorrow, F. Orlandi, C. Planas, R. Raciborski, W. Röger, A. Rossi, A. Thum-Thysen and 
V. Vandermeulen, “The production function methodology for calculating potential growth rates and output gaps”, European 
Economy, Economic Papers No. 535, November 2014 
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revenue-to-GDP ratio with respect to the output gap. Multiplying the latter with the size of total revenue 
as a share of GDP yields the value of the semi-elasticity of revenue. On the expenditure side, the OECD 
elasticity of unemployment-related expenditures is used and weighted with the share of unemployment-
related expenditure in total expenditure (based on Eurostat data). Subtracting one from this value and then 
multiplying it by the size of total public spending as a share of GDP gives the semi-elasticity of 
expenditure.  
The value of the semi-elasticities of the relevant taxes and expenditures have been recently updated by the 
Commission, using the individual elasticities updated by the OECD(
29
) in the context of the Output Gap 
Working Group. The individual elasticities underlying the semi-elasticities will be revised every 9 years. 
The weights (tax and spending structure, revenue/expenditure-to-GDP ratio) are computed by the 
Commission services as an average over the period 2002-2011(
30
) and are to be updated every 6 years to 
reflect changes in the government receipts and spending. The semi-elasticities and weights currently in 
use are shown in Annex 11. 
The average budgetary semi-elasticity used for the EU is 0.5(
31
) and ranges from 0.31 to 0.65 across 
Member States, suggesting significant differences in the cyclicality of the budget balance. The semi-
elasticity for revenue is close to zero, since revenue is almost as cyclical as GDP, except for non-tax 
revenue. Therefore, the revenue-to-GDP ratio moves only slowly with the business cycle, especially in 
Member States where non-tax revenue is relatively low. In contrast, the semi-elasticity for expenditure 
ranges from -0.38 to -0.62, which accounts for the larger part of the disparity in the budgetary semi-
elasticity across Member States. Its value broadly corresponds to the share of total expenditures in GDP. 
This mirrors the fact that the elasticity of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio to the output gap is close to minus 
one. Indeed, the cyclical effect of the denominator (GDP) largely dominates the low cyclicality of 
expenditure in level, given the small share of unemployment-related expenditure in total expenditure.  
Once the cyclically adjusted balance has been estimated, one-off and other temporary measures (here 
referred to collectively as 'one-off measures') are removed in order to obtain an estimate of the structural 
balance, i.e. the underlying budgetary position. 
The ability to correctly identify one-off measures is crucial for carrying out fiscal surveillance. The 
Commission has developed a set of guiding principles for classifying transactions as one-offs in order 
make the criteria used in fiscal surveillance more transparent.  These guiding principles have been 
summarised below and are extensively explained in Chapter II.3 of the 2015 Report on Public Finances in 
EMU, (
32
) which also provides examples of frequently occurring one-offs and discusses a number of 
measures that have ‘borderline’ characteristics, but which ultimately have not been considered to be one-
off measures. 
Principle I: One-off measures are intrinsically non-recurrent. One-off measures are transactions that 
have, by their very nature, only a temporary, non-recurrent impact on general government revenue or 
expenditure. For this to be the case, a one-off measure must have an inherent characteristic that makes its 
impact temporary, i.e. a characteristic that means that it cannot have a sustained impact on the budgetary 
position. 
                                                          
(29) For more details, see G. Mourre, C. Astarita and S. Princen, “Adjusting the budget balance for the business cycle: the EU 
methodology”, European Economy. Economic Papers, November 2014, and Price, R. W, Dang T. and Guillemette Y. (2014), “New 
tax and expenditure elasticity estimates for EU budget surveillance”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1174. 
(30) For more details, see G. Mourre, G-M. Isbasoiu, D. Paternoster and M. Salto, “The cyclically-adjusted budget balance used in 
the EU fiscal framework: a revised computation”, European Economy. Economic Papers, March 2013. 
(31) This is a non-weighted average between all 28 EU Member States. 




Principle II: The one-off nature of a measure cannot be decreed by law or by an autonomous 
government decision. In order to ensure timely and effective policy surveillance, it should be possible to 
evaluate the one-off nature of a measure unambiguously upon its announcement. For that reason, the one 
off nature of a measure should not depend on whether the policymaker announces the measure as 
temporary or permanent. 
Principle III: Volatile components of revenue or expenditure should not be considered one-off. It is 
clear that the cyclical part of revenue or expenditure should not be considered as a one-off, as its impact is 
already corrected for via the cyclical adjustment of the general government balance (as explained above). 
But even after this cyclical adjustment, revenue or expenditure components may still exhibit a significant 
degree of volatility. The concept of one-offs is not, however, primarily intended to smooth time series and 
should therefore not be used to correct for this kind of volatility.  
Principle IV: Deliberate policy actions that increase the deficit do not, as a rule, qualify as one-offs. 
The provisions on one-offs are primarily meant to avoid policy measures that do not lead to a sustained 
improvement of the budget balance being treated as structural. In order to give policymakers the right 
incentive to fully recognise the permanent budgetary impact of their actions, there is therefore a strong 
presumption that deliberate policy actions that increase the deficit are of a structural nature. 
Principle V: Only measures having a significant impact on the general government balance should 
be considered one-offs. As a rule, measures worth less than 0.1 % (rounded) of GDP should not be 
considered one-offs. 
 
1.2.1.1 Calculating the appropriate Medium-Term Objective 
The MTOs presented by the Member States in their SCPs need to comply with the requirements set out in 
Section 1.2.1. Compliance with these requirements is assessed by the Commission according to the 
methodology described in the Code of Conduct on the SGP. Using this methodology, the Commission 
estimates the country-specific lower bounds for the MTOs every 3 years. The Member States then present 
their MTOs in the forthcoming SCPs by adopting either an MTO in line with these lower bounds or a 
more ambitious one, if in their view circumstances are deemed to warrant it.  
The methodology used to compute country specific lower bounds ensures that the requirements of the 
Pact are complied with in the following way: 
(a) The safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit limit: For each Member State, the 
minimum value of the MTO that ensures this safety margin is assessed by taking into account past output 
volatility and the budgetary sensitivity to output fluctuations (i.e. the budgetary semi-elasticities as 
discussed in Box 1.4). The resulting value gives the minimum benchmark (MTOMB). A country with a 
greater past output volatility and a larger budgetary sensitivity will need a more demanding MTO in order 
to ensure that the 3% limit is not breached during a normal economic cycle. By allowing sufficient 
margin with respect to the 3% limit, the operation of the automatic stabilisers is ensured. 
The calculation of the minimum benchmark is based on the representative output gap (ROG), multiplied 
by the budgetary semi-elasticity ε: MTOMB = – 3 – ε*ROG. Annex 2 considers their calculation in more 
detail and gives the values of the minimum benchmark currently in use, as well as updated values to be 
used over 2017-2019.  
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(b) Sustainability or rapid progress towards sustainability: For each Member State a minimum value 
for the MTO that ensures sustainability or rapid progress to sustainability taking into account implicit 
liabilities and debt (MTOILD) is computed. This is the minimum value that ensures the convergence of 
debt ratios towards prudent levels with due consideration to the economic and budgetary impact of ageing 
populations, and is the sum of 3 components.  







ILD EffortAgeingCostBalanceMTO  
 
Component (i) represents the budgetary balance that would stabilise the debt ratio at 60% of GDP. It 
corresponds to the product of 60% with the forecast average nominal growth until 2060 as calculated by 
the Ageing Working Group (AWG).(
33
)  
Component (ii) represents the budgetary adjustment that would cover a fraction of the present value of the 
projected increase in age-related expenditure, where α=33% and the ageing cost corresponds to the 
discounted value of the increase in the cost of ageing, calculated up to an infinite horizon.  
Component (iii) represents a supplementary debt-reduction effort, specific to countries with general 
government gross debt above 60% of GDP. It follows a continuous linear function:  
Effortdebt-reduction= 0.024*debt - 1.24 
which ensures a supplementary effort of 0.2% of GDP when debt reaches 60%, while requiring a 
supplementary effort of 1.4% of GDP when the debt ratio attains 110% of GDP. 
The resulting value of the MTO (up to one decimal) is then rounded to the most favourable ¼ of a 
percentage point.  
(c) Compliance with the -1% lower bound for euro area and ERM2 Member States: Euro area and 
ERM2 Member States have the additional bound captured by the MTOEuro/ERM2 component, where 
MTOEuro/ERM2 = –1% of GDP.  
The three bounds on the MTO are then combined to yield country specific greatest lower bound for the 
MTO, which corresponds to the lowest MTO that fulfils all the criteria defined above.
 




MTOmin = max (MTOILD, MTOMB, MTOEuro/ERM2) 
                                                          
(33)The calculation is based on the real GDP forecast and an average inflation rate of 2%. Data sources are the latest available T+10 
forecast and the AWG  estimates beyond T+10. The Ageing Working Group in cooperation with the European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) revises their projections of GDP growth every three years. For the most recent projections see 2015 Ageing Report 
(Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2015/pdf/ee3_en.pdf  
(34) At the time of the 2012 update of the MTO, the Commission proposed that if the MTO yielded by these formulae corresponds to 
an unrealistically tight primary balance, a Member State can ask to benefit from an exception clause. Indeed, as there is no precedent 
of a country maintaining a primary surplus significantly above 5.5% of GDP for a sustained period of time, countries would not be 
required to comply with a minimum value for their MTO implying a primary surplus significantly over this limit in the period to 
which the specific MTO applies. Instead, an exception can be made, which allows the concerned Member State to present a MTO 
corresponding to a primary surplus of 5.5% of GDP, as long as the -1% of GDP lower bound for euro area and ERM2 countries is 




When Member States present their MTOs in their SCPs, they can adopt either an MTO equal to the 
minimum MTO yielded by the formula above or a more ambitious one if they feel circumstances call for 
it.  
1.2.1.2 Revising the Medium-Term Objective 
In order to ensure a consistent application of the principles mentioned above for defining the country-
specific minimum MTOs, regular methodological discussions take place in the Economic and Financial 
Committee.  
Regulation (EC) 1466/97 requires that the MTOs are revised every 3 years or more frequently if a 
structural reform with a major impact on the sustainability of the public finances is implemented. The 
regular revision of the MTOs follows the publication of the Ageing Report which occurs every 3 years 
and provides up-to-date data on the ageing challenge facing the Member States.  
In addition to the 3-yearly revisions of the minimum MTOs, countries undertaking structural reforms with 
a major impact on the sustainability of the public finances can also have their minimum MTOs revised on 
a case-by-case basis, in agreement with the Commission. In particular, the introduction of major pension 




1.2.2. The Medium-Term Objective as an anchor 
The MTO is the central concept of the preventive arm that serves to ensure sustainable public finances 
and compliance with the 3% of GDP deficit criterion in all but the most unusual adverse circumstances. 
According to the preventive arm of the SGP, countries must attain the MTO or be on an appropriate 
adjustment path towards it.  
Compliance with the MTO, or with the required adjustment toward it, is evaluated on the basis of an 
overall assessment with the structural balance as the reference, and including an analysis of the 
expenditure aggregate net of discretionary revenue measures. Therefore: 
(i) the structural balance is compared with the MTO to see whether the MTO has been attained, and if this 
is not the case the change in the structural balance is considered to see whether the country is on an 
appropriate adjustment path (Sections 1.3.2.1 and 1.3.2.2);  
(ii) in parallel, compliance with the MTO requirement is assessed by looking at whether the evolution of 
net expenditure is in line with the expenditure benchmark (Section 1.3.2.6). 
This assessment is conducted both on an ex ante and an ex post basis. The latter is of particular 
importance as it can lead to  a Significant Deviation Procedure (i.e. the procedural steps set out under art. 
121(4) TFEU and articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Regulation 1466/97), which itself can result in sanctions for 
euro area Member States. Section 1.3 discusses how both assessments of compliance are undertaken. 
                                                          
(35) In case of major pension reforms, updated long-term budgetary projections need to be peer reviewed and endorsed by the 
Economic Policy Committee (Ageing Working Group) before updating the Ageing Report figures for MTO calculations. 
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1.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE STABILITY AND CONVERGENCE PROGRAMMES (SCPS) 
The role of the SCPs is to elaborate on and communicate the Member States’ medium-term budgetary 
plans, which are then examined by the Commission and Council following their submission. All Member 
States, except euro area Member States under a macroeconomic adjustment programme, are required to 
submit an SCP. The Commission publishes an assessment of each plan, which is transmitted to the 
Council along with a recommendation for the Council Opinion. The Council then adopts an Opinion on 
the programmes, which is usually reflected in the recitals and the recommendation n°1 of the Country-
Specific Recommendations.  
The Commission assesses the content of the programmes in terms of compliance of the Member State’s 
policies with the broad economic policy guidelines endorsed by the European Council and with the 
requirement to attain or to be on the adjustment path towards the MTO, together with an assessment of 
compliance with the information requirements. Coherence with the economic policy guidelines and 
compliance with the information requirements are based on a qualitative assessment discussed in Section 
1.3.1.  
The assessment of compliance with the preventive arm is based on a numerical analysis of the data 
presented in the SCP and comprises the following: 
• an ex post assessment of budgetary execution for the outcomes of year t–1 and the average of the 
outcomes of years t–1, t–2, on the basis of outturn data validated by Eurostat;  
• an in-year assessment of the plans for year t, on the basis of in-year estimates, complemented by a risk 
assessment based on the Commission forecasts; 
• an ex ante evaluation of the budgetary plans for t+1, complemented by a risk assessment based on the 
Commission forecasts, and 
• a qualitative assessment covering years t+2 and t+3, which go beyond the horizon of available 
Commission forecasts at the time of the submission of the SCPs. 
When on the basis of outturn data, the ex post assessment concludes for a significant deviation from the 
adjustment path to the MTO, a Significant Deviation Procedure (i.e. the procedural steps set out under art. 
121(4) TFEU and articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Regulation 1466/97) would be launched (see Section 1.4). 
The in-year and ex ante assessments aim to inform the policy debate and provide guidance to countries, 
but cannot lead to a Significant Deviation Procedure, which is triggered by an observed significant 
deviation.(36) Section 1.3.2 describes how the assessment under the preventive arm is undertaken. 
Compliance with the MTO requirement is evaluated both ex ante, in year and ex post on the basis of an 
overall assessment with the structural balance as the reference, and including an analysis of the 
expenditure aggregate net of discretionary revenue measures. If, following an overall assessment, the ex 
post analysis concludes that a significant deviation from the adjustment path to the MTO (or the MTO 
itself)37 has occurred, the Commission will address a warning under Article 121(4) of the Treaty to the 
Member State concerned, launching a Significant Deviation Procedure. The warning will be followed by 
a Council recommendation, based on a Commission recommendation, for necessary policy measures to 
                                                          
(36) Art. 6.2 and Art. 10.2 of  Regulation 1466/97. 
(37) For countries at their MTO, a significant deviation is assessed with respect to a requirement of 0% of GDP (see annex 14), 
which is usually reflected in the recommendation n°1 of the CSR as "ensure that the medium‐term budgetary objective continues to 




address the deviation. If the Member State then fails to take appropriate action within the given deadline a 
decision on no effective action and the imposition of sanctions for euro area countries, in the form of an 
interest-bearing deposit, are possible. Section 1.4 provides more details. 
1.3.1. The reporting requirements 
The content of the SCPs should comply with the requirements of Regulation (EC) 1466/97 and the Code 
of Conduct on the SGP, which sets out guidelines on their content and format. Member States are 
expected to follow these guidelines and to justify any departure from them. The standardisation of the 
format and content of the programmes should ensure equality of treatment. Overall, the SCPs should 
include data to enable a quantitative assessment of the Member State's fiscal outturns and plans, which 
conform to the requirements set out in the legislation, and should show that government policy is in line 




Economic and budgetary forecasts and plans 
In order to enable the Council and the Commission to assess compliance with the MTO requirement, 
including an assessment of the expenditure benchmark, the SCPs must present a fully-fledged multi-
annual macroeconomic scenario, projections for the main fiscal variables as well as their relevant 
components, and a description and quantification of the envisaged budgetary strategy. The MTO being 
the overarching goal of the preventive arm to ensure a prudent and sustainable budgetary policy over the 
medium-term, Member States should report in their SCPs the MTO that they are aiming at as well as the 
planned adjustment path towards it. In addition, Member States have also to provide the following 
information: budgetary targets for the general government balance in relation to the MTO, and the 
projected path for the general government debt ratio; an update of the fiscal plans for the year of 
submission of the programme, based on the April notification of fiscal data,(
39
) including a description 
and quantification of the policies and measures, with information on expenditure and revenue ratios and 
on their main components (including one-off and other temporary measures); the planned growth path of 
government expenditure, and of government revenue at unchanged policies (explaining the underlying 
assumptions, methodologies and relevant parameters), along with a quantification of the planned 
discretionary revenue measures. The budget balances should be broken down by subsector of general 
government and structural reforms should be specifically analysed when they are flagged as contributing 
to the achievement of the objectives of the programme.  
The status of the programme and of the measures, with respect to national budgetary procedures and 
parliamentary processes, should be made explicit. After a new government has taken office, Member 
States are expected to show continuity with respect to the budgetary targets endorsed by the Council on 
the basis of the previous programmes. Stability and Convergence Programmes should show how 
developments have compared with the budgetary targets in the previous programme or update, including 
the Draft Budgetary Plan submitted each autumn by euro area Member States.  
 
                                                          
(38) The same reporting requirements hold also for countries in the corrective arm. However, annex 3 includes also the additional 
table to request the structural reform clause, which is applicable only to Member States in the preventive arm interested in availing 
from the clause. 
(39) The requirement to report public finance data to the Commission in the context of the EDP stems from Council Regulation (EC) 
479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing 
the European Community. 
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The figures presented must be based on realistic and cautious macroeconomic forecasts, with the main 
assumptions underlying them being presented in the programme. More precisely, Regulation (EC) 
1466/97 requires that these projections are based on the most likely macro-fiscal scenario or on a more 
prudent scenario.  
Since the entry into force of the Two Pack in May 2013 (Regulation 473/2013, Article 4.1), euro area 
Member States are obliged to publish their national medium-term fiscal plans at the same time as their 
Stability Programmes, i.e. no later than 30 April each year. These plans should be based on 
macroeconomic forecasts that have been produced or endorsed by an independent body and must include 
at least all the information contained in the Stability Programmes. In fact, national medium-term fiscal 
plans and stability programmes may be the same document. Should a Member States choose this option, 
it should clearly state in the Stability Programme that the latter is to be regarded as the national medium-
term fiscal plan. It should also specify whether the macroeconomic forecasts underpinning the 
programme have been produced or endorsed by an independent body. As specified in the Code of 
Conduct on the Two-Pack,(40) it is understood that, while the endorsement would enable the use of the 
respective forecasts, a negative decision would typically trigger a review of the forecast in the light of the 
comments issued by the independent body and a revised forecast may be submitted for assessment to the 
independent body.(
41
) Regarding the annual Draft Budgetary Plans – to be submitted by 15 October  -, 
Member States will also indicate whether the underlying macroeconomic forecast has been produced or 
endorsed by an independent body. Section 3.1.1.2 provides more details. 
As part of the SCP, the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts should be compared to the most recent 
available Commission forecasts and, if appropriate, those of other independent bodies. Significant 
differences between the chosen macro-fiscal scenario and the Commission forecast should be explained in 
detail, especially if the level or growth of external assumptions departs significantly from the Commission 
forecasts. In order to enhance cross-country comparability and to ensure high quality, the concepts used 
should be in line with the standards established at European level, in particular in the context of the 
European System of Accounts (ESA).(
42
) Moreover, the forecasts presented should be prepared in a 
manner that is consistent with the requirements of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the Member States, which relate primarily to the credibility of the forecasts and 
the transparency with which they are prepared and presented. 
Consistency of policy measures 
In addition to these data, the SCPs should provide information on the consistency of the budgetary 
objectives and the measures to achieve them, with the broad economic policy guidelines and the National 
Reform Programmes.(
43
) A description of the measures taken or envisaged to improve the quality of the 
public finances as well as information on existing or envisaged national budgetary rules (expenditure 
rules, etc.), and any other institutional features relative to the public finances should also be included in 
                                                          
(40)http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/2014-11-07_two_pack_coc_amended_en.pdf  
(41) Irrespective of the choice of having the forecasts produced or endorsed by an independent body, Member States should have 
specific mechanisms in place to cope with situations in which there are different views between the Ministry of Finance and the 
independent body in terms of the main variables of the forecasts. These could, for example, take the form of arrangements to reach 
an agreement. 
(42) The revised European System of Accounts (ESA 2010), applied since September 2014, is set up by Regulation (EU) 549/2013 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the European system of national and regional accounts in the 
European Union.  
(43) Euro area Member States under EDP which have submitted an Economic Partnership Programme (EPP), should provide in their 
Stability Programmes information on the implementation of their EPP or any additional information requested in the Council 




the SCPs. Given the inevitability of forecasting errors, the SCPs should include a comprehensive 
sensitivity analysis and/or develop alternative scenarios in order to enable the Commission and the 
Council to consider the complete range of possible fiscal outcomes. 
The Code of Conduct on SGP indicates that each Member State should appropriately define a scenario at 
unchanged policies and make the underlying assumptions, methodologies and relevant parameters public, 
so that it is clear from the plans in the SCPs what part of the Member States' plans are based on concrete 
enacted measures and what part requires additional policy choices. For future years, whose budget has not 
yet been adopted, the scenario at unchanged policies will imply the extrapolation of revenue and 
expenditure trends and the inclusion of measures that are known in sufficient detail. While there is no 
further guidance on what should be included in the SCPs scenario at unchanged policies, the no policy 
change assumption underpinning the Commission forecasts (Box 1.5) provides a useful benchmark for 
what is, and what is not, compatible with such a scenario.  
1.3.2. The assessments of the SCPs  
The analysis of budgetary policy in the SCPs aims to deliver, for each Member State, an overall 
assessment of compliance with the requirements of the preventive arm, in terms of being at or on the 
adjustment path towards the MTO, on an ex post, in-year and ex ante basis. In fact, the ex ante and in year 
assessment of compliance with the requirements of the preventive arm is undertaken both on the basis of 
the plans submitted every spring in the SCPs, which feeds the Country-Specific Recommendations 
concluding the European Semester, and again every autumn for euro area Member States on the basis of 
the Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs) in the associated Commission Opinion. The methodology and the 
rationale used for the assessment of compliance is the same for both the SCPs and the DBPs.   
The assessment of compliance contains three key elements: 
 Is the MTO set at an appropriate level? This is discussed in Section 1.3.2.1 
 Is the Member State at the MTO or on the adjustment path towards the MTO, by considering the 
position of the structural balance? This is discussed in Sections 1.3.2.2 to 1.3.2.5. 
 Are expenditure plans in line with the expenditure benchmark? This is discussed in Section 1.3.2.6. 
Section 1.3.2.7 describes how these three elements should be put together, to arrive at an overall 
assessment of compliance with the preventive arm of the SGP. At the outset, it is important to realise that 
the assessment is done in two stages: (i) taking the SCP(44) targets at face value (after recalculating the 
structural balance based on the commonly agreed methodology(
45
) and (ii) taking into account the risks 
attached to the SCP scenario, as embodied in, for instance, the most recent Commission forecasts. It is the 
latter that is then used to set each Member State's requirements in terms of structural adjustment under the 
preventive arm.   
 
                                                          
(44) The same applies to DBP targets set by euro area Member States in autumn. 
(45)This is implemented by the Commission services through the CONV simplified routine to recalculate the potential GDP/output 
gap submitted by the Member States in their plans. For more details, see “The production function methodology for calculating 
potential growth rates and output gaps”, European Economy, Economic Papers No. 535, November 2014.  
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BOX 1.5: THE COMMISSION FORECASTS, THE "NO POLICY CHANGE” ASSUMPTION USED THEREIN, AND THE ROLE 
IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANS  
European Economic Forecasts are produced independently by Commission staff. At present, they are 
produced three times per year (winter, spring and autumn), with spring and autumn forecasts being 
produced after Eurostat validation of public finances data. The European Economic Forecasts concentrate 
on the Member States, the EU and the euro area, but also include the outlook for candidate countries as 
well as some major non-EU countries. They cover a medium-term forecast horizon of up to 2 years, with 
an additional year being added in each autumn round.  
The forecasts are framed by a common set of 'external assumptions' for commodity prices, exchange rates 
and interest rates. Furthermore, European Economic Forecasts are produced under the assumption of "no 
policy change". In the autumn forecasts, the fiscal measures contained in euro area Member States' draft 
budgetary plans are fully reflected. 
A forecast under the no-policy change assumption extrapolates past revenue and expenditure trends and 
relationships in a way that is consistent with past policy orientations, and includes all fiscal policy 
measures. A fiscal policy measure is an intervention by the government to change past policy orientations 
that is specified in sufficient detail, as well as adopted or at least credibly announced, and has a direct 
incremental budgetary impact. 
The no policy-change assumption involves some judgement as it allows the incorporation of some 
measures that have not yet been legislated for. For example, measures which formally require a legal step 
(such as the adoption of a law in parliament) but which have been taken in the past quasi automatically 
(such as e.g. indexation of government salaries in certain countries) can be included in the no policy 
change scenario, even though they have not yet been formally approved, provided that it is reasonable to 
assume that the past practice will be continued. In addition, measures which have been announced, but 
not yet included in (draft) legislation, can still be incorporated, provided that these measures have been 
specified in sufficient detail and to which the government is credibly committed.  
Commission forecasts are widely used as a basis for economic surveillance, and they are crucial to fiscal 
surveillance. In particular, when examining ex ante and in-year the SCPs (and for euro area Member 
States the DBPs, too), the assessment is done in two stages, i.e. first taking the programmes and plans at 
face value and then taking into account the risks attached to the programmes and plans, on the basis of the 
most recent Commission forecasts. Importantly, the SGP requirements are always set on the basis of the 
Commission forecasts.  
The no-policy change assumption plays an important role at the various stages of fiscal surveillance, and 
especially so for the corrective arm of the SGP (Part II of this Vade mecum).  
 
1.3.2.1 Is the MTO set at an appropriate level?  
Member States’ MTOs should be at least as demanding as the minimum MTOs (as set out in Section 
1.2.1). The assessment determines whether the MTO is in line with the minimum MTOs emerging from 
the formula (Section 1.2.1.1). In accordance with Article 121(3) of the Treaty and Articles 5(2) and 9(2) 
of Regulation (EC) 1466/97, if the Council considers that the MTO presented in a Stability or 
Convergence Programme should be strengthened, it will indicate in its Country-Specific 





1.3.2.2 Is the Member State at its MTO or on an appropriate adjustment path towards it? The 
change in the structural balance 
For the in-year and ex ante assessments the achievement of the MTO is assessed by seeing whether the 
Member State is planning and forecast to have a structural balance at least as tight as its MTO. As a 
matter of convention, from an ex post perspective, the Commission considers the structural balance to be 
in line with the MTO, if it is within ¼% of GDP of its value.(
46
) If the Member State is not at its MTO(47) 
in one of the years under consideration, it must nonetheless be on an appropriate adjustment path towards 
it. The adjustment delivered or set out for future years in the SCP (and, for euro area Member State also 
in the DBP) should be defined by an annual improvement in the structural balance, respecting the rules of 
the preventive arm of the SGP.  
Regulation (EC) 1466/97 defines an appropriate annual improvement in the structural balance as follows: 
 Euro area and ERM2 Member States should plan for an annual improvement in their structural 
balance of 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark. 
 For Member States with debt in excess of 60% of GDP or with pronounced risks of overall debt 
sustainability(
48
), a faster adjustment path, i.e. above 0.5% of GDP is expected (see Box 1.6, for 
detailed modulation). All Member States should undertake a greater adjustment in good economic 
times, while the effort may be more limited in bad economic times.  
 In all cases, revenue windfalls and shortfalls should be taken into account. 
 In addition, the regulation also provides for a “waiver” from any adjustment in case of an “unusual 
event outside the control of the Member State […] which has a major impact on the financial 
position of the general government or in periods of severe economic downturn for the euro area or 
the Union as a whole”. 
Regulation (EC) 1466/97 does not, therefore, specify an appropriate annual adjustment for Member States 
outside the euro area and ERM2 with debt below 60% of GDP and at most moderate risks of debt 
sustainability. While these countries should pursue greater improvements in good and in bad times, the 
size of the adjustment is not defined in the regulation. 
The "Commonly agreed position on flexibility within the SGP" endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 12 
February 2016(49) gives  a modulation of the required annual adjustment - the so-called matrix of 
requirements (see Box 1.6) – that was originally proposed  by the Commission in  its Communication on 
Flexibility(
50
) within the SGP, to take the economic cycle as well as the debt level and sustainability 
                                                          
(46) Still, such a deviation from the MTO of less than ¼% of GDP enters in the (corrected) required adjustment in the following 
year. See annex 14. 
(47) Even if the Member State plans to be at its MTO on the basis of the face value or/and recalculated structural balance, it is 
expected to make a structural effort if the Commission forecast shows that it is not at the MTO.  
(48) In this context, risks to overall debt sustainability are measured, among other information, by the S1 indicator. This indicator 
shows the adjustment effort required over five years, in terms of a steady improvement in the structural primary balance, to bring 
debt ratios to 60% of GDP in 2030, taking also into account the costs arising from an ageing population. For more information see 
the 2015 Fiscal Sustainability Report : http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eeip/pdf/ip018_en.pdf 
(49)http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14345-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
(50) Communication from the Commission Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth 
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needs of each Member State more adequately into consideration. This interpretation is fully in line with 
the provisions under Articles 5 and 9 of Regulation (EC) 1466/97, which allow for modulation of the 
efforts and for no adjustment in case of an “unusual event outside the control of the Member State […] 
which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government”. In the latter case, the 
requirements on the adjustment path to the MTO do not apply for the relevant years and no adjustment to 
the structural balance is required (see also Section 1.3.2.5).  
Predictability of the assessment is key in a context where a significant deviation from the requirements 
will lead to procedural consequences, which eventually include financial sanctions for euro area Member 
States. In order to provide ex ante guidance and to ensure predictability of the assessment's outcome and 
certainty on what is expected from a Member State, the required adjustment for year t is frozen in the 
spring of year t-1 (see Box 1.6 for a detailed explanation). However, in order to avoid situations where the 
freezing of the requirements could lead to unwarranted consequences, namely required adjustments that 
turn out to be either too large (should outturn data signal a worsening of the economic conditions so that 
the country is considered to be either in exceptionally or very bad times) or not necessary anymore to 
progress towards the MTO, the requirements based on the most recent data would prevail. Member States 
subject to a Significant Deviation Procedure which have not yet corrected the significant deviation with 
respect to their MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, should have an adjustment path that reflects their 
Council recommendation under art. 121(4) TFEU.  
BOX 1.6: DEFINING THE APPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT PATH 
The required annual fiscal effort is modulated so that Member States can adapt their fiscal adjustments 
over the economic cycle while taking into account their fiscal consolidation needs.  
All Member States are expected to accumulate savings in good times so as to be able to have sufficient 
latitude for the operation of the so-called automatic stabilisers (e.g. higher welfare spending and lower 
tax revenues) during the downturns. In good times, revenues of the state increase due to more vigorous 
economic activity and expenditure related to unemployment falls and usually multipliers are smaller 
than in bad times. More in general, the economy is expected to be more resilient, such that a bigger 
structural effort can be undertaken with limited impact on the economy and a larger adjustment can be 
attained. Thus, the larger the positive (negative) output gap, the greater (lower) the required adjustment 
effort. The matrix of requirements below also takes into account the direction into which he economy is 
moving, i.e. whether the economic situation is improving or deteriorating, by distinguishing whether the 
real GDP exceeds or falls short of a country-specific potential growth rate.  
In addition, the required effort is also greater for Member States with unfavourable overall fiscal 
positions, i.e. whether fiscal sustainability is at risk or the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the 60% of GDP 
reference value of the Treaty. 
Concretely, the matrix envisages a higher fiscal adjustment for the Member States identified as 
experiencing good times, i.e. when their output gap is estimated to be  1.5% of potential GDP. This is 
particularly important for the Member States with fiscal sustainability risks or debt-to-GDP ratios 
exceeding the 60% Treaty reference value and therefore such Member States would be required to 
provide a structural fiscal adjustment of at least 0.75% of GDP or at least 1% of GDP, depending on 
whether their good economic situation continues to improve further or not. 
In normal times, interpreted as an output gap between -1.5% and +1.5% of potential GDP, all Member 





States with a debt-to-GDP ratio below 60% would be required to make an effort of 0.5% of GDP, 
whereas the Member States with debt levels above 60% would need to make an adjustment greater than 
0.5% of GDP. This is conventionally understood to be 0.6% of GDP at least. 
In bad times, interpreted as an output gap between -3% and -1.5% of potential GDP, the required 
adjustment would be lower. All EU Member States with the debt-to-GDP ratio below 60% would be 
required to ensure a budgetary effort of 0.25% of GDP when their economies grow above potential, and 
a fiscal adjustment of zero would be temporarily allowed when their economies grow below the 
potential. In the same cyclical conditions, these requirements become 0.5% of GDP and 0.25% of GDP 
respectively for Member States with debt levels above 60%. 
In very bad times, interpreted as an output gap between -4% and -3% of potential GDP, all Member 
States with the debt-to-GDP ratio below 60% would be temporarily allowed zero adjustment, meaning 
that no fiscal effort would be required, whereas Member States with debt-ratios exceeding 60% would 
need to provide an annual adjustment of 0.25% of GDP. In exceptionally bad times, interpreted as an 
output gap below 4% of potential GDP or when real GDP contracts, all Member States, irrespective of 
their debt levels, would be temporarily exempted from making any fiscal effort.  
The output gap thresholds set at -3% and -4% of potential GDP are supported by past data: since the 
1980s, output gaps in EU countries have been below -4% in only one year out of twenty, while they 
reached -3% in one year out of ten, hence these two values are considered indicating very bad and 
exceptionally bad times. 
 
  Required annual fiscal adjustment (pp of GDP) 
 Condition 
Debt ≤ 60% and 
low/medium sustainability 
risks 
Debt > 60% or high 




Real growth <0 or output 
gap < -4 
No adjustment needed 
Very bad 
times 
-4  output gap <-3 0 0.25 
Bad times -3  output gap <-1.5 
0 if growth below 
potential, 0.25 if growth 
above potential 
0.25 if growth below 




-1.5output gap <1.5 0.5 > 0.5 
Good 
times 
Output gap 1.5 
>0.5 if growth below 
potential, 0.75 if growth 
above potential 
0.75 if growth below 
potential, 1 if growth 
above potential 
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In order to ensure the predictability of the ex post assessment's outcome and that Member States are able 
to plan adequately and adopt the appropriate budgetary measures to ensure compliance with their 
obligations under the preventive arm of the Pact, the required adjustment path to the MTO for year t is 
frozen in the spring of year t-1. This means that for the purpose of defining the required adjustment: 
- The initial structural balance level and its distance with respect to the MTO are those forecast for 
the year t-1 in spring t-1. Thus, the extent of the adjustment required of a Member State in year t 
will be determined on the basis of the structural balance level as measured in spring of year t-1. The 
starting point also places an upper bound on the adjustment required as a Member State cannot be 
required to adjust to a structural position that lies above the MTO.  
- The real GDP growth and output gap that apply in determining the adjustment are those forecast by 
the Commission for year t in the spring of t-1.  
- The debt-to-GDP ratio and the sustainability risk indicator (S1) are those forecast by the 
Commission for year t-1 in spring t-1.  
The resulting adjustment requirement for year t should be set out in the assessment made in year t-1. 
This will then be the benchmark for assessing the appropriateness of the change in the structural balance 
for year t in the in-year assessment that occurs during year t, and in the ex post assessment that occurs in 
year t+1. In order to avoid unwarranted consequences of fluctuations in the output gap and the structural 
balance beyond the control of the governments, if the output gap turns out ex post to be larger than -3% 
of potential GDP (i.e. the Member State is found to be in very bad times or exceptionally bad times) or 
the Member State is found to have achieved the MTO, the conditions ex post prevail over the frozen 
requirements.  
 
1.3.2.3 Taking into account the implementation of structural reforms 
The Stability and Growth Pact provides the necessary flexibility within the rules to support structural 
reforms without compromising fiscal responsibility. Regulation (EC) 1466/97 allows Member States 
implementing major structural reforms to deviate temporarily from the MTO or the adjustment path 
towards it, if these reforms have positive budgetary effects in the long-term, including by raising potential 
growth. The deviation is allowed provided the Member State remains in the preventive arm, that an 
appropriate safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit reference value is preserved(51) and that 
the budgetary position is expected to return to the MTO within the programme horizon (i.e. by the year 
t+4 at the latest, with t being the year of submission of the SCP). The Commission Communication on 
Flexibility within the SGP(
52
) provided additional guidance on the best possible use of the flexibility 
embedded in the existing fiscal rules to strengthen the link between structural reforms and fiscal 
responsibility. On this basis, the Council decided on the implementation of the flexibility within the SGP, 
as reflected in the commonly agreed position endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 12 February 2016.(
53
)  
Box 1.8 describes the structural reform clause. The full text of the "Commonly agreed position on 
flexibility" is reported in Annex 17. 
The so-called “structural reform clause” allows for a temporary deviation from the MTO or the 
adjustment path towards it under well-defined conditions. More specifically, structural reforms must (i) 
                                                          
(51) The Code of Conduct of the SGP stipulates that this safety margin should take account of past output volatility and budgetary 
sensitivity to output fluctuations, which indicates that the structural balance should be equal or above the minimum benchmark, 
defined in Section 1.2.1.1. 





have a verifiable positive impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances, (ii) be major and (iii) 
be fully implemented.  
Arguably, assessing the impact of structural reforms on the long-term sustainability of public finances is 
amongst the most challenging conditions of the structural reform clause. It is neither possible nor 
probably desirable to set up a numerus clausus list of structural reforms that could qualify for the 
temporary deviation. However, some guidance can be provided to delimit the kind of eligible reforms.  
There are two possible channels through which reforms can affect public finances in the long-run. First, 
some structural reforms may generate a direct positive budgetary impact as for instance is the case of 
pension reforms, health care reforms or reforms to the public administration. Second, some structural 
reforms may have an indirect sustainability-enhancing effect, in cases where they result in higher 
potential output and, therefore, lead to higher future revenues. However, some structural reforms may 
also generate budgetary costs, particularly in the short-run. Consequently, a qualitative assessment of the 
sustainability-enhancing nature of a reform should encompass all these possible budgetary effects.  
According to the stipulations in the Code of Conduct on the SGP, the effects of the reforms over time “are 
to be assessed by the Commission and the Council in a prudent way, making due allowance of the margin 
of uncertainties associated to such an exercise.”  
In operational terms, this assessment by the Commission should build on the input provided by the 
concerned Member State regarding both the costs and savings which are direct consequence of the 
reform, and the indirect budgetary impact linked to potential output effects of the reform. In fact, Annex 1 
to the Code of Conduct on the SGP – which details the structure of the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes – establishes that the growth and budgetary implications of 'major' structural reforms should 
be detailed by Member States when submitting their economic and budgetary projections. Based on the 
information provided(
54
) by the Member State, the Commission will pass an informed judgement, which 
may include a plausibility assessment, on whether the reform meets the sustainability-enhancing 
condition to qualify for application of the clause. This plausibility analysis could draw upon the 
methodology outlined in Annex 16, while having in mind uncertainties and risks associated with 
quantitative estimations of impacts of structural reforms. 
The reforms must be major. While, there are some individual reforms with a major positive impact on 
growth and the long-term sustainability of public finances, such as pension reforms (see Box 1.7), well-
designed and comprehensive packages of reforms addressing structural weaknesses may also have a 
major positive impact. This is notably the case when the reforms are mutually reinforcing through an 
appropriate policy mix and sequencing of implementation. 
All the reforms must be fully implemented before being considered as eligible for the clause. The reforms 
must be adopted by the national authorities through provisions of binding force, whether legislative or 
not, in accordance with the applicable domestic laws and procedures. However, the effective 
implementation of adopted reform may take time and may be subject to delays and setbacks. This raises 
the question of introducing strong safeguards against the risk of implementation failures. While the SGP 
does not provide the tools for monitoring the enforcement of structural reforms, the legal framework in 
which the SGP operates – notably the European Semester process and the Excessive Imbalances 
                                                          
(54) According to the Code of Conduct of the SGP, sufficient, detailed information is to be provided in the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes. Therefore, since 2015, Member State applying for the use of the structural reform clause are requested to 
include in both the SCP and the NRP a table with detailed description (including the budgetary impact) of each structural reform 
(see annex  3).  
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) – allows the Commission and the Council to assess the challenges and imbalances 
requiring structural reforms, and for monitoring action taken by the Member States.  
In case the structural reform is not yet fully implemented, in order to assess ex ante whether the 
abovementioned eligibility criteria are met, the Member State should also submit a dedicated structural 
reform plan – subsumed, as relevant, in the National Reform Programme (NRP) or Corrective Action 
Plan (CAP).(56) The plan will include well-specified measures and set credible timelines for their 
adoption and delivery. The implementation of the reforms will be closely monitored in the context of the 
European Semester. If the Member State is under an Excessive Imbalances Procedure (EIP) and has 
submitted a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) with the necessary information, the implementation of the 
reforms will then be monitored through the EIP. In both cases, Member States will be expected to provide 
in-depth and transparent documentation quantifying the short-term costs – if any – of the reforms and 
both the medium-term budgetary and potential growth impact of the reforms, as well as providing details 
on the timetable of their implementation. Concurrently, Member States will provide an independent 
evaluation of the information provided to support their application for the reform clause, including on the 
estimated short and medium-term impact on the budgetary position or a comprehensive independent 
information to support the estimated impact. 
 
BOX 1.7: THE PENSION REFORM CLAUSE 
Sustainability-enhancing pension reforms have received specific consideration in the legislation (art. 
5(1) of regulation 1466/97) and in the Code of Conduct on the SGP.  
Pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully-funded pillar, 
constitute a specific case of structural reforms which also justify a temporary deviation from the MTO 
or the adjustment path towards it by the amount of the direct incremental impact of the reform on the 
general government balance, provided that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP 
deficit reference value is preserved.(57) This type of pension reforms has a direct deficit-increasing 
impact in the short term. The direct impact of a pension reform involves a transfer of pension 
obligations to or from the general government that is made up of two elements: i) the social 
contributions or other revenue collected by the pension scheme taking over the pension obligations and 
which is meant to cover for these obligations and ii) the pension and other social benefits paid by this 
pension scheme in connection to the obligations transferred. The direct impact of such pension reforms 
does not include interest expenditure that is linked to the higher accumulation of debt due to forgone 
social contributions or other revenues.  
A Member State wishing to avail itself of the pension reform clause must liaise with Eurostat in order 
to verify the eligibility of the reforms envisaged and include the cost of the reform incurred on the first 
year, following the introduction of the reform and any annual incremental costs for subsequent years in 
its SCP. 
The structural reform clause is granted in the context of the assessment of the SCPs, specifically in the 
relevant Country Specific Recommendation (CSR). In case a Member State applies for the clause in 
                                                          
(55) Regulation EU/1176/2011. 
(56) A plan announcing upcoming reforms as a simple manifestation of political intentions or of wishes would not fulfil the 
requirements for the application of Article 5(1) of Regulation 1466/97. 
(57) The Code of Conduct of the SGP stipulates that this safety margin should take account of past output volatility and budgetary 
sensitivity to output fluctuations, which indicates that the structural balance should be equal or above the minimum benchmark, 




autumn, the structural reform clause may be granted provided it is endorsed by the Council in the autumn 
of the same year as an updated CSR. The "Commonly agreed position on flexibility within the SGP" – see 
Annex 17 – gives further details on the way the Commission and the Council will set the requirements 
(via the CSR) in case the structural reform is planned but not yet fully implemented.  
In case a Member State fails to implement or reverses the agreed reforms, the temporary deviation from 
the MTO, or from the adjustment path towards it, will no longer be considered as warranted. If such 
failure results in an observed significant deviation (Section 1.3.2.7) from the MTO or the path towards it, 
the Commission will launch a Significant Deviation Procedure, according to the steps set out under article 
121(4) TFEU and articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Regulation 1466/97. 
 
BOX 1.8: THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE “STRUCTURAL REFORM CLAUSE” 
The structural reform clause allows Member States to temporarily deviate from the MTO or the 
appropriate adjustment path towards it. However, the deviation should not lead to a breach of the 3% of 
GDP deficit threshold and a safety margin to this threshold should be continuously preserved. As 
indicated in Box 1.6, the requirements in terms of change in the structural balance (and expenditure 
benchmark) for each year are set and kept unchanged on the basis of the spring forecast of the year 
before. Therefore, the temporary deviation linked to structural reforms submitted in the SCPs in year t 
will be allowed from year t+1 onwards.  
Regarding the amount of the allowed deviation linked to structural reforms, the Council agreement – 
based on Regulation (EC) 1466/97 – establishes a difference between pension reforms and other kind of 
structural reforms.  
 In case of an eligible pension reform (see Box 1.7), the allowed deviation from the adjustment path 
towards the MTO or from the MTO itself would amount to the direct incremental impact of the 
reform on the general government balance. There is no cap for the amount of allowed deviation in 
this case, provided that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit reference 
value is preserved.  
 In case of other structural reforms, the Council agreement establishes that the allowed deviation from 
the MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, will not exceed 0.5% of GDP, thereby establishing a cap 
to the maximum allowed deviation. 
The need to cap the deviation in respect of the structural reform clause is explained by the acknowledged 
significant uncertainty which attaches to estimating the costs and benefits of such reforms. By contrast, 
the costs of pension reforms are directly measurable and verified by Eurostat.  
Beside the capping, two other safeguards ensure the integrity of the MTO as the central target of the 
preventive arm of the SGP, namely: 
- the application of the structural reform clause is restricted to one single time per period of adjustment 
towards the MTO; 
- the maximum initial distance, which the structural balance can be from the MTO, is 1.5% of GDP in 
year t. This condition is meant to ensure that - in the benchmark case of an annual adjustment of 
0.5% of GDP - the Member State can achieve its MTO within the four year horizon of the 
SCP.Moreover, according to the commonly agreed position on flexibility within the SGP endorsed 
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by the ECOFIN Council of 12 February 2016,(58) in case the same Member State is granted also the 
investment clause (see Section 1.3.2.4), the cumulative temporary deviation allowed under the two 
clauses will not exceed 0.75% of GDP.  
The allowance is modulated according to the Member State position with respect to its MTO so as to 
ensure an equivalent impact on the debt levels. Thus, a Member State which is at the MTO is allowed to 
depart from it for three years. Whereas a Member State which is not initially at the MTO, but would reach 
it before the end of the period would adjust on a trajectory that is parallel to their original path and halt 
that adjustment if, while being entitled to the deviation, they reach the point where they are within 0.5% 
of GDP of their MTO (i.e. their MTO minus the temporary deviation). In the fourth year of the 
adjustment period covered by the structural reform clause, the deviation is no longer applied and the 
Member State is then required to adjust according to the matrix. In the benchmark case, this will return 
the Member State to their MTO.  
Algebraically, with t being the year of submission of the SCPs and assuming t+1 is the year for which the 
temporary deviation is granted, the new adjustment path towards the MTO for a Member State benefitting 
from the structural reform clause will be: 
SBt+1 = SBt + min[adj_matrixt+1 – deviation, {(MTO – deviation) – SBt }] 
SBt+2 = SBt+1 + min[adj_matrixt+2, {(MTO – deviation) – SBt+1 }]  
SBt+3 = SBt+2 + min[adj_matrixt+3, {(MTO – deviation) – SBt+2 }] 
SBt+4 = SBt+3 + min[adj_matrixt+4, {MTO – SBt+3}] 
Where: 
- SBt+1 denotes the structural balance in % of GDP in year t+1 
- adj_matrixt+1 denotes the appropriate adjustment towards the MTO in year t+1 resulting from the 
matrix in Box 1.6  
- deviation denotes the temporary allowed deviation 
- {(MTO – deviation) – SBt} denotes the distance between the MTO minus the temporary allowed 
deviation and the structural balance prevailing the previous year. 
Expressing the above in terms of the adjustment required in year t+1, gives: 
        reform_adjt+1 = min{adj_matrixt+1 – deviation, [(MTO – deviation) – SBt)]} 
 
1.3.2.4 Taking into account investment 
Under the preventive arm of the SGP, some investments aiming at, ancillary to, and economically 
equivalent to major structural reforms, may under certain conditions justify a temporary deviation from 
the MTO or from the adjustment path towards it. The Commission provided its first guidance in 2013 on 





the application of these provisions following Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) 1466/97, i.e. as a specific 
application of the "structural reform clause". This guidance, commonly referred to as the “investment 
clause” was further specified through the Commission Communication on Flexibility within the SGP.(
59
) 
On this basis, the Council decided on the implementation of the flexibility within the SGP, as reflected in 
the commonly agreed position endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 12 February 2016.(
60
) The 
investment clause is described in Box 1.9. The full text of the "Commonly agreed position on flexibility" 
is reported in Annex 17. 
A temporary deviation from the MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, may be granted for the financing 
of certain specific investments with positive, direct and verifiable long-term budgetary effects on growth 
and on the sustainability of public finances under certain conditions. In particular, the Member State's 
GDP growth is forecast to be negative or to remain well below its potential (resulting in negative output 
gap greater than 1.5% of potential GDP), the Member State remains in the preventive arm and an 
appropriate safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit reference value is preserved.(61) 
The deviation allowed must be linked to the national expenditure on projects co-funded by the EU under 
the Structural and Investment Funds,(
62
) Trans-European-Network (TEN) and Connecting Europe 
Facility (CEF) and to national co-financing of investment projects also co-financed by the EFSI, with 
positive, direct and verifiable long-term budgetary effects. Moreover, co-financed expenditure should not 
substitute for nationally financed investments, so that total public investments are not decreased. 
The investment clause is activated ex ante upon request from Member States in their SCPs one year ahead 
of the application of the clause. The process for Member States to request the flexibility and for the 
Council to grant this flexibility is the same as for the “structural reform clause” (Section 1.3.2.3), When 
requesting the application of the investment clause, Member States should include in their SCPs in 
particular the following information: i) the forecast path of national co-financing expenditure (as a % of 
GDP), ii) detailed information on the positive, direct and verifiable long-term budgetary effect of the 
expenditure covered by the clause, iii) the corrected path of the structural balance resulting from the 
application of the clause, iv) an independent evaluation of the information provided to support the 
application for the investment clause, including the estimated long-term impact on the budgetary position, 
or independent information to support the estimated impact. Member State should present information by 
main category of projects co-financed by the EU (including the EFSI), the size of the expenditure 
involved, the key features and objectives of the investment project and specifying how it will contribute 
to boost potential growth and the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
The temporary deviation from the medium-term objective, or the adjustment path towards it, is granted by 
the Commission and the Council based on an overall assessment of the situation of the concerned 
Member State. Namely, the temporary deviation for investment expenditure listed above will be subject 
to a plausibility assessment by the Commission and the Council, where consideration is given to whether 
the project in question aims at, is ancillary to, and economically equivalent to the implementation of 
structural reforms. In its assessment the Commission will consider whether the eligible investment occurs 
against the background of structural actions aiming at improving the productive capacity of the economy. 
In this sense, investment is considered as aiming at, ancillary to, and economically equivalent to major 
                                                          
(59) Communication from the Commission Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, COM(2015) 12 of 13.01.2015: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-
13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf 
(60) http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14345-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
(61) The Code of Conduct on the SGP stipulates that this safety margin should take account of past output volatility and budgetary 
sensitivity to output fluctuations, which indicates that the structural balance should be equal or above the minimum benchmark 
(defined in Section 1.2.1.1).. 
(62) See Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013. 
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structural reforms. However, the granting of the temporary deviation under the investment clause will not 
be conditional on a specific assessment of structural reforms comparable to the assessment undertaken for 
the application of the structural reform clause. 
The investment clause is granted in the context of the assessment of the SCPs, specifically in the relevant 
Country Specific Recommendation. In case a Member State applies for the clause in autumn, the 
investment clause may be granted provided it is endorsed by the Council in the autumn of the same year 
as an updated Country Specific Recommendation.  Ex-ante, the potential deviation will depend on the 
commitments of the EU structural funds towards each Member State as well as on the level of planned 
co-financing. Ex post, the allowed deviation will depend on the effective payments of EU structural funds 
and on the correspondent effective co-financing. The allowance will be reviewed reflecting the actual co-
financing of the Member States. The (downward) revision of this temporary deviation shall not imply that 
a Member State implements an effort superior to the one necessary to reach its MTO. 
 
BOX 1.9: THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE “INVESTMENT CLAUSE” 
As for the “structural reform clause” (Box 1.8): 
- the application of the investment clause is restricted to one single time per period of adjustment 
towards the MTO; 
- the maximum initial distance, which the structural balance can be from the MTO, is 1.5% of GDP 
in year t. 
Moreover, according to the commonly agreed position on flexibility within the SGP endorsed by the 
ECOFIN Council of 12 February 2016,(63) 
- the full allowed deviation (i.e. the initial deviation and the following incremental deviations, if 
any) from the MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, corresponds to the total amount of the 
national part of eligible co-financed expenditure, but will not exceed 0.5% of GDP; and in case the 
same Member State is granted also the Structural Reform Clause (see Section 1.3.2.3), the 
cumulative temporary deviation allowed under the two clauses will not exceed 0.75% of GDP.  
As for the “structural reform clause”, the allowed deviation is adjusted according to the Member State 
distance to its MTO so as to equalise the impact on the debt level. A Member State at its MTO is 
allowed to depart from it for three years. For countries, not yet at the MTO but likely to reach it before 
the end of the period, an adjustment parallel to the original trajectory is required until they find 
themselves at the distance of the temporary deviation allowed to the MTO.  
Effectively, this means that a Member State benefiting from the clause when at MTO or sufficiently 
close to MTO would be able to remain at either the distance of one temporary deviation, or of one 
initial temporary deviation complemented with following incremental temporary deviations, to the 
MTO, until t+3. From t+4 onwards, the Member State will lose the benefit of the temporary deviation 
granted in the first year. For the incremental temporary deviation, the logic is kept unchanged: if a 
Member State asks for an incremental temporary deviation in year t for year t+1, it will lose the benefit 
of the temporary deviation from year t+4 and onwards. 





Algebraically, with t being the year of submission of the SCPs and assuming t+1 is the year for which 
the temporary deviation is granted, the new adjustment path towards the MTO for a Member State 
benefitting from the investment clause will be: (
64
) 
SBt+1 = SBt + min[adj_matrixt+1 – deviation, {(MTO – deviation) – SBt }] 
SBt+2= SBt+1 + min[adj_matrixt+2 – Incr. dev. t+2, {(MTO – (deviation + Incr. dev. t+2) – SBt+1 }]  
SBt+3= SBt+2 + min[adj_matrixt+3 – Incr. dev. t+3, {(MTO – (deviation + Incr. dev. t+2 + Incr. dev. 
t+3) – SBt+2 }] 
SBt+4= SBt+3 + min[adj_matrix t+4 – Incr. dev. t+4, {MTO – (Incr. dev. t+2 + Incr. dev. t+3) – SBt+3}] 
Where: 
- SBt+1 denotes the structural balance in % of GDP in year t+1 
- adj_matrixt+1 denotes the appropriate adjustment towards the MTO in year t+1 resulting from 
the matrix in Box 1.6 
- deviation denotes the temporary allowed deviation 
- Incr.dev. t+i denotes the positive incremental change with respect to the temporary deviation 
allowed in the previous year, 
- {(MTO – deviation) - SBt+i} denotes the distance between the MTO minus the temporary 
allowed deviation and the structural balance prevailing the previous year. 
Expressing the above in terms of the adjustment required in year t+1, gives: 
reform_adjt+1 = min{adj_matrixt+1 – deviation, [(MTO – deviation) – SBt)]} 
 
1.3.2.5 Considering the impact of adverse economic events 
Since the Six-Pack reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2011, the pace of fiscal consolidation may 
be adapted for all Member States, as long as this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium-
run, in cases of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the EU as a whole. Parallel provisions 
apply to countries in the preventive arm and in the corrective arm (see Section 2.3.3.1)  
Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) 1466/97 states that: “In the case of an unusual event outside the control of 
the Member State concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general 
government or in periods of severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole, 
Member States may be allowed temporarily to depart from the adjustment path towards the medium-term 
budgetary objective referred to in the third subparagraph, provided that this does not endanger fiscal 
sustainability in the medium term.” 
The activation of this provision would not mean putting on hold indiscriminately the fiscal adjustment, 
but rather re-designing the adjustment path on country-specific basis, to take into account the exceptional 
circumstances of the severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the EU as a whole. 
                                                          
(64) It has to be noted that for countries benefitting from the clause while they are above the MTO, this formula displays a ceiling 
and not a compulsory adjustment path. 
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Beside a severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole, the article refers to an 
unusual event outside the control of the Member State. Together with article 6(3), these provisions 
envisage that temporary deviations with respect to the required fiscal adjustment towards the MTO can 
either be allowed ex-ante (art. 5.1) or can be left out of consideration ex post (art. 6.3), provided that they 
result from i) an unusual event, ii) outside the control of the Member State, iii) with a major impact on the 
financial position of the general government and iv) not endangering fiscal sustainability in the medium 
term. 
 
1.3.2.6 Is the Member State compliant with the requirements of the expenditure benchmark? 
The assessment of the appropriateness of the path towards the MTO includes an assessment of respect of 
the expenditure benchmark. The expenditure benchmark acts as a guide for Member States to ensure that 
their policies are consistent with either remaining at the MTO or being on an appropriate adjustment path 
towards it. This Section considers how the expenditure benchmark is treated. 
Applying the expenditure benchmark 
According to Regulation (EC) 1466/97, for Member States that have attained their MTOs: 
- Annual expenditure growth should not exceed a reference medium-term rate of potential GDP 
growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures. Thus, allowing the 
Member State to remain at its MTO. Countries that have exceeded their MTO do not need to 
be assessed for compliance with the expenditure benchmark.  
For Member States that have not attained their MTO: 
- Annual expenditure growth should not exceed a specific lower rate, which is set below the 
reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by 
discretionary revenue measures. The difference between the appropriate growth rate for net 
expenditure and the reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth is referred to as the 
convergence margin and is set so as to ensure the appropriate adjustment towards the MTO 
(i.e. in line with the required change in the structural balance). As a default the convergence 
margin is calculated to be consistent with a tightening of the structural balance of 0.5% of 
GDP. In cases where a higher or lower tightening of the structural balance is required, the 
convergence margin is recalibrated to reflect the tighter or looser adjustment path. 
- Any discretionary reductions of government revenue items must be matched by either 
expenditure reductions or by discretionary increases in other revenue items or both. 
In addition, whether at the MTO or not, excess expenditure growth over the medium-term reference is not 
counted as a breach of the benchmark if it is fully offset by revenue increases mandated by law. This 
provision is applicable to situations where Member States have revenue sources that are linked by law to 
certain expenditure items, so that when expenditure increases, the revenues automatically also increase to 
fund the higher expenditure. More precisely, a revenue (change) mandated by law is a change in a 
specific tax or contribution rate which is – in principle – triggered automatically (i.e. through a specific 
piece of pre-existing legislation) by a change in a well-specified and clearly linked expenditure category, 
with the intention of ensuring sufficient financing for this expenditure category. An example of this is the 
case where health/medical expenses are funded by a hypothecated tax which is automatically adjusted to 




understanding and explanation of why a particular feature of a Member State's tax and spending system 
complies with this situation.  
The expenditure benchmark applies to an expenditure aggregate that excludes interest spending, 
expenditure on EU programmes fully matched by EU funds revenue and cyclical elements of 
unemployment benefit expenditure. In addition, investment spending is averaged over a four year period 
to smooth the impact of any large investment projects.  
Computing the expenditure benchmark 
In order to compute the expenditure benchmark, the following variables are needed: 
- the medium-term rate of potential GDP growth  
- the convergence margin which is subtracted from the medium-term rate of potential GDP 
growth to obtain the reference rate for countries not at their MTO 
- the expenditure aggregate which will be used to assess compliance with the expenditure 
benchmark 
- a measure of inflation (GDP deflator) to convert the benchmark growth rate, which is given in 
real terms, into nominal terms so that it can be compared to the change in the expenditure 
aggregate. 
The medium-term rate of potential GDP growth used to define compliance with the expenditure 
benchmark is set on a country-by-country basis. It aims to link the changes in net expenditure growth 
with the growth of the economy, so that compliance with the expenditure benchmark is linked either to a 
stable deficit over the medium-term (for Member States at or above their MTOs) or to a tightening of the 
budgetary position (for Member States on the adjustment path to their MTOs). It is defined as an average 
over time and in terms of potential – rather than actual – growth to ensure that the application of the 
expenditure benchmark does not lead to pro-cyclicality.  
The medium-term rate of potential GDP growth is calculated by a 10-year average of potential GDP, 
comprising 5 years of outturn data (as provided by Eurostat), the year underway and four years of 
forward-looking data. These figures build on the Commission forecasts, which follow the commonly 
agreed methodology set out by the Output Gap Working Group for the years beyond the scope of the 
Commission forecast. As from spring 2015 the medium-term rate of potential GDP growth applied in 
year t is set on the basis of the Commission spring forecast in t-1. Annex 4 gives the medium-term rates 
used for the assessments of the 2015 and 2016 budgetary figures.(
65
)  
The convergence margin is country-specific and is subtracted from the medium-term rate of potential 
GDP growth to obtain the reference rate for countries not at their MTO. As a default this is set so that the 
lower increase in net expenditure relative to GDP is consistent with a tightening of the budget balance of 
0.5% of GDP, when GDP grows at its potential rate. It is calculated based on the assumption that any 
decrease in the share of public expenditure not financed by additional revenue measures in the economy 
(which would occur if net expenditure grows more slowly than GDP) would then translate into an exactly 
proportional improvement of the structural balance (the coefficient being equal to the share of public 
                                                          
(65) The reference rates in use for the budgetary figures of 2015 were computed on the basis of the Commission winter forecast 
2013. Following the introduction of yearly update of the reference rate (in spring 2015), a transitional arrangement was put in place, 
only for the assessment of 2016, according to which the less demanding reference rate between the old  and the updated one is used.  
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expenditure in GDP times the shortfall of expenditure growth). The size of the convergence margin 
therefore depends on the size of the general government sector, with larger public sectors requiring less 
expenditure restraint in percentage terms to yield a particular tightening of the structural budget. As with 
the medium-term rate of potential GDP growth, the convergence margin for year t is set in spring t-1, 
according to the methodology set out in Box 1.10. 
 
BOX 1.10: THE CONVERGENCE MARGIN 
The convergence margin is country-specific. It is applied to the medium-term rate of potential GDP 
growth to obtain the reference rate for countries not at their MTO. It serves to support the annual 
improvement of the structural balance towards the MTO, as required under the preventive arm of the 
SGP.  
By default, the convergence margin is calibrated to be consistent with a 0.5% of GDP improvement in the 
structural balance. Its size depends on the share of government primary expenditure in GDP (P, in % of 
GDP).The higher P, the larger the improvement of the structural balance when the growth rate of net 
public spending (numerator) is limited below GDP (denominator) growth.(66)  
Thus, the convergence margin (expressed in percentage points) is given by: 
C=50/P 
where the value of P comes from the same Commission forecast vintage on which the medium-term rate 
(10-year average) of potential GDP growth is centred. For example, the 2015 share of government 
primary expenditure in GDP (as per the spring forecast 2015) is used to calculate the convergence margin 
for 2016. 
The reference rate L is then derived from the medium-term rate R (both expressed in percentage points) 
by the deduction of the convergence margin, as follows: 
L = R – C. 
As discussed in Box 1.6, Member States' required annual fiscal adjustment is modulated so as to take into 
account the economic cycle as well as their debt levels and sustainability risks: it can be therefore lower 
or higher than 0.5% of GDP. In those cases, the convergence margin is recalibrated to reflect this greater 
or lower adjustment need. The recalibrated convergence margin (Crec) is given by: 
Crec= C * adjustment/0.5 
where the “adjustment” term corresponds to the required tightening expressed in percentage points of 
GDP. This gives the recalibrated reference rate (Lrec) = R – Crec. 
Member States' required annual fiscal adjustment is modulated so as to take into account the economic 
cycle as well as their debt levels and sustainability risks (see Box 1.6). This requirement is then used to 
                                                          
(66) For example, for a country with a primary expenditure of 40% of GDP the convergence margin is 1.25 percentage points of 
GDP. If the primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio increases to 41%, this reduces the convergence margin to 1.22 p.p., i.e. the lower rate 
will be 0.03 p.p. higher. Assuming real GDP growth of 2%, the 1 p.p. increase in primary expenditure in fact corresponds to a lower 




calculate an applicable convergence margin and a corresponding recalibrated reference rate, as explained 
in Box 1.10. For a country with an adjustment above 0.5%, the recalculated applicable convergence 
margin will be greater, leading to tighter reference rate which constrains net expenditure growth more. 
For a country with a lower adjustment requirement, the recalculated applicable convergence margin will 
be smaller, leading to a loosening of the constraint on net expenditure growth.  
In order to ensure the predictability of the ex post assessment's outcome and that Member States are able 
to take the appropriate measures in the forthcoming budget plan, the applicable convergence margin and 
the resulting reference rate is communicated in the spring of year t-1 for year t and is kept fixed – unless 
the required adjustment is reset - for all the assessments (ex ante, in-year and ex post) of the budgetary 
figures of year t (see Box 1.6 for further details on the implementation of the so-called freezing of the 
requirements).  
While potential GDP is measured in real terms, expenditure plans are typically set in nominal terms. 
Therefore, to convert the expenditure figures into real terms to allow for the comparison the GDP deflator 
is used as a measure of inflation.(
67
) When the Commission assesses Member States plans for year t 
depicted in the SCP (or the DBP) of the same year, the average GDP deflator from the Commission's 
spring forecast and that of autumn of the preceding year will be used. The ex post assessment of outturn 
data of year t undertaken in year t+1 will be based on the average GDP deflator forecast for t from the 
Commission's spring and in autumn forecasts of t-1 (see Table 1.1). 
 
 
Table 1.1: Use of deflators for the in-year and ex post assessment of the expenditure benchmark 
Budget and year 
of in year 
assessment 
Year of ex post 
assessment (during 
European Semester) 
Deflators to use 
2015 2016 
Average of 2014 spring and autumn 
Commission forecasts 
2016 2017 
Average of 2015 spring and autumn 
Commission forecasts 
2017 2018 
Average of 2016 spring and autumn 
Commission forecasts 
t t+1 





                                                          
67The GDP deflator fulfils two criteria: First, it is conceptually sound and coherent with the aim of the preventive arm. Since the 
expenditure benchmark is based on a potential rate of GDP growth, aligning growth rates of both net expenditure and revenues 
(where growth rate is proxied by GDP growth) and using a common deflator ensures a constant differential and allows the Member 
State respecting the expenditure benchmark to remain at its MTO. Second, on a practical level, the GDP deflator typically displays 
less volatility than other measures of inflation and is therefore more conducive to supporting transparent and stable policy-making. 
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Compliance with the expenditure benchmark requires that planned expenditure growth be compared with 
the appropriate benchmark growth rate (see Box 1.11). 
 
BOX 1.11: HOW THE NET EXPENDITURE GROWTH RATE FOR YEAR T IS COMPUTED? 
Step 1 – The first step in the calculation requires the computation of modified expenditure aggregates for 
years t(
68
) and t-1, referred to as Gt and Gt-1, respectively.  
Step 2 – Expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures is obtained by subtracting from Et the 
estimated impact for year t of revenue measures having an incremental effect on revenues collected in t 
with respect to t-1. To this purpose, it is necessary to estimate the incremental impact for year t (Rt) of 
discretionary revenue measures having an incremental effect on revenues collected in t, including the 
revenue increase mandated by law – both revenue increasing and decreasing measures are to be taken 
into account. Member States should provide the estimate of this impact in their SCPs: it is the sum of 
“discretionary revenue measures” (table 2c, row 3) and of “revenue increases mandated by law” (table 2c, 
row 4). 
Step 3 – Compute the net expenditure growth rate for year t: gt = (Gt – Rt – Gt-1)/ Gt-1 
Step 4 – Deflate to obtain the net expenditure growth in real terms, using the annual percentage change of 
the GDP deflator. 
Annex 9 provides a numerical example of how the net expenditure growth rate is calculated and applied.  
  
Variable 
(for t unless otherwise mentioned, in nominal 
terms) 
Source 
+ Government expenditure aggregate SCPs (table 2a, ESA code TE ) 
– Interest expenditure SCPs (table 2a, ESA code D.41) 
– Government expenditure on EU programmes which 
is fully matched by EU funds revenue 
SCPs (table 2c, row 1) 
– Gross fixed capital formation (for year t) SCPS (table 2a,  ESA code P.51g)  
+ Gross fixed capital formation averaged over t-3 to t 
SCPs (table 2a, ESA code P.51g) +  
ESTAT for past data  
– Cyclical unemployment benefit expenditure SCPs (table 2c, row 2) 
= modified expenditure aggregate Et  
Concluding the assessment on the expenditure benchmark 
                                                          




Countries that have exceeded their MTO do not need to be assessed for compliance with the expenditure 
benchmark, as long as the MTO is maintained (see Section 1.3.2.6). In all other cases, the conclusion of 
the assessment should focus on whether the growth rate of government expenditure, net of discretionary 
revenue measures, contributes to the appropriate adjustment towards the MTO or whether it is in line with 
the medium-term rate of potential GDP growth for countries at their MTO.  
Compliance with the expenditure benchamark in Member States' SCPs (or DBPs) is assessed against both 
the plans' own and the Commission forecasts, with the latter being the basis for the risk assessment of the 
plans.  The ex post assessment of compliance is based on outturn data, with the exception of deflator 
values. 
 
1.3.2.7 The assessment of compliance with the preventive arm 
Regulation (EC) 1466/97 specifies how a deviation from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it will 
be measured. More specifically, the Regulation states that: “A deviation from the medium-term objective 
or from the appropriate path towards it shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the 
structural balance as the reference, including an analysis of the expenditure net of discretionary revenue 
measures […]".  
The assessment of the SCPs(69) (and also of DBPs for euro area Member States), therefore, evaluates the 
overall compliance of the Member State with the requirements of the preventive arm and can reach a 
conclusion of compliance, (some) deviation(70) or significant deviation. For the ex ante assessment, the 
latter refers to a risk of a significant deviation based on the Member State plans and the Commission 
forecast; for the ex post assessment (which is based on observed data as available in spring of year t+1), it 
triggers the procedural steps set out under art 121(4) TFEU (hereafter Significant Deviation Procedure - 
SDP), as outlined in Section 1.4. The assessment should also include a discussion of the figures 
underlying the two indicators, i.e. structural balance and expenditure benchmark, to enable a clear 
understanding of the basis of the overall conclusion.  
As defined in Articles 6(3) and 10(3) of Regulation (EC) 1466/97, the assessment of whether the 
deviation is significant shall, in particular, include the following criteria: 
(a) for a Member State that has not reached the MTO,(71) when assessing the change in the structural 
balance, whether the deviation is at least 0.5% of GDP in a single year or at least 0.25% of GDP on 
average per year in 2 consecutive years; 
(b) when assessing expenditure developments net of discretionary revenue measures, whether the 
deviation has a total impact on the government balance of at least 0.5% of GDP in a single year or 
cumulatively in 2 consecutive years. 
The Articles further specify that “The deviation of expenditure developments shall not be considered 
significant if the Member State concerned has overachieved the medium-term budgetary objective, taking 
into account the possibility of significant revenue windfalls and the budgetary plans laid out in the 
stability/convergence programme do not jeopardise that objective over the programme period. Similarly, 
                                                          
(69) Taking the plans at face value (after recalculating the structural balance based on the commonly agreed methodology, 
implemented through the CONV simplified routine), and then taking into account the risks attached to the SCP/DBP scenario, as 
embodied in, for instance, the most recent Commission forecasts.  
(70) "Some" deviation refers to any deviation which is not significant – in the sense of article 6(3) and 10(3) of Regulation 1466/97. 
(71)In case a Member State has reached its MTO, a deviation from it of at least 0.5% of GDP  still results in a significant deviation. 
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the deviation may be left out of consideration when it results from an unusual event outside the control of 
the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial position of the general 
government or in the case of a severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole, 
provided that this does not endanger the fiscal sustainability in the medium-term.” 
In considering compliance with the preventive arm, the analysis will therefore be different depending on 
the position of the Member State with respect to its MTO. If the Member State has exceeded the MTO, 
compliance with the expenditure benchmark is only necessary in order to assess any two year deviation, 
should the Member State plan to depart from its MTO in the next year. As a convention, the Commission 
considers a country to be at its MTO if it is within ¼ percentage points of GDP from its MTO. This 
convention has been applied over time, and aims to account for the inevitable uncertainty in judging the 
precise position of the structural balance. 
The starting point for the analysis of any year t (whether assessed ex ante or ex post), is to look at the 
structural balance in that year to see whether the Member State in question achieved its MTO. Based on 
the Commission forecasts, the following outcomes are possible: 
(i) The Member State exceeded its MTO in t. 
(ii) The Member State achieved its MTO in t. 
(iii) The Member State did not achieve its MTO in t. 
A Member State that did not achieve its MTO in t will need to have been or plan to be on an appropriate 
adjustment path to the MTO in that year. This will require comparing the actual change in the structural 
balance to the appropriate adjustment path and to assess compliance with the expenditure benchmark, 
with respect to the requirements frozen in spring of the year t-1 (see Box 1.6).(
72
) The frozen 
requirements do not apply if the economic conditions have deteriorated to very bad or exceptionally bad 
times or if the Member State has achieved its MTO.  
The ex ante and in year assessment of a (risk of) significant deviation on each indicator will look at 
whether the difference between the two is forecast/planned to be equal to or more than 0.5% of GDP for 
the year under consideration, or will result in an average deviation of 0.25% of GDP over two years. The 
ex post assessments of a significant deviation on each indicator will look at whether the observed 
difference between the two equal to or more than 0.5% of GDP for the year under consideration, or 
resulted in an average deviation of 0.25% of GDP over two years. 
In addition, Member States that exceeded their MTO in t-1 can deviate from the requirements of the 
expenditure benchmark without it being considered significant, as long as the MTO is maintained.(73) 
As part of the incorporation of the MTO objective into the national legal order, those countries that are 
signatories of the TSCG and bound by the Fiscal Compact have committed themselves to implement 
automatic correction mechanisms at the national levels which will operate in the event of significant 
observed deviations. The Commission's Communication on Common principles for the national 
correction mechanisms(
74
) gives the principles underlying the design of the requested corrective 
                                                          
(72) For a Member State under a Significant Deviation Procedure which has not corrected its significant deviation, the adjustment 
path should reflect the requirements of its Council recommendation requesting the correction of the significant deviation. 
73 However, in that context, the ex post assessment of these countries should consider whether revenue windfalls are in part 
responsible for the overachievement of the MTO. 






) Moreover, the Two Pack requires that euro area Member States have in place 
independent bodies to oversee the operation of these mechanisms. Section 3.2.1 goes over these 
requirements in more detail. 
Table 1.2 presents an overview of how the assessment of the two different indicators can lead to the 
following overall conclusions:  
- If the Member State is compliant with both indicators, the overall conclusion will be one of 
compliance with the preventive arm. On an ex ante basis, this means that if the plans turn out 
as forecast, the Member State will be compliant with the preventive arm while on an ex post 
basis it indicates compliance in the previous year. 
- In all other cases, in line with Art. 6(3) of Regulation 1466/97, the conclusion will depend on 
the 'overall assessment', which should include an in-depth analysis based on the two 
indicators. Within this, the risk of or the conclusion of an ex post significant deviation 
requires at least one indicator to be in significant deviation, in line with the specification in the 
Code of Conduct on the SGP. In case the Member State is in significant deviation on both 
indicators, this gives a strong presumption of a (risk of or observed) significant deviation, but 
an overall assessment is still needed before reaching the conclusion, as there is no element of 
automaticity in the Regulation in reaching the conclusion of a significant deviation.(76) On an 
ex ante basis, this means that if the plans turn out as forecast, the Member State will be in 
significant deviation with respect to the preventive arm and would have a Significant 
Deviation Procedure (SDP, (i.e. the procedural steps set out under art. 121(4) TFEU and 
articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Regulation 1466/97) launched once the outturn figures are 
confirmed. On an ex post basis, it acts as the trigger for a SDP. 
In the overall assessment, particularly when only one indicator points to a significant deviation, the 
Commission analyses the factors which lead to the discrepancy between the two indicators. It informs the 
Council about this analysis, explaining the discrepancy between both indicators and the reasons behind 
the conclusion of the overall assessment. The conclusion of the assessment of Member States' plans 
should consider whether the resulting change in the structural balance, including the analysis of the 
expenditure net discretionary revenue measures, appears to be appropriate or whether a significant 
deviation from the adjustment path can be expected – either on a one year or on a two-year basis (see 
Annex 14). Where a conclusion of overall significant deviation is reached on an ex post basis on outturn 
data, this triggers a SDP, which starts with a Commission warning to the Member State in question and 
can lead to an interest-bearing deposit being required, for euro area Member States. Section 1.4 presents it 
in more details. 
 
                                                          
75 See Box 3.2 in Section 3.2.1 
(76) Articles 6(3) and 10(3): "A deviation from the medium-term budgetary objective or from the appropriate adjustment path 
towards it shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment […]. The assessment of whether the deviation is significant shall, 
in particular, include the following criteria […]".    
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Table 1.2: The overall assessment under the preventive arm 
∆SBal 
 
Dev. from the EB 
Adjustment delivered Deviation 






Need an overall 
assessment  
(cannot lead to a 
significant deviation 
procedure) 
Need an overall 
assessment 




Need an overall 
assessment 
( cannot lead to a 
significant deviation 
procedure) 
Need an overall 
assessment 
(cannot lead to a 
significant deviation 
procedure) 
Need an overall 
assessment 
(can lead to a 
significant deviation 
procedure) 
Breach of the 
threshold of 
significance 
Need an overall 
assessment 
(can lead to a 
significant deviation 
procedure) 
Need an overall 
assessment 
(can lead to a 
significant deviation 
procedure) 
Need an overall 
assessment, but strong 
presumption of 
significant deviation 






1.4. THE PROCEDURE IN CASE OF OBSERVED SIGNIFICANT DEVIATION, INCLUDING THE 
INTRODUCTION OF SANCTIONS FOR THE EURO AREA MEMBER STATES 
The ex post assessment of the preventive arm is of particular importance as in the event where a 
significant deviation from adjustment path to the MTO is found, the Commission will launch a SDP. It is 
based on outturn data.  Graph 1.3 sets out the various steps to be followed, while Annex 7 provides details 
on the voting modalities.  
The first step in the procedure is for the Commission to address a warning under Article 121(4) of the 
Treaty to the Member State in question. Within one month of the warning, the Council will examine the 
situation in the Member State and adopt a recommendation under Article 121(4) on necessary policy 
measures, including a new adjustment path towards the MTO. This recommendation will be based on a 
Commission recommendation and will set a deadline of no more than 5 months for the Member State to 
address the deviation. If the Commission judged that the situation was particularly serious and warranted 
urgent action, the deadline can be reduced to 3 months. On a proposal from the Commission, the Council 




Following the Council recommendation, the Member State in question must report to the Council on 
action taken, within the deadline set. If the Member State fails to take appropriate action within this 
deadline, the Commission will immediately recommend that the Council adopt, by qualified majority, a 
decision establishing that no effective action has been taken. The Commission may recommend that the 
Council adopt a revised recommendation under 121(4) on the appropriate measures to be taken. 
If the Council does not adopt the decision on no effective action and the lack of appropriate action by the 
Member State in question persists, the Commission will make a new recommendation for a Council 
decision on no effective action within one month of the previous one. This new recommendation will be 
subject to reverse simple majority voting in the Council, meaning that a majority of Member States must 
vote against its adoption in order for it not to be adopted. If there is no majority against the Commission 
recommendation, the Council decision is adopted. In all Council legal acts in the context of the significant 
deviation procedure, only euro area Member States vote on decisions concerning other euro participants, 
and the vote of the Member State concerned is not taken into account in any case. The Council submits a 
report to the European Council on all decisions taken. 
The adoption of a Council decision on no effective action is the start of the sanctions procedure for euro 
area Member States. These sanctions are covered by Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 of the Parliament and 
the Council, which is based on Article 136 of the TFEU. Within 20 days from the adoption of a Council 
decision on no effective action, the Commission shall issue a recommendation for a new Council 
decision, requiring that the Member State in question lodge an interest-bearing deposit with the 
Commission. The deposit will equal 0.2% of the previous year's GDP. The Council will vote on the 
adoption of this decision with reverse qualified majority voting. Any such vote must occur within 10 days 
of the Commission's recommendation. In addition, the Council may also vote to amend the Commission's 
recommendation and adopt the amended text as a Council decision, by qualified majority voting.  
While the default is for the deposit to equal 0.2% of GDP, the amount may be modulated. In order for this 
to occur, the Member State in question must issue a reasoned request to the Commission within 10 days 
of the Council decision on non-effective action. Following the receipt of this request, the Commission 
may recommend that the Council reduce the amount or cancel  the interest-bearing deposit. 
The interest-bearing deposit will bear a rate of interest which reflects the Commission's credit risk and the 
relevant investment period. It will be returned to the Member State with the interest accrued once the 
situation which led to a decision of non-effective action relative to the Council recommendations under 
Article 121(4) no longer exists. The Council decision to return the deposit and the accrued interest shall 
be taken on the basis of a Commission recommendation, although the Council may amend this 
Commission recommendation by qualified majority voting. In the case, however, where a country enters 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure having lodged an interest-bearing deposit, the default situation will be for 
this deposit to be turned into a non-interest-bearing deposit following the Council decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit. Section 2.2.4 considers this in detail. 
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Graph 1.3: Actions in the case of significant deviation from the adjustment path to the MTO 
 




This Part focuses on the corrective arm of the Pact and is structured on the basis of the successive steps 
under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). Section 2.1 provides the background. Section 2.2 explains 
how an EDP is launched and Section 2.3 considers the actions to be taken after a Council 
recommendation to put an end to excessive deficit is issued. Section 2.4 explains the actions to be taken 
after a non-effective action following a Council EDP recommendation or decision to give notice, 
respectively. Section 2.5 explains how an EDP is abrogated.  
2.1. LEGAL BASIS, RATIONALE AND PROCEDURAL STEPS 
Compliance with the preventive arm of the Pact should ensure that countries are kept out of the corrective 
arm – also referred to as the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) – under all except the most unusual of 
circumstances. Therefore the EDP ought not to be thought of as being part of the normal budgetary 
procedure in the Member States, but as being the end of the line where previous budgetary policy errors 
are rectified. This is in line with the notion of "gross errors" referred to in Article 126 TFEU.  
The corrective arm of the Pact implements the steps set out under Article 126 TFEU and Protocol 12 on 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Its operation is set out in Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 and its 
subsequent amendments, and details relating to its implementation are further specified in the Code of 
Conduct on the SGP.(
77
) 
A peculiarity of the EDP is that the word “deficit” is used to refer both to a situation of excessive general 
government borrowing and to government debt that is greater than 60% of GDP and is not diminishing at 
a satisfactory pace. Where it is important to distinguish between the two concepts, the distinction is made 
explicitly in this manual. This occurs, for example, when defining how to judge a breach of the numerical 
limits set in the Treaty, which are given for both the general government deficit and general government 
gross debt. At other times though, where the procedure is the same whatever the cause of the breach, the 
word deficit is used to refer to both excesses of deficit and debt.  
The corrective arm comprises the various steps that are taken when Member States' deficits or debt levels 
are judged to be excessive. In the case of the deficit, this corresponds to a value greater than 3% of GDP. 
In the case of the debt, it corresponds to a debt in excess of 60% of GDP and not sufficiently diminishing 
towards that level. In both cases, a breach of the numerical requirements does not necessarily lead to the 
Member State being placed in EDP, as other factors may be taken into account. Nevertheless, in case of 
breach of the deficit criterion, the presumption is that for countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% - 
unless the breach is small and temporary – which triggers the consideration of relevant factors see Section 
2.2.2 – the Member State is placed in EDP to correct its budgetary excess. 
The launch of an EDP brings with it Council recommendations for the Member State concerned to take 
action and correct its excessive deficit within a specific timeframe. The Commission and the Council 
regularly monitor the action taken by the Member State and conclude either that it is taking effective 
action or that the EDP is to be moved to the next stage, i.e. stepped up. Stepping up involves stricter 
requirements and possibly financial sanctions for euro area Member States, while the application of 
macroeconomic conditionality can also lead to a suspension of commitments or payments under the 
                                                          
(77) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/code_of_conduct_en.pdf.  
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European Structural and Investment Funds for all Member States.(
78
) The comprehensive sanctions 
toolbox and its functioning are described in greater detail in Section 2.4. 
 
2.1.1. Legal basis of the corrective arm  
The primary legal basis of the corrective arm of the SGP is Article 126 TFEU and Protocol 12 to the 
Treaty. Article 126 TFEU specifies that Member States shall avoid excessive deficits and defines 
budgetary discipline in terms of compliance with specific bounds for government deficit and debt levels 
(see Box 2.1).(
79
) It sets out the steps to be taken when one or both of these conditions are not complied 
with. The actual reference values against which the deficit and debt criteria are based are defined in 
Protocol 12 (see Box 2.2).  
Article 126 also includes the provision of sanctions under paragraph 126(11) for euro area Member 
States. Since the entry into force of the Six Pack, sanctions have become applicable much earlier in the 
EDP, with the first financial sanctions for euro area countries being possible from the decision launching 
the EDP. This is based on Article 136 TFEU which applies only to euro area Member States (see Box 
1.2). Article 136 specifies that, to ensure the proper functioning of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), the Council shall set out specific economic policy guidelines for the euro area and strengthen the 
coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline, in accordance with the relevant procedures 
described in Articles 121 (multilateral surveillance –preventive arm of the SGP) and 126 (the corrective 
arm of the SGP). Article 136 also serves as the legal basis for the Two Pack which introduces additional 
reporting requirements for euro area countries under EDP and arms the Commission with the possibility 
of issuing an autonomous recommendation to euro area Member States at risk of non-compliance with 
their EDP deadline. 
  
                                                          
(78) All countries, except the United Kingdom, can be subject to a suspension of commitments or payments of the European 
Structural and Investment Funds under the macroeconomic conditionality provisions. 
(79) Protocol 15 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland annexed to the TFEU 
states that the United Kingdom “shall endeavour to avoid an excessive deficit”. As a result, the avoidance of excessive deficit and 






(Continued on the next page) 
Box 2.1: Article 126 of TFEU 
1. Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. 
 
2. The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government 
debt in the Member States with a view to identifying gross errors. In particular it shall examine compliance 
with budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two criteria: 
 
(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a 
reference value, unless: 
— either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the 
reference value, 
— or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio 
remains close to the reference value; 
 
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio 
is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. 
 
The reference values are specified in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaties. 
 
3. If a Member State does not fulfil the requirements under one or both of these criteria, the Commission shall 
prepare a report. The report of the Commission shall also take into account whether the government deficit 
exceeds government investment expenditure and take into account all other relevant factors, including the 
medium-term economic and budgetary position of the Member State. 
The Commission may also prepare a report if, notwithstanding the fulfilment of the requirements under the 
criteria, it is of the opinion that there is a risk of an excessive deficit in a Member State. 
 
4. The Economic and Financial Committee shall formulate an opinion on the report of the Commission. 
 
5. If the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it shall 
address an opinion to the Member State concerned and shall inform the Council accordingly. 
 
6. The Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission, and having considered any observations which the 
Member State concerned may wish to make, decide after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit 
exists. 
 
7. Where the Council decides, in accordance with paragraph 6, that an excessive deficit exists, it shall adopt, 
without undue delay, on a recommendation from the Commission, recommendations addressed to the 
Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period. Subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 8, these recommendations shall not be made public. 
 
8. Where it establishes that there has been no effective action in response to its recommendations within the 
period laid down, the Council may make its recommendations public. 
 
9. If a Member State persists in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the Council, the Council 
may decide to give notice to the Member State to take, within a specified time limit, measures for the deficit 
reduction which is judged necessary by the Council in order to remedy the situation. 
In such a case, the Council may request the Member State concerned to submit reports in accordance with a 
specific timetable in order to examine the adjustment efforts of that Member State. 
 
10. The rights to bring actions provided for in Articles 258 and 259 may not be exercised within the 
framework of paragraphs 1 to 9 of this Article. 
 
11. As long as a Member State fails to comply with a decision taken in accordance with paragraph 9, the 
Council may decide to apply or, as the case may be, intensify one or more of the following measures: 
— to require the Member State concerned to publish additional information, to be specified by the Council, 
before issuing bonds and securities, 
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— to invite the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy towards the Member State 
concerned, 
— to require the Member State concerned to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of an appropriate size with 
the Union until the excessive deficit has, in the view of the Council, been corrected, 
— to impose fines of an appropriate size. 
The President of the Council shall inform the European Parliament of the decisions taken. 
 
12. The Council shall abrogate some or all of its decisions or recommendations referred to in paragraphs 6 to 
9 and 11 to the extent that the excessive deficit in the Member State concerned has, in the view of the 
Council, been corrected. If the Council has previously made public recommendations, it shall, as soon as the 
decision under paragraph 8 has been abrogated, make a public statement that an excessive deficit in the 
Member State concerned no longer exists. 
 
13. When taking the decisions or recommendations referred to in paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 12, the Council 
shall act on a recommendation from the Commission. 
When the Council adopts the measures referred to in paragraphs 6 to 9, 11 and 12, it shall act without taking 
into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned. 
A qualified majority of the other members of the Council shall be defined in accordance with Article 
238(3)(a). 
 
14. Further provisions relating to the implementation of the procedure described in this Article are set out in 
the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaties. 
 
The Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting 
the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, adopt the appropriate provisions which shall then 
replace the said Protocol. 
Subject to the other provisions of this paragraph, the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, lay down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the 





The actual implementation of the corrective arm of the Pact is governed by secondary legislation, based 
on Article 126(14) TFEU, in the form of Regulation (EC) 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, as amended by Regulation (EC) 
1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 and Council Regulation (EU) 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011.(
80
)  
In addition, Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area added a system of effective 
preventive and graduated enforcement mechanisms to the Pact. This Regulation complements the 
sanctions envisaged under Article 126(11) by an earlier and graduated system of sanctions on the basis of 
                                                          
(80) Annex 1 contains links to all relevant legislation. The consolidated text is available under: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1997R1467:20111213:EN:PDF. 
 
Box 2.2: Protocol 12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
 
DESIRING TO lay down the details of the excessive deficit procedure referred to in Article 126 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
 
HAVE AGREED upon the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union 
and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 
 
Article 1 
The reference values referred to in Article 126(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
are: 
— 3 % for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product at market prices; 
— 60 % for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices. 
 
Article 2 
In Article 126 of the said Treaty and in this Protocol: 
— ‘government’ means general government, that is central government, regional or local government and 
social security funds, to the exclusion of commercial operations, as defined in the European System of 
Integrated Economic Accounts; 
— ‘deficit’ means net borrowing as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts; 
— ‘investment’ means gross fixed capital formation as defined in the European System of Integrated 
Economic Accounts; 
— ‘debt’ means total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated 
between and within the sectors of general government as defined in the first indent. 
 
Article 3 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the excessive deficit procedure, the governments of the Member 
States shall be responsible under this procedure for the deficits of general government as 
defined in the first indent of Article 2. The Member States shall ensure that national procedures in the 
budgetary area enable them to meet their obligations in this area deriving from these Treaties. The Member 




The statistical data to be used for the application of this Protocol shall be provided by the Commission. 
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Article 136 for euro area countries only. This is to ensure that sanctions are more effective by being 
applicable at a time when Member States are able to react. In fact, restricting them to Article 126(11) 
means that they would only be levied on Member States that would be, by definition, in a very difficult 
financial situation. All countries – except the United Kingdom – may also be subject to the suspension of 
commitments or payments under the European Structural and Investment Funds following a Council 
decision on a lack of effective action under the EDP.(
81
) 
Together these two regulations set out the roles and procedures to be followed by the Member States, the 
Commission, the Council, the European Council and the European Parliament. As their application is 
intertwined, they are considered together in the present Vade mecum. 
The Code of Conduct on the SGP foreseen under Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the preventive arm has 
been complemented by specification on the implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure.(
82
)  
Council Regulation (EC) 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 (
83
) on the application of the Protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community defines the 
statistical and reporting obligations on Member States, in terms of the data to be provided for the 
application of the EDP. 
As described in Box 1.3, Member States which have adhered to the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) have committed themselves 
to voting through reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV – see Annex 7) on all votes concerning euro 
area Member States for deficit EDPs, and to presenting an economic partnership programme when subject 
to an EDP.(84) 
In 2013 two Regulations based on Article 136 TFEU and applying only to the euro area entered into 
force. Although these Regulations – commonly referred to as the Two Pack –do not add to the SGP policy 
requirements, they bring about changes to the surveillance procedure. For this reason, a large part of their 
requirements has been incorporated seamlessly into the operation of the SGP.  
Regulation (EU) 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability(
85
) streamlines the requirements 
placed on financially fragile countries and embeds these provisions in the EU framework for policy co-
ordination and surveillance, suspending the reporting requirements under the SGP for countries under a 
macroeconomic adjustment programme.  
                                                          
(81) Regulation (EU) 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) 1083/2006:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:347:0320:0469:EN:PDF   
(82) In addition, the Amsterdam European Council resolution on the SGP of 17 June 1997 and the Report of the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council on “Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”, endorsed by the European Council 
in its conclusions of 22 March 2005, also form part of the corrective arm of the Pact, but do not introduce additional operational 
requirements. 
(83) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:145:0001:0009:EN:PDF 
(84)The commitment to RQMV applies only to Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. The commitment to present an 





Regulation (EU) 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive 
deficit for the Member States of the euro area(
86
) complements the surveillance cycle for all euro area 
countries and increases monitoring and reporting requirements for countries under EDP. As part of these, 
the Commission can request that countries under EDP be subject to closer monitoring, with the 
submission of regular reports all the way through their EDP.(
87
) The Regulation also allows the 
Commission to issue an autonomous recommendation to Member States at risk of missing their deadline 
for correction (see Box 2.8). Moreover, with the launch of an EDP, euro area Member States must present 
an economic partnership programme (EPP), which sets out the fiscal structural reforms necessary to 
ensure an efficient and lasting correction of the excessive deficit. 
The Code of Conduct on the Two Pack sets out the specifications on the implementation of the Two Pack 
and the guidelines on the format and content of draft budgetary plans, economic partnership programmes 
and debt issuance reports.(
88
)  
2.1.2. Rationale behind the corrective arm of the SGP 
The corrective arm of the SGP is centred on the Treaty requirement that Member States should avoid 
excessive deficit and debt levels. It implements a step by step EDP which is triggered by a general 
government deficit exceeding the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value, and/or a debt level above 60% of 
GDP and insufficiently diminishing towards that level.  
Establishing a clear limit to a Member State's deficit and debt is necessary in a context of enhanced 
spillovers and interdependence between EU – especially euro area – countries, as emerged clearly in the 
recent crisis. The spillovers from unsound fiscal policy constrain monetary policy and render its role more 
difficult. High debt levels in some Member States may cause difficulties to other Member States 
especially in difficult times. Large deficits can have a destabilizing and inflationary impact especially in 
good economic times. By constraining the general government deficit to be at most 3% of GDP and 
requiring debt to sufficiently decrease towards 60% of GDP, the Treaty seeks to reduce such risks.  
The limit on debt also stems from the fact that too high debt levels can have important adverse 
consequences. High public sector debt levels are in general associated with high interest payments in 
percentage of GDP, which could crowd out investments; moreover, high levels of debt impose constraints 
on the use of countercyclical fiscal policy in recessions and the ability to absorb the indebtedness of other 
sectors at times of stress, which could act as a drag on growth. Also, growing debt levels lead to higher 
interest payments not just because there is more debt, but also because growing debt also raises the risk of 
default and so governments face higher interest rates on the amount that they borrow. This can lead to the 
so-called snowball effect, where the effect of debt on interest rate drives debt levels up and these then 
drive interest rates higher resulting in a vicious spiral towards unsustainability.  
The debt requirement was operationalized with the 2011 amendment of the SGP – commonly referred to 
as the Six Pack – through the so-called debt reduction benchmark. At that time, a number of Member 
States were already in EDP and, consequently, had their fiscal consolidation paths already defined. In 
order to ensure that these Member States have time to adapt their structural adjustments to comply with 
the new debt benchmark, a transition period of three years after the correction of their excessive deficit 
                                                          
(86) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:140:0011:0023:EN:PDF 
(87) The content and format of such reports is defined in Commission Delegated Regulation 877/2013 (see annex 13) 
(88) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/2014-11-07_two_pack_coc_amended_en.pdf 
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was introduced. During that period, these Member States have to make sufficient progress towards 
compliance with the debt benchmark rather than actually be compliant with the formula that applies 
outside the transition period (see Sections 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.1.3).  
The operation of the corrective arm of the SGP is defined by a series of steps set out in Article 126 of 
TFEU, which are presented in more detail in the next subsections.  
2.1.3. Overview of procedural steps under the corrective arm of the SGP 
Following a breach of the deficit criterion, identified on the basis of outturns, plans or forecast data, or 
following a breach of the debt criterion, identified on the basis of outturn data, the Commission prepares a 
report according to Article 126(3) of the Treaty. In the report, the Commission assesses the case for 
launching an EDP, based on a consideration of all factors pertinent to such a decision. Then, Article 
126(4) TFEU requires that the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) formulates an opinion on the 
Commission report. 
Following the Commission's report and the ensuing opinion from the Economic and Financial Committee, 
if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit exists or may occur, the Commission issues an 
opinion to the Member State concerned under Article 126(5); then, the Commission prepares a proposal 
for an Article 126(6) Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit; and finally, the 
Commission prepares a so-called Article 126(7) recommendation to be adopted by the Council, which 
sets a time limit to correct the Member State's public finance imbalances and to be compliant with both 
the deficit and the debt requirements. The recommendation contains annual deficit targets both in nominal 
and in structural terms, which are linked by an underlying macroeconomic scenario set on the basis of the 
Commission forecasts. Moreover, a quantification of the policy response required to attain these targets, 
in terms of the total amount of measures to be taken, is also given.(89) 
                                                          
(89) All the underlying data relevant to the definition of the EDP recommendation to bring an end to the situation of an excessive 




Graph 2.1: The steps of the EDP 
 
 
Note: EA: euro area, MS: Member States, QMV: qualified majority voting, RQMV: reverse qualified majority voting. Annex 7 sets 
out the voting modalities under the SGP in detail. 
Following the Council decision under 126(6) and the adoption of the Article 126(7) recommendation, the 
Member State must show that it has taken action to address its excessive deficit within a deadline set in 
the recommendation. According to the Regulation this deadline should be within six months, or within 
three if the situation is judged to be particularly serious. For euro area Member States, the Commission 
may also recommend to set a sanction in the form of a non-interest bearing deposit if the Member State 
has already lodged an interest-bearing deposit under the preventive arm or in case of serious non-
compliance with the budgetary policy obligations in the SGP.  
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The Commission undertakes a first assessment, which looks at whether the Member State is on track to 
correct its excessive deficit, i.e. if it has taken effective action, following the submission of the Member 
State's report on action taken. Depending on the outcome of this assessment, the procedure may be 
put/held in abeyance or stepped up. An EDP in abeyance is subject to continuous monitoring and may be 
activated again if this monitoring shows the Member State not to be on course to comply with the 
recommendation. With the Two Pack, for euro area Member States, the continuous monitoring is based – 
on a request by the Commission – on regular reports submitted by the country every six months. At any 
point in the EDP process euro area Member States may be issued an autonomous recommendation by the 
Commission if the latter perceives a risk of non-compliance with the deadline to correct the excessive 
deficit. Conversely, as long as a Member State is judged as having taken effective action, it may be issued 
with revised recommendations, including the possibility of extending the deadline for correction, if 
unexpected adverse economic events with a major impact on public finances impede its ability to correct 
its excessive deficit by the deadline initially recommended despite its action. 
The stepping up of the EDP involves a Council decision following a Commission recommendation under 
Article 126(8) that effective action has not been taken. For euro area Member States, this is the next 
trigger for the imposition of sanctions in the form of a fine corresponding to 0.2% of GDP in the 
preceding year as a rule. Following a Council decision that effective action has not been taken, the 
Commission shall propose to suspend part or all of the commitments under the European Structural and 
Investment Funds (applicable to all countries except the United Kingdom). In the case where immediate 
action is sought, or where there has been significant non-compliance, the Commission may instead 
propose a suspension of part or all of the payments rather than commitments.(
90
) 
Euro area Member States whose EDP has been stepped up are issued by the Council with a notice under 
Article 126(9). The notice mirrors the Article 126(7) recommendation in that it includes a time limit for 
correcting the excessive deficit as well as annual nominal and structural balance targets, which are linked 
by an underlying macroeconomic scenario. In addition, the notice also contains a series of measures – and 
the corresponding timetable for their implementation – that are conducive to the achievement of the 
nominal and structural targets. Non-euro area Member States are issued with revised Article 126(7) 
recommendations following an Article 126(8) decision that effective action has not been taken. 
Following a notice under Article 126(9) or a revised Article 126(7) recommendation, an assessment of 
whether a Member State is on track to correct its excessive deficit, i.e. if it has taken effective action, can 
again lead to either maintaining/putting the procedure in abeyance or to a decision on a lack of effective 
action. With the Two Pack, the regularity of the reports to be submitted by euro area Member States 
increases to every three months when subject to a notice under Article 126(9). The possibility of revising 
the notice or the recommendation and extending the deadline also remains, as long as the Member State is 
found to have taken effective action, but has faced unexpected adverse economic circumstances with a 
major impact on its public finances. 
Where the Commission concludes that effective action has not been taken to comply with the 
requirements of an Article 126(9) notice, the procedure is stepped up to Article 126(11) for euro area 
Member States with a Council decision to intensify sanctions. For as long as the Member State continues 
not to comply with its notice under Article 126(9) it can face an annual fine equal to 0.2% of its GDP in 
the preceding year plus a variable component determined by the magnitude of its excessive deficit, up to a 
maximum of 0.5% of GDP. For non-euro area Member States, a repeat of steps 126(8) followed by a new 
recommendation under Article 126(7) is undertaken for as long as the Member State is not on track to 
correct its excessive deficit and has not taken effective action. For all countries except the United 
Kingdom, each decision on a lack of effective action should be accompanied by a Commission proposal 
                                                          




to either suspend (or increase the size of the suspension) of commitments under the European Structural 
and Investment Funds or suspend (or increase the size of the suspension) of payments. 
The EDP is abrogated when the excessive deficit is corrected in a durable manner (according to the no-
policy change Commission forecast) and the correction is confirmed by outturn data. In all cases, 
abrogation requires a correction of the deficit that is lasting and compliance with the debt rule on a 
forward-looking basis. The abrogation requires a Council decision under Article 126(12) TFEU adopted 
by a qualified majority vote in Council, based on a Commission recommendation. 
The Commission forecasts (and the no-policy change assumption used therein – see Box 1.5) play an 
important role at the various stages of the EDP. At the opening of the EDP the deficit is regarded as 
"temporary" if it moves back below the Treaty reference value following the end of the unusual event or 
the severe economic downturn according to the Commission forecast (Regulation 1467/97). The forward-
looking part of the debt benchmark (Section 2.2.1.2) also relies on the Commission forecast (same text). 
The no-policy change assumption also plays a role in the formulation of EDP recommendations (Section 
2.2.3). In particular, fiscal efforts in the recommendations need to be formulated such that, on a no-policy 
change basis, the forward-looking part of the debt rule would be complied with by the EDP deadline. The 
no-policy change assumption is also instrumental for the assessment of compliance with the EDP 
recommendation. In the assessment of effective action (Section 2.3.2.1), the "careful analysis" builds on 
the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' measures of fiscal effort. The 'top-down' approach refers to the change in 
the structural balance corrected for the differences in growth and revenue outturns with respect to the no-
policy change scenario at the time of the recommendation. The 'bottom-up' measure of fiscal effort, i.e. 
the budgetary impact of the fiscal consolidation measures implemented, is estimated on the expenditure 
side by comparison between expenditure outturns and the no-policy change scenario. Similar 
considerations apply to the EDP abrogation (Section 2.5). The relevant text here is the Code of Conduct, 
where it is explicit that the assessment of sustainability of the correction has to be performed based on the 
Commission forecast. This holds for both the deficit and for the forward-looking debt criterion. 
2.2. LAUNCHING AN EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
An EDP is launched by a Council decision based on a Commission proposal on the existence of an 
excessive deficit. The Commission proposal is based on a Commission report under Article 126(3) of the 
Treaty which assesses the case for the launch of an EDP. The production of the report is itself triggered 
by a breach of the numerical deficit and debt criteria in the Treaty. 
Section 2.2.1 sets out the conditions for the deficit and debt triggering the production of an Article 126(3) 
report, the content of which is described in Section 2.2.2. Then, Section 2.2.3 zooms in on the content of 
Article 126(7) recommendations and Article 126(9) notices, while Section 2.2.4 describes the preparation 
of a recommendation for a non-interest bearing deposit following a Council decision that an excessive 
deficit exists. 
2.2.1. Establishing the existence of an excessive deficit or debt 
The start of an EDP is the identification by the Commission of a breach of either the deficit or debt 
criterion in a Member State. The breach in itself is just the first step; it triggers the production of a report 
under Article 126(3), which considers in detail a series of factors and assesses the case for launching an 
EDP. 
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The breach of the deficit criterion may be identified on the basis of outturns, plans or forecast data. The 
preparation of an Article 126(3) report on the basis of forecast data can be based on either the Member 
State's plans – as outlined in their SCPs, DBPs, or in other announcements made by the government – or 
the Commission forecasts. A planned breach of the debt criterion needs to be confirmed by outturn data in 
order to trigger the opening of an EDP.(91)  
Although a breach of either the deficit or the debt criteria is sufficient to lead to the preparation of an 
Article 126(3) report, in some cases a Member State will be found to be in breach of both. In these cases, 
the Article 126(3) report will consider both criteria and an EDP may be launched on the basis of both 
criteria.(92)  
It should be noted that special transitional arrangements apply to the debt rule for Member States that 
were in EDP in November 2011, when the latest amendments of the SGP – commonly known as the Six 
Pack – were adopted. Member States in this situation need to show compliance with the debt benchmark 
according to the special transition arrangements for the three years after the correction of their excessive 
deficit.(93) This is covered in Section 2.2.1.3, below. 
 
2.2.1.1 Establishing non-compliance with the deficit criterion 
A Member State is non-compliant with the deficit requirement if its general government deficit is greater 
than 3% of GDP. No other considerations are taken into account before producing an Article 126(3) 
report on the basis of the deficit criterion. Indeed, the Commission has committed itself(
94
) to prepare a 
report whenever there is the risk of an excessive deficit or whenever the planned or actual government 
deficit exceeds the reference value of 3% of GDP. 
 
2.2.1.2 Establishing non-compliance with the debt criterion 
A Member State is non-compliant with the debt requirement if its general government debt is greater than 
60% of GDP and is not sufficiently diminishing and approaching 60% of GDP at a satisfactory pace. The 
concept of “sufficiently diminishing” and the “satisfactory pace” are defined in Regulation (EC) 1467/97 
as being fulfilled if “the differential [of the debt ratio] with respect to the reference value has decreased 
over the previous three years at an average rate of 1/20th per year as a benchmark”. The Regulation then 
specifies that “the requirement under the debt criterion shall also be considered to be fulfilled if the 
budgetary forecasts of the Commission indicate that the required reduction in the differential will occur 
over the three-year period encompassing the two years following the final year for which data is 
available”. It further specifies that “the influence of the cycle on the pace of debt reduction” should be 
taken into account. These elements are translated into a debt reduction benchmark which has been agreed 
                                                          
(91) Differently from the deficit criterion, there is no notion of planned breach of the debt criterion in the Treaty (Art. 126.2 and Art. 
126.7). 
(92) This is the case, for example, of the EDP launched in June 2013 for Malta: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/126-03_commission/2013-05-21_mt_126-3_en.pdf ; 
and in January 2014 for Croatia: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/126-
03_commission/2013-11-15_hr_126-3_en.pdf 
(93) Cyprus, Portugal, Slovenia, France, Ireland, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom will enter the transition period when their 
EDPs are abrogated. Austria, Belgium,  and the Netherlands are currently in their transition periods. 
(94) Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997: EUR-Lex - 31997Y0802(01) - 




with the Member States in the Economic and Financial Committee of the Council and is set out in the 
Code of Conduct on the SGP. 
When a Member State's debt exceeds 60% of GDP, compliance with the debt criterion should be 
examined. A breach of the 60% threshold from below automatically triggers the production of an Article 
126(3) report, unless the debt-to-GDP ratio goes below the threshold reference value within the 
Commission forecast horizon.(95) In all other cases, a breach of the debt criterion is judged by considering 
the debt reduction benchmark in three configurations: the backward looking version, by taking into 
account the impact of the cycle and the forward-looking version. The backward and forward looking 
benchmarks are computed over a three-year horizon to avoid treating debt peaks as normal factors, hence, 
catering for the volatility that would imply a one-year rule. Moreover, the length and depth of economic 
cycles are asymmetric and unknown and cannot, of course, be guaranteed to fit into a six year time 
period. This means that meeting the debt reference benchmark on either the backward or forward looking 
measures might at time require large fiscal efforts in bad times. As this is undesirable in itself, the debt 
reduction benchmark is also adjusted for the effect of the cycle. Only if a country is in breach of all these 
conditions, the Commission has the obligation to write an Article 126(3) report.(96) More specifically, a 
breach of the debt criterion is judged according to the steps set out in Graph 2.2, namely: 
1)  The government debt ratio is above the reference value of 60% of GDP  
and  
2)  The debt is too high on the backward-looking measures:  
bt > bbt = 60% + 0.95/3 (bt-1 - 60%) + 0.95
2/3 (bt-2 - 60%) + 0.95
3/3 (bt-3 - 60%) 
where bt equals the debt ratio in year t and bbt is the backward-looking benchmark debt ratio in year t. If 
the Member States is being considered for an EDP on the basis of its outturn data, the year t applies to the 
year which has just ended. 
and 
3) (a) The debt is forecast to be too high on the forward-looking measures 
bt+2 > bbt+2 = 60% + 0.95/3 (bt+1 - 60%) + 0.95
2/3 (bt - 60%) + 0.95
3/3 (bt-1 - 60%)  
where bbt+2 stands for the forward-looking benchmark debt ratio; bt+1 and bt+2 stand for the debt forecast in 
year t+1 and t+2 as estimated by the Commission under the 'no-policy-change' assumption (see Box 1.5) 
on the basis of the fiscal outcome of year t. If the Member State is being considered for an EDP on the 
basis of its outturn data, the year t in the formula applies to the year that has just ended. 
and 
(b) the breach of the benchmark cannot be attributed to the influence of the cycle. The 
methodology for correcting for the cycle is described below. 
                                                          
(95) This to ensure consistency of treatment with countries having debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% and meeting the forward-looking 
debt benchmark.  
96 As explained in Section 2.2.2.3, as long as the Commission considers that the Member State's situation has not changed since the 
last Article 126(3) report, it is not bound to produce another report.  
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Graph 2.2: The steps to assess compliance with the debt criterion 
 
 
The steps set out in Graph 2.2 do not apply when there is a breach of the 60% threshold from below, as 
neither the backward- nor the forward-looking benchmark can be meaningfully computed in case a 
Member State goes above the 60% threshold for the first time in year t. In such a case, the identified 
breach of the debt criterion automatically triggers the production of an Article 126(3) report,(97) in which 
due consideration is given to all the relevant factors (Section 2.2.2.2). 
The correction of the cycle 
The cyclical correction that forms part of the third step of the assessment aims to ensure that a Member 
State will not be subject to an EDP if the debt benchmark is not fulfilled purely as a direct consequence of 
the impact of the cycle. The actual debt ratio will be adjusted and then compared to the debt benchmark 
(step 3b of the decision tree above), to see whether an Article 126(3) report should be prepared.  
Adjusting the debt for the cycle consists of a correction of both the numerator and the denominator of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. To this end, the following cyclical adjustment of the debt ratio should be undertaken: 
                                                          
(97) Unless the debt-to-GDP ratio goes below the threshold reference value within the Commission forecast horizon. 
YES NO 
Not applicable bt < bbt 
YES NO 
No further step 
(3a) bt+2 < bbt+2 
YES NO 
No further step 
bt < 60% of GDP 
(3b)  <bbt 
YES 



























































where tB  stands for debt, tY  for GDP at current prices, 
pot
t
y  for potential growth, 
t
p for the price 
deflator of GDP, tC  for the cyclical component of the budget balance. The cyclical components and 
potential growth are calculated according to agreed methodologies. (98) 
This methodology therefore:  
 corrects the debt level for the cyclical component of the deficit over the past three years. This 
adjustment implies that if the output gap is positive, the adjusted debt level will be larger than the 
observed debt and vice versa; and 
 corrects the GDP level for the output gap over the past three years, so that the corrected level of GDP 
in time t represents the level that GDP would have reached if it had evolved according to its potential 
from year t–3 on. The growth rate of the price deflator of GDP is used to convert real growth into 
nominal growth.  
 
2.2.1.3 Establishing non-compliance with the debt criterion in the transition period 
Member States that were in EDP on the date that the Six Pack amendments to the SGP were adopted (8 
November 2011) are subject to transitional arrangements for the three years following the correction of 
their excessive deficit(
99
) in order to ensure that they have time to adapt their structural adjustments to the 
level needed to comply with the debt reduction benchmark. During those three years, compliance with the 
debt criterion is judged according to whether the Member State makes sufficient progress towards 
compliance. Thus, the debt requirement still applies during the transition period as the Member States 
concerned need to be moving towards compliance during this period.  
The concept of “sufficient progress towards compliance” is set out in the Code of Conduct on the SGP. It 
is defined as the Minimum Linear Structural Adjustment (MLSA) ensuring that – if followed – Member 
States will comply with the debt rule at the end of the transition period. This minimum linear structural 
adjustment path is constructed (see Annex 6) taking into account both the influence of the cycle and the 
forward-looking nature of the debt benchmark. In order to ensure continuous and realistic progress 
towards compliance during the transition period, Member States should simultaneously respect the two 
conditions below: 
                                                          
(98) Following the ECOFIN Council meetings of July 2002/May 2004, the production function (PF) approach for the estimation of 
output gaps now constitutes the reference method. Cfr. footnote 30.   
(99) The transition period does not begin on the date of the abrogation of the existing EDP, but with the correction of the deficit, 
which will typically take place in the year before the EDP is actually abrogated since abrogation can only take place based on actual 
data. 
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 First, the annual structural adjustment should not deviate by more than ¼ % of GDP from the linear 
structural adjustment ensuring that the least stringent condition consistent with the respect of the debt 
benchmark is met by the end of the transition period (minimum linear structural adjustment);  
 Second, at any time during the transition period, the remaining annual structural adjustment should 
not exceed ¾ % of GDP.(
100
) 
These conditions should ensure that the path of deficit reduction chosen by the Member State is sustained 
over the three years of the transitional period (first condition) and realistic (second condition), while 
providing some room for manoeuvre during the transition period.  
Whereas compliance is judged ex ante and ex post, only an observed breach of the MLSA can lead to the 
opening of a debt-based EDP. An ex ante assessment of compliance with the MLSA is undertaken both 
on the basis of the plans submitted in the SCPs, which feeds the Council-Specific Recommendations 
concluding the European Semester, and every autumn for euro area Member States on the basis of the 
Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs) in the associated Commission Opinion. The process is the following: 
 Year 1: First year of the transition period 
Ex ante assessment: the consolidation path set out in the SCP in April, and in the DBP for euro area 
Member States in October, is compared in years 1, 2 and 3 to the minimum linear consolidation path 
consistent with sufficient progress towards compliance, as defined by the conditions 1) and 2) mentioned 
above.  
Ex post assessment: based on fiscal notification for year 1 and the revised macroeconomic scenario, i.e. 
the latest Commission forecast, a report based under Article 126(3) will be prepared if one of the two 
conditions has been breached. 
 Year 2: Second year of the transition period 
Ex ante assessment: on the basis of the updated SCP in April of year 2, and on the DBP for euro area 
Member States in October, the consolidation path is compared in years 2 and 3 to the new minimum 
linear structural adjustment ensuring sufficient progress towards compliance as defined above, including 
the deficit and debt outcome of year 1 and the revised macroeconomic scenario, i.e. the latest 
Commission forecast.  
Ex post assessment: based on fiscal notification for year 2 and the revised macroeconomic scenario, if one 
of the two conditions has been breached, a report based under Article 126(3) will be prepared. 
 Year 3: Third (and last) year of the transition period 
Ex ante assessment: on the basis of the updated SCP in April of year 3, and on the DBP for euro area 
Member States in October, the projected changes in the structural balance are compared to the new 
minimum linear structural adjustment which, by construction, is equivalent to assessing compliance with 
the debt reduction benchmark by the end of the transition period.  
Ex post assessment: based on fiscal notification for year 3, if the minimum linear structural adjustment 
which, by construction, is equivalent to assessing compliance with the debt reduction benchmark by the 
end of the transition period, has not been respected, a report based under Article 126(3) will be prepared.  
                                                          




Hence, a negative assessment of the observed progress made towards compliance with the debt 
benchmark during the transition period leads to the preparation of a Commission report, based on Article 
126(3).  
2.2.2. Preparing an Article 126(3) report 
The Article 126(3) report presents an assessment of the case for launching an EDP for a Member State on 
the basis of its deficit and/or debt position. The report is submitted to the Economic and Financial 
Committee which has 2 weeks following its adoption by the Commission to formulate an opinion under 
Article 126(4). 
 
2.2.2.1 Assessing the breach of the deficit criterion in the Article 126(3) report 
The deficit criterion is considered in detail in the Article 126(3) report in the case of a reported or planned 
deficit of above 3% of GDP. The Treaty – and by extension the SGP – provides two exception clauses 
with regard to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure on the basis of the deficit criterion. Member 
States are deemed to have complied with their deficit commitment if at least one of the two following 
conditions is met: 
 the deficit has declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level close to 3% of GDP; 
 the excess is only exceptional and temporary, and the deficit value is still close to 3% of GDP. 
A deficit above 3% of GDP is considered exceptional when it results either (i) from an unusual event 
outside of the Member State's control and with a major impact on its public finances, or (ii) from a severe 
economic downturn. A severe economic downturn is defined(101) as a negative real growth of GDP or as 
an accumulated loss of output during a protracted period of very low real growth of GDP relative to its 
potential. The excess over 3% is considered temporary if the Commission forecasts indicate that the 
deficit will fall below 3% following the end of the unusual event or the severe economic downturn.  
The report presents an overall assessment of the deficit situation and the context in which it occurred. 
Article 126(3) specifies: “The report of the Commission shall also take into account whether the 
government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and take into account all other relevant 
factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of the Member State.”  
According to Regulation 1467/97 the relevant factors will be taken into account in the following way: 
 For a Member State with debt below 60% of GDP: the relevant factors are considered in the overall 
assessment, whatever the level of the deficit. 
 For a Member State with debt above 60% of GDP: the relevant factors are only considered if the 
deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. 
Regulation 1467/97 gives further details on the relevant factors to be taken into account, presenting a list 
that falls under three headings: developments in the medium-term economic position, developments in the 
                                                          
(101) Article 2(2) of Regulation 1467/97. 
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medium-term budgetary positions and developments in the medium-term government debt position. 
However, the regulation states that this list is not exhaustive and that “The Commission shall give due 
and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are 
relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the 
Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular 
consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving 
the policy goals of the Union, the debt incurred in the form of bilateral and multilateral support between 
Member States in the context of safeguarding financial stability, and the debt related to financial 
stabilisation operations during major financial disturbances” (see Box 2.3). The Regulation also includes 
as relevant factors “the implementation of policies in the context of the prevention and correction of 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances, the implementation of policies in the context of the common 
growth strategy of the Union”. Therefore, the Commission Communication on Making the best use of 
flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact(
102
) clarifies that Member States' 
contributions to the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)(103) and the implementation of 
structural reforms (e.g. in the context of the European Semester, as well as within the Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure) fall under these categories and should be considered as relevant factors. Finally, 
Regulation 473/2013 of the Two Pack requires that the extent to which the Member State has taken into 
account the Commission's Opinion on the its Draft Budgetary Plan should also be considered as a relevant 
(mitigating or aggravating) factor. 
 
BOX 2.3: THE TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXCESSIVE DEFICIT 
Art. 2(3) of Regulation 1467/97 stipulates that in the context of an Article 126(3) report "[…] particular 
consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving 
the policy goals of the Union, the debt incurred in the form of bilateral and multilateral support between 
Member States in the context of safeguarding financial stability, and the debt related to financial 
stabilisation operations during major financial disturbances". 
On 26 November 2011, the Commission confirmed to the Eurogroup that financial support to other EU 
Member States would be subject to special treatment when assessing the public finances of creditor 
Member States in the context of the EDP.  
In order to avoid that assistance provided to other EU Member States in the context of a coordinated, EU-
wide policy, should result in a country being placed in EDP, debt-increasing operations are taken into 
account in the Article 126(3) report when considering a possible breach of the debt criterion. This is the 
case both for an apparent breach of the debt reduction benchmark, or the 'sufficient progress' benchmark 
towards it (applicable during the three-year transition period following the correction of the excessive 
deficit for the procedures under way at the time of the adoption of the Six Pack reform of the SGP). A 
Member State should therefore not be placed in EDP for breach of the debt criterion, including in the 
transitory period, if such breach would not have been registered in the absence of the solidarity 
operations.  
When assessing 'sufficient progress towards compliance' through the Minimum Linear Structural 
Adjustment (MLSA) during the transition period, both the debt and the deficit figures are netted out from 
                                                          
(102) COM(2015) 12: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-
13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf  
(103) As reflected also in the "Commonly agreed position on flexibility within the SGP", endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on 12 




debt- and deficit-increasing operations, respectively. The same applies to the computation of the debt 
benchmarks (backward- and forward-looking), which are used to calculate the required annual MLSA. 
The operations taken into account under the debt criterion are the bilateral loans to Greece under the 
Greek loan facility (GLF), EFSF disbursements, the impact of the paid-in capital under the ESM and the 
measures during the second financial assistance programme for Greece which have a budgetary impact on 
lenders through the reduction of future expected income. These measures are the reduction of the GLF 
margin and interest rates, the transfer to Greece's segregated account of the income equivalent to the 
Securities Market Programmes (SMP) profits and the cancelation of the EFSF guarantee fee. Payments 
made under the EFSM are not taken into account as the lending is not re-routed to EU Member States and 
therefore does not affect their debt. 
Operations in the context of the Greek programme, with an impact on the deficit of the supporting 
Member States (reduction of GLF margin and interest rates, distribution of SMP profits, etc.), are also 
subject to special consideration. In order to avoid that they should lead to a Member State being placed in 
EDP on the basis of the deficit criterion, these operations are regarded as one-off and temporary 
measures, in line with the practice followed for other support operations in the context of the financial 
crisis, and as such netted out of the structural balance. 
In the same vein, on 9 October 2013 Vice President Rehn clarified in a letter to finance ministers the 
treatment of recapitalisation of the banking sector under the EDP, namely that they are regarded as one-
off or temporary measures and as relevant factors for financial stability, which means that they do not 
count against the Member State in the context of the excessive deficit procedure.  
The treatment of capital injections requiring recourse to public backstops can be summarised as follows. 
For a Member State in which the capital injection would lead to an apparent breach of the debt or deficit 
criterion of the Pact, financial stabilisation operations in the above context would be taken into account as 
a relevant factor in the Commission's assessment of compliance with the criteria, and thus an EDP would 
normally not be opened. Member States with debt above 60% of GDP however would be an exception 
and an EDP would be opened, unless the amount of capital transfers is limited, so that it allows them to 
keep the nominal deficit close to the 3% reference value, and temporary. The EDP recommendation in 
such a case would consider that such operations are usually of a one-off nature. 
For a Member State that is already in EDP, a capital injection would not lead to a stepping-up of the 
procedure - provided that the recommended fiscal effort had been delivered- , as one-off and temporary 
measures are netted out of the fiscal effort recommended to correct the excessive deficit by the deadline. 
For the abrogation of the EDP, the deficit has to be brought below 3% of GDP in a sustainable manner. A 
capital injection could thus lead to a delay in abrogating the procedure. 
In addition, for countries whose deficit does not significantly exceed a level that can be considered close 
to the 3% of GDP reference value and whose debt ratio does not exceed the 60% of GDP reference value, 
special consideration should be given to pension reforms, on condition that overall fiscal sustainability is 
maintained. The pension reforms that are eligible for consideration are those introducing a multi-pillar 
system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar and publicly managed pillar with an associated cost 
to the public finances. Special consideration should be given to the features of the overall pension system 
created by the reform, namely whether it promotes long-term sustainability while not increasing risks for 
the medium-term budgetary position. In order to take the impact of any reforms into account, the net cost 
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of the reform is measured as its direct impact on the general government deficit.(
104
) This impact stems 
from the fact that some revenue, which used to be recorded as government revenue, is diverted to a fully-
funded pension fund classified in a sector other than general government. Moreover, some pensions and 
other social benefits, previously accounted for as government expenditure, will be paid by the pension 
scheme once the reform has been implemented. Thus, net costs do not include interest expenditure linked 
to the higher accumulation of debt due to forgone social contributions or other revenues. This 
consideration should be part of a broader assessment of the overall features of the pension system created 
by the reform, namely whether it promotes long-term sustainability while not increasing risks for the 
medium-term budgetary position. In this way, countries that reform their pensions systems in a way that 
improves the long-term sustainability of their public finances but introduces short and medium-term 
costs, are able to deviate slightly from the 3% of GDP limit without being placed in excessive deficit. Box 
2.4 explains in detail how pension reforms are to be taken into account in the corrective arm of the Pact. 
 
BOX 2.4: RULES IN THE 2011 REFORM OF THE SGP FOR SYSTEMIC PENSION REFORMS 
Systemic pension reforms have a special treatment in the fiscal rules. These structural reforms shift the 
responsibility of old-age insurance toward the private sector by setting up a mandatory fully funded 
pillar. The budgetary costs of such reforms can be large due to the fact that the government must 
redirect part of its revenue from social security contributions to the private pillar in exchange for lower 
pension expenditure in the (possibly distant) future. 
The 2005 reform of the Pact included provisions for the impact of pension reforms to be considered in 
the Maastricht deficit criterion in the form of a gradually decreasing 5 year allowance for deviating 
from the deficit threshold. These provisions were changed by the 2011 reform of the SGP. 
The Six Pack acknowledges the fact that the budgetary implications of systemic pension reforms can 
be drawn out over a longer period while taking better account of the government's capacity to absorb 
higher deficits over this protracted period. Hence, the revised rules make the allowance for maintaining 
a higher deficit permanent, provided that the government debt-to-GDP ratio remains below 60% of 
GDP and that deficit does not significantly exceed what can be considered to be close to the 3% of 








                                                          




CRITERIA FOR TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SYSTEMIC PENSION REFORMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EDP 
 
For ongoing excessive deficit procedures the new rules imply that an EDP may be abrogated even if 
the government deficit is above the 3% of GDP threshold only if its debt-to-GDP ratio is below 60% of 
GDP, the net costs of a systemic pension reform explain the excess in the deficit while staying close to 
the reference value. In addition to the above, the general rules for abrogation (detailed in Section 2.5) 
apply, i.e. the government deficit is reduced to below the reference value in a durable manner and the 
forward looking element of the debt benchmark is met. 
Furthermore, the net costs of the systemic pension reform must be determined. Regulation (EC) 
1467/97 is not explicit in what constitutes the net cost of such a reform, only referring to the 'net costs 
of the publicly managed pillar'. The Code of Conduct on the SGP defines these costs as direct costs 
stemming from the fact that some of the government's revenues has to be directed to the private 
pension pillar (adding to the costs of the reform), whereas some of the pension payments are, in fact, 
carried out by the private scheme instead of the public pillar (reduce the costs of the reform). Any 
lump-sum payments linked to the systemic pension reform should also be factored in the calculation of 
'net costs'. Such a lump-sum payment might take place if the new mandatory, funded pension scheme 
does not only allow for the acquisition of new pension rights but also enables the government to 
transfer some of the rights already accumulated (in the public pillar) to the new scheme. 
The government might encounter additional indirect costs if it uses government bonds to finance its 
increased deficits following the reform. However, these costs being indirect, the increase in the 
government's interest expenditure is not counted towards the direct net costs of implementing a multi-
pillar pension system. 
when abrogating EDP
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reforms
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2.2.2.2 Assessing the breach of the debt criterion in the Article 126(3) report 
The same factors that may be taken into account for the opening of a deficit-based EDP, are also borne in 
mind in the overall assessment for a country in breach of the debt requirements. In particular, adherence 
to the MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, is a relevant factor in assessing compliance with the debt 
criterion, as it is supposed, under normal macroeconomic circumstances, to ensure sustainability or rapid 
progress to sustainability in the medium term. In turn this factor needs to be evaluated in conjunction with 
an assessment of the overall economic environment (while considering that the debt reduction benchmark 
in itself already contains a correction for the impact of the cycle(105)), and other relevant factors, including 
implementation of structural reforms improving the sustainability of public finances, i.e. implying a 
downward shift in the path of the debt ratio at least in the medium term. Also the expected timeline for 
complying with the debt rule, under the assumption of a return to normal economic conditions, notably 
inflation, can provide a useful gauge when taking into account the relevant factors. Since the entry into 
force of the Two-Pack, the extent to which the Member State has taken into account the Commission's 
Opinion on its Draft Budgetary Plan (see Section 3.1.1.3) is also a relevant factor to be considered (Art. 
12(1) of Reg. 473/2013). 
Member States can also put forward other relevant factors deemed significant. The Commission then 
judges if the factor put forward by the Member State is encompassed by the definition given in 
Regulation 1467/97 and assesses whether it can be taken into account.  
In the case of the debt, the relevant factors are taken into account in all cases, whatever the magnitude of 
the breach. Pension reforms are considered along with the other relevant factors, but the detailed 
treatment for systemic pension reforms as set out in Section 2.2.2.1 is not applicable. 'Stock-flow 
adjustments' (SFAs), which are all the changes in debt unexplained by the deficits/surpluses – including 
changes in the stock of financial assets such as the depletion of cash reserves –, are also explicitly 
considered as 'relevant factors' in Regulation (EC) 1467/97. Table 2.1 presents the components of the 
stock-flow adjustments.  
                                                          
(105) For a country breaching the 60% reference value from below, the current practice is to consider the cyclically-adjusted debt-to-
GDP ratio in the context of the relevant factors, as in this case the sole identification of the breach of the debt criterion automatically 
triggers the production of an Article 126(3) report (section 2.2.1.2) unless the debt-to-GDP ratio goes below the threshold reference 





Table 2.1: Eurostat's breakdown of the change in government debt 
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The contribution of SFAs to the evolution of gross government debt should be considered whenever an 
Article 126(3) report is prepared based on the debt criterion. This assessment will not be quantitative in 
the sense that it will not yield a recalculated debt benchmark. Nevertheless, an adjustment to the change 
in gross government debt should be applied to reveal whether developments in SFAs justify the failure to 
meet the numerical debt benchmark.(
106
) In particular, gross debt should be 'netted out' by the net 
acquisition of currency and deposits to prevent that the government's cash management activity comes 
into conflict with its obligation to meet the debt criterion. This is further considered in Box 2.5. 
BOX 2.5: CONSIDERING 'STOCK-FLOW ADJUSTMENTS' FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DEBT CRITERION 
To prevent that transactions that are undertaken, for instance, for cash management purposes alter the 
assessment under the debt criterion some adjustments must be made to the measure of gross 
government debt. 
Currency holdings 
Cash holdings of the government are the most liquid assets, which could be used immediately to buy 
back government bonds. Thus, deducting the net acquisition of currencies and deposits from (the 
change in gross) government debt should not change the assessment of fiscal sustainability. 
In the context of an Article 126(3) report, gross debt would be adjusted by the increase in the 
government's cash reserve. Such a situation may arise when the government decides to take advantage 
of favourable market conditions and raise more funds than it needs (pre finances itself). This would 
show up in both its financial liabilities and in its cash balance. In this case, netting out the so acquired 
funds would be appropriate. However, attention must also be paid to any increase in the 'accounts 
payable' of the government as in some cases less use of cash reflects the building up of arrears.  
                                                          
(106) Recital 14 of the Council Regulation (EU)1177/2011 foresees that the assessment of the composition of the stock-flow 
adjustment on debt developments may be sufficient to exclude the establishment of an EDP on the basis of the debt criterion. 
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The government could equally decide to reduce its government debt (close to the end of the recording 
period with the intention to record a lower EDP debt) through the excessive use of its cash reserve. 
However, it can be assumed that a certain level of cash would have to be maintained for operational 
reasons, and thus it is likely that the government will have to issue bonds in the near future. Therefore, 
in this case, it would also be prudent to adjust (the change in) gross government debt with the (net 
acquisition of) currency and deposits line of SFA (and therefore the adjusted government debt would 
be higher than EDP debt). 
Large swings in the government's currency position are not uncommon. In the October 2011 EDP 
notification, the net acquisition of 'currency and deposits' varied both across countries and over time. It 
exhibited variations over 5% of GDP (in absolute terms) in some countries (Denmark, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Hungary and Slovenia), but in most cases it remained within the range of -3% and +3% 
of GDP. 
Intergovernmental loans 
A Member State should not be placed in EDP for breach of the debt criterion, including in the 
transition period, as a result of assistance provided to other EU Member States in the context of a 
coordinated, EU-wide policy. Box 2.3 describes how loans under the Greek loans facility, the EFSM, 
the ESM and operations under the second assistance programme to Greece should be taken into 
account in the Article 126(3) report.  
Other adjustments 
In spite of the fact that the net debt approach would, in theory, better reflect changes to the 
sustainability of fiscal policy, further adjustments to the gross debt figure are not recommended. The 
reason for this is that the more assets are netted out, the further one departs from the Maastricht 
original concept for the debt criterion. Also, the valuation of most assets is difficult or sometimes even 
arbitrary and, by taking them into account, the quality of the measurement of the EDP definition of 
government debt would suffer as well. 
 
2.2.2.3 Concluding the Article 126(3) report 
Once consideration has been taken of all relevant factors to assess the case for launching or not an EDP, 
the Article 126(3) report is sent to the Economic and Financial Committee of the Council which has 2 
weeks to formulate an opinion, based on Article 126(4).  
Following the Commission's report and the ensuing opinion from the Economic and Financial Committee, 
if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit exists or may occur, the Commission addresses an 
opinion to that effect to the Member State concerned and informs the Council accordingly, under Article 
126(5). The Commission also prepares a proposal for a Council decision on the existence of an excessive 
deficit under Article 126(6) and a recommendation for a Council recommendation on the provisions to 
take to correct the excessive deficit under Article 126(7). 
In case the launch of an EDP is not warranted, it should be noted that as long as the Commission 
considers that the Member State's situation has not changed significantly since the Article 126(3) report, it 
is not bound to produce another report. This refers to those situations where both the causes (breach of the 




therein have not undergone material changes since the latest report, so that the assessment of the case for 
not launching an EDP remains unchanged too. 
 
2.2.3. Preparing an Article 126(7) recommendation or an Article 126(9) notice 
The Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) to correct the 
excessive deficit contains an underlying analysis of the macro-fiscal situation of the Member State, a 
timeframe within which the excessive deficit should be corrected and annual targets for the nominal and 
structural deficit linked by an underlying macroeconomic scenario. Moreover, the amount of measures 
deemed needed to meet the structural deficit targets is also specified. 
Once in EDP, the Commission will recommend the Council to issue a notice under Article 126(9) to euro 
area Member States which have been found by the Council in an Article 126(8) decision not to have taken 
effective action – on the basis of the methodology defined in Section 2.3.2 – to comply with an Article 
126(7) recommendation or with a revised notice under Article 126(9). 
Following the adoption by the Council of an Article 126(8) decision establishing a lack of effective 
action, Article 5(1) of Regulation 1467/97 requires that, for euro area Member States, a Council decision 
to give notice to take measures to correct the excessive deficit situation be taken within 2 months 
according to Article 126(9). In terms of content, the main difference between a notice under Article 
126(9) and a recommendation under Article 126(7) is that the measures conducive to the achievement of 
the budgetary targets and the deadlines for their adoption are explicitly indicated in the notice. Otherwise, 
a notice under Article 126(9) follows the abovementioned specifications for the preparation of Article 
126(7) recommendations, including due consideration to relevant factors.  
Thus, both EDP recommendations under Article 126(7) and decisions to give notice under Article 126(9) 
contain the following quantitative budgetary objectives: 
 A deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. As a rule, when the EDP is launched in year t, 
following a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit, the latter should be corrected in 
year t+1. However, in case of special circumstances, a longer deadline could be set. 
 A path towards the correction of the excessive deficit with intermediary annual targets for the general 
government balance. Even in the case of deadline set for the year (t+1) following the identification of 
an excessive deficit (in t), the EDP recommendation (or notice) would entail at least one intermediary 
nominal target (that of year t).  
 An annual fiscal effort of at least 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark, defined in structural terms, consistent 
with the nominal path towards the correction of the excessive deficit. 
In addition, a quantification of the amount of measures required to meet these annual targets should be 
included in the Article 126(7) recommendation and a more detailed specification of the measures with the 
corresponding deadlines for their adoption is explicit in the Article 126(9) notice. Box 2.6 explains the 
relationship between the structural adjustment and the required measures.  
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Setting a path for the deficit and a deadline for correction 
The aim of Article 126(7) recommendations and Article 126(9) notices is to present a credible path for the 
timely correction of the excessive deficit. According to Article 3(4) of the Regulation (EC) 1467/97: 
“[…] The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive 
deficit, which shall be completed in the year following its identification unless there are special 
circumstances. In its recommendation, the Council shall request that the Member State achieve annual 
budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are consistent 
with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted 
balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit 
within the deadline set in the recommendation.” 
The Code of Conduct on the SGP specifies: “As a rule, the initial deadline for correcting an excessive 
deficit should be the year after its identification and thus, normally, the second year after its occurrence 
unless there are special circumstances. This deadline should be set taking into account the effort that the 
Member State concerned can undertake, with a minimum of 0.5% of GDP, based on a balanced 
assessment of the relevant factors considered in the Commission report under Article 126(3). If this effort 
seems sufficient to correct the excessive deficit in the year following its identification, the initial deadline 
should not be set beyond the year following its identification.  
Longer deadlines could be set, in particular in the case of excessive deficit procedures based on the debt 
criterion, when the government balance requested to comply with the debt criterion is significantly higher 
than a 3% of GDP deficit.”  
Article 2(6) of Regulation (EC) 1467/97 further specifies that the deadline for correction will be set by 
taking into account the relevant factors: “If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that 
an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent 
procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in 
paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as 
specified in Article 3(5) and Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline.” 
Judging whether or not one year is sufficient to correct an excessive deficit requires a careful 
consideration of the magnitude of the necessary structural adjustment against both the urgency of the 
adjustment in terms of the fiscal risk borne by the Member State in question and the economic feasibility 
of such an effort. The Regulation also indicates that relevant factors are taken into account when setting 
the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. Thus, while the correction of an excessive deficit 
is expected to take place within the year following its identification, relevant factors including the 
implementation of major structural reforms shall be taken into account when considering instead a 
multiannual path for the correction of the excessive deficit either in a new EDP or when extending the 
original deadline.(
107
) Any additional year should be considered taking into account again both the 
economic feasibility and the urgency for the Member State to correct its excessive deficit in that 
additional year.  
Irrespective of whether an EDP is opened due to a breach of the deficit or of the debt criterion, both 
Article 126(7) recommendations as well as Article 126(9) notices present a correction path with annual 
                                                          
(107) The Communication from the Commission on Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, COM(2015) 12 of 13.01.2015 clarifies the role of structural reforms as a relevant factor to be considered, where 





targets for the nominal and structural deficits, which are defined on the basis of an underlying 
macroeconomic scenario, as per the Commission forecasts. For Member States with debt above 60% of 
GDP, the fiscal path has to take into account the need to comply with the debt benchmark so that the 
fiscal trajectory leads to the debt complying with at least the forward-looking element of the debt 
reduction benchmark at the end of the correction period, on a no-policy change basis (see Box 1.5). As a 
result, the level for the general government balance recommended for the final year may be above the 
Treaty reference value of a general government balance of -3% of GDP.  
Following Article 10 of Regulation 472/2013 of the Two Pack, for euro area Member States under a 
macroeconomic adjustment programme, the programme's deficit targets should be integrated in the 
Article 126(7) recommendation or Article 126(9) notice, as relevant. In addition, the measures needed to 
achieve these budgetary targets as well as the deadlines for their implementation shall also be specified in 
the Article 126(9) notice.  
Specifying the measures  
Along with the paths for both the nominal and structural deficits,(108) and the underlying macroeconomic 
scenario that links them, a no-policy change trajectory of receipts and spending is given. This is because 
the change in the structural balance need not be equal to the magnitude of the measures that need to be 
taken by the Member State in question. In particular, the structural balance implicitly assumes that 
receipts and spending grow in line with potential GDP. In most countries, the no-policy change trajectory 
of receipts and spending will be different and in some cases significantly so. For example, a country with 
no automatic indexation of tax thresholds will have revenue trends that are above the change in potential 
growth and will therefore need to take fewer policy measures than a country with indexation linked to the 
GDP deflator to achieve the same tightening in the structural balance, other things being equal.  
Therefore, a quantification of the measures required to meet the annual nominal and structural targets 
should be included in the Article 126(7) recommendations. As regards the Article 126(9) notices, they 
should clearly specify both the necessary measures as well as the deadlines for their adoption, which 
define a timetable which will also bind the Member State to submit reports to show compliance with these 









                                                          
(108)The structural balance is defined as the cyclically-adjusted general government balance net of one off and other temporary 
measures (see Box 1.4).    
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BOX 2.6: RECONCILING THE REQUIRED CHANGE IN THE STRUCTURAL BALANCE AND THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL 
  MEASURES 
 
The figure above represents a case in which the Excessive Deficit Procedure is launched on the basis of 
actual data of year t and with a deadline for correction set in year t+2. At time t, there is a structural 
balance of -4% of GDP and the target for the EDP is for a structural balance of -2% of GDP to be attained 
at t+2. Therefore, there needs to be an improvement in the structural balance of 2 percentage points of 
GDP, which, if implemented linearly requires that the structural balance improve by 1 percentage point of 
GDP between t and t+1 and between t+1 and t+2. These two steps are shown in the dashed line which is 
called the EDP scenario. 
However, in order for this improvement in the structural balance to be obtained, the size of the additional 
measures that the Member State in question could be greater than the improvement in the structural 
balance. This is because in this example, the no-policy change scenario is for an annual deterioration in 
the structural balance of 1 percentage point per year, as indicated by the “no policy change scenario 
underlying the recommendation”. This might be due to commitments to increase spending at a faster rate 
than potential growth, for example. In order to meet the EDP targets, additional measures equal to 2 
percentage points of GDP will need to be taken in both t+1 and t+2. These are shown by the blue lines. In 
t+1, taking the required additional measures equal to 2 percentage points of GDP will bring the structural 
balance from -5% of GDP to -3% of GDP and set the no policy change scenario on a new trajectory 
shown by the dashed black line. In order to reach the target of structural balance of -2 by t+2, additional 
measures shown by second blue line equal to 2 percentage points of GDP, would be required.  
In calculating the additional measures that need to be introduced to reach a given change in the headline 
balance, the impact of the measures on growth must be taken into account. This is not shown in the 
graphic as the aim is to illustrate the difference between the change in the structural balance and the 
amount of measures needed to reach it.  
The Commission assumptions underlying the recommendations (or notices) are published in the Staff 
Working Document that accompanies them, which include the necessary information to undertake the ex 




The Article 126(7) recommendation also establishes a maximum deadline of six months for effective 
action to be taken and reported on in order to correct the excessive deficit in a timely manner. However, 
when justified by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline may be shortened to three months. It is 
four months in case of an Article 126(9) notice. 
Along with the Article 126(7) recommendations (or notices), the Commission can request that euro area 
Member States be subject to additional reporting requirements (see Annex 13), as set out in Regulation 
473/2013 of the Two Pack. (
109
) This request may occur at any point in the EDP for euro area Member 
States that were not initially subject to it. In all cases, the Member States concerned will be required to 
submit the regular reports until the abrogation of their excessive deficit procedure. These reporting 
requirements include a comprehensive assessment of budgetary execution at the time of the first report 
after the launch of EDP and make it incumbent on the Member States to submit updates to the 
Commission every six months, while under an Article 126(7) recommendation and every three when 
under notice according to Article 126(9). The reports submitted should follow the specifications and 
templates of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 877/13 of 27 June 2013 supplementing Regulation 
(EU) 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for monitoring and 




2.2.4. Sanctions: recommending a non-interest bearing deposit 
For euro area Member States, following the Council's adoption of a decision under Article 126(6) 
establishing the existence of an excessive deficit, the Commission may issue a recommendation for a 
further Council decision requiring the Member State to lodge a non-interest bearing deposit.(
111
) This 
will systematically happen if the Member State in question had lodged an interest-bearing deposit 
following non-compliance with the recommendations in the preventive arm after a Commission warning, 
or on a case-by-case basis if the Commission identifies particularly serious non-compliance with the 
budgetary policy obligations laid out in the SGP. When the Commission decides to issue a 
recommendation for a Council decision on sanctions, it will do so within 20 days of the Council's 
adoption of the Article 126(6) decision. The amount of the non-interest bearing deposit shall equal 0.2% 
of the previous year's GDP, as a default and maximum value. The deposit will be lodged with the 
Commission – if the country had already lodged an interest-bearing deposit, it will be turned into a non-
interest bearing one and any difference in the applicable amount (taking into account the interest accrued) 
will be returned to the Member State or made up by it. 
The Council decision on the lodging of a non-interest bearing deposit shall be considered adopted, unless 
the Council decides to reject the Commission's recommendation within 10 days, using qualified majority 
voting.  
While the default position is for the Commission to ask for a deposit equal to 0.2% of the previous year's 
GDP, the Commission may recommend that the Council reduce the amount or cancel the non-interest 
bearing deposit altogether. This can happen on the grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or 
following the reasoned request by the Member State concerned, addressed to the Commission within 10 
                                                          
(109) Euro area countries under enhanced surveillance according to Regulation 472/2013 are automatically made subject to this 
regular reporting, whether or not they are under EDP. Conversely, euro area countries under a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme may not be made subject to this regular reporting as their obligations under their macroeconomic adjustment programme 
are sufficient to ensure the closer monitoring that the regular reporting leads to.  
(110) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:244:SOM:EN:HTML. 
(111) Regulation EU/1173/2011 
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days of the Council's adoption of the Article 126(6) decision. The Council may also amend the 
Commission's recommendation for a deposit using qualified majority voting and adopt the amended text 
as a Council decision. 
2.3. STEPS FOLLOWING A RECOMMENDATION UNDER 126(7) OR A NOTICE UNDER 126(9) 
This Section considers the steps to be followed after the adoption of a Council recommendation under 
Article 126(7) or a Council decision to give notice under Article 126(9). Section 2.3.1 sets out the 
reporting requirements on Member States in EDP and Section 2.3.2 describes how compliance with the 
recommendations (or notices) is judged. Section 2.3.3 considers the cases in which the deadline for 
correction can be extended. Section 2.3.4 describes the continuous monitoring that takes place when 
EDPs are placed in abeyance and discusses the correction of the excessive deficit. 
2.3.1. Member States' reporting on action taken and continuous monitoring of compliance 
Article 126(7) recommendations and Article 126(9) notices contain a deadline for the Member State 
concerned to adopt the necessary measures to comply with the recommendation. Depending on whether 
the situation is deemed particularly serious or not, this deadline can be within three or six months in a 
recommendation and four months in a Council decision to give notice. Within this deadline, the Member 
State must report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response to the Council's 
recommendation or notice. The report, which is made public by the Member State, includes the targets for 
government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the 
revenue side which should be consistent with the Council's requirements, as well as information on the 
measures already taken and on the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets. These requirements do 
not apply to countries under a macroeconomic adjustment programme.  
In addition, as per Regulation (EU) 473/2013, euro area Member States subject to additional reporting 
requirements will provide every six months when subject to a recommendation or every three months 
when subject to a notice, a comprehensive assessment of in-year budgetary execution for the general 
government and its subsectors including any financial risks stemming from contingent liabilities. This 
additional information should also be included in the first report on action taken. Annex 13 gives the 
tables that should be used for the regular reporting for euro area countries under these additional reporting 
requirements (see Section 2.3.4 for more details).  
Regulation (EU) 473/2013 also requires euro area Member States to submit an Economic Partnership 





) The EPP is a one-off document where Member States define a roadmap for 
the fiscal structural reforms which they consider necessary to ensure an efficient and lasting correction of 
their excessive deficit. Section 3.1.2.2 presents more details on the EPPs.  
In addition, the Commission is allowed by Regulation 473/2013 to request a comprehensive independent 
audit of the public accounts and the provision of any available additional information for the purposes of 
monitoring progress towards to the correction of the excessive deficit from euro area countries, on an ad 
                                                          
(112) Non-euro area signatories of the TSCG who have chosen to be bound by the fiscal compact prior to adopting the euro 
(Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania) have also committed themselves to submitting an EPP. However, this commitment falls outside 
of the Community framework. 





hoc basis, independent of the activation of the additional reporting requirements. Box 2.7 provides more 
details. 
BOX 2.7: ADDITIONAL AD HOC INFORMATION REQUESTS FROM EURO AREA COUNTRIES 
According to Regulation 473/2013 the Commission may require that euro area Member States: 
 Carry out and report on a comprehensive independent audit of the public accounts of all subsectors 
of general government with the aim to assess their reliability, completeness and accuracy for the 
purposes of the EDP. This should preferably be conducted in coordination with national supreme 
audit institutions; 
 Provide available additional information for the purposes of monitoring progress towards the 
correction of the EDP. 
This information must be provided to the Commission following a request, and within the deadline set 
by the Commission. The request can be issued at any point as many times as the Commission wishes in 
the EDP process. The ability to request this information is not predicated on the activation of the 
additional reporting requirements set out in Section 2.3.4 as these information requests occur on an ad 
hoc basis. The right to request this information does not apply to euro area Member States subject to a 
macroeconomic adjustment programme, as it is the terms of that programme that determine the 
information flow from the Member State to the Commission and the Council. 
2.3.2. Assessing compliance with an Article 126(7) recommendation or an Article 126(9) notice  
Following the submission by the Member State of the report on action taken along with any other 
information requested by the Commission when relevant, the Commission undertakes a first, formal 
assessment to evaluate compliance with the terms of the recommendation or notice according to an agreed 
methodology, as endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on 20 June 2014.(
114
) This first assessment is done by 
assessing whether the Member State is forecast to meet the nominal and structural targets, according to 
the Member States' plans and Commission's forecasts (as it usually takes place at a time where no outturn 
data are available yet). Thus, the first assessment of compliance with the nominal targets and the 
structural adjustments is of a preliminary nature and focuses on the credibility of the Member States' 
plans. Indeed, according to the Code of Conduct on the SGP, this preliminary assessment should consider 
whether the Member State concerned has publicly announced or taken measures that seem sufficient to 
ensure adequate progress towards the correction of the excessive deficit within the time limits set by the 
Council.  
If the Commission considers that the Member State has acted in compliance with the recommendation (or 
notice) and that the EDP fiscal requirements are likely to be fulfilled, it informs the Council of its 
assessment, and the procedure is put in abeyance (see section 2.3.4). Otherwise, the procedure is either 
stepped up (if no effective action has been taken – see below) or a revised EDP recommendation or notice 
is issued (if the assessment of effective action is positive but “unexpected adverse economic events with 
major unfavourable consequences for government finances occurred” (Article 3(5) of Regulation (EC) 
1467/97). The notion of adverse economic events encompasses those developments outside of the 
government's control, which may result in the deficit target not being met, in spite of the government 
                                                          
(114) Economic and Financial Affairs Council conclusions of the meeting of 20 June 2014: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/143293.pdf  
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putting in place measures that could have been expected to correct the deficit based on the scenario 
underlying the recommendation. Essentially, these unexpected developments consist mainly of lower 
economic growth or a shortfall in revenues compared to what was expected at the time of the 
recommendation, as well as impact of other unexpected and unusual events. The following Section 
2.3.2.1 and Annex 5 detail how these factors are taken into account in the assessment of effective action.  
After the first assessment of effective action, Member States' compliance with the recommendation (or 
notice) is subject to continuous monitoring (section 2.3.4). The regular Commission forecast exercises 
provide a natural occasion to check whether Member States are on track with the correction of their 
excessive deficit.  
After the opening of an EDP and alongside the first assessment of effective action following an Article 
126(7) recommendation, euro area Member States' Economic Partnership Programme (EPP) is also 
assessed. To that end, the Commission prepares a proposal for a Council opinion on the EPP, following 
the guidance set out in section 3.1.2.1.  
 
2.3.2.1 The assessment of effective action following Article 126(7) recommendations or 126(9) 
decisions to give notice  
The Code of Conduct on the SGP stipulates that “A Member State should be considered to have taken 
‘effective action’ if it has acted in compliance with the recommendation or notice, regarding both the 
implementation of the measures required therein and budgetary execution. The assessment should in 
particular take into account whether the Member State concerned has achieved the annual budgetary 
targets initially recommended by the Council and the underlying improvement in the cyclically adjusted 
balance net of one off and other temporary measures. In case the observed budget balance proves to be 
lower than recommended or if the improvement of the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and other 
temporary measures falls significantly short of the adjustment underlying the target, a careful analysis of 
the reasons for the shortfall would be made. In particular, the analysis should take into account whether 
expenditure targets have been met and the planned discretionary measures on the revenue side have been 
implemented.” 
Following the specifications provided in the Code of Conduct on the SGP which are based on Regulation 
(EC) 1467/97, the logical and procedural steps for the assessment of effective action are summarised in a 
decision tree, endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of June 2014, which is described in Graph 2.3. Thus, the 
Commission first examines whether the Member State concerned has met or is forecast to meet the 
recommended headline deficit target and the underlying improvement in the structural balance.(115) 
Compliance with both requirements leads to the EDP being held in abeyance.  
If, on the contrary, the Member State fails or is a risk of failing to meet the recommended headline deficit 
or/and the required improvement in the structural balance, the Commission engages in a more detailed 
examination to identify the reasons for any shortfall. This examination is known as the careful analysis. 
The aim of the careful analysis is to evaluate whether the Member State concerned has delivered on the 
policy commitments set out in the recommendation or in the notice despite the effects of the action taken 
not being reflected in the deficit figures. Thus, it is essential to determine whether the targets were missed 
due to an inadequate policy response or due to forecast errors or adverse economic outturns.  
                                                          
(115)The structural balance is defined as the cyclically-adjusted general government balance net of one off and other temporary 




To that end, the careful analysis builds on two measures of fiscal effort: (i) a top-down measure which 
corresponds to the change in the structural balance adjusted for forecast errors (ΔS*) and (ii) a bottom-up 
measure based on a direct estimation of the budgetary impact of fiscal measures (FE). According to the 
Code of Conduct, the bottom-up assesses “whether expenditure targets have been met and the planned 
discretionary measures on the revenue side have been implemented”. In both cases the aim is to 
determine whether the Member State has actually delivered on the policy commitments engaged in its 
Article 126(7) recommendations or Article 126(9) notices.  
In the case where both measures indicate that the fiscal effort was equal or above the recommended one, 
there is a presumption that the Member State concerned has delivered on its policy commitments. 
Conversely, if both the top-down and bottom-up measures fall below the recommended effort, there is a 
presumption of non-delivery. When the top-down and bottom-up approaches come to different 
conclusions, there is no prior presumption on which metric best appraises the extent of government 
action. In order to enhance the quality of the estimated budgetary impact of revenue measures, the 
Commission uses all available information including, in particular, estimates from the Independent Fiscal 
Institutions. To ensure transparency the Commission provides the Council with all data needed to 
replicate the Commission estimates, including data on the yields of fiscal measures and a quantification of 
the main discretionary tax measures incorporated in the bottom-up approach. In order to conclude 
whether the Member State concerned has delivered on its policy commitments, the Commission uses 
qualitative economic judgement in making its final assessment where relevant, in particular where the 
top-down and bottom-up approaches come to different conclusions, as part of the careful analysis.  
A positive conclusion to the careful analysis implies that effective action has been taken and the 
procedure is put in abeyance. In this case if the deadline for correction turns out to be out of reach, there 
is the possibility to extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, even if the headline 
deficit target has not been met (see Section 2.3.3). Conversely, if the careful analysis concludes that the 
Member State has not delivered on its policy commitments, the procedure will be stepped up. However, 
an EDP cannot be stepped up if the Member State achieves its intermediate headline deficit targets, even 
when the recommended change in the structural balance is not achieved. At the same time, though, a 
careful analysis should be conducted to better understand the nature of the underlying budgetary 
developments. Where the absence of stepping-up of the procedure is taken based on in-year data, should 
the (notified) ex post data show that the intermediate budgetary balance has eventually not been met, the 
EDP can still be stepped up. 
It has to be borne in mind that the methodology for the assessment of effective action aims at assessing 
whether the action taken by the Member States is sufficient to meet the budgetary objectives of the 
recommendation or notice and is, as such, solely based on the analysis of indicators of budgetary effort. 
Therefore, a Member State's failure to deliver on effective action cannot be offset by structural reform 
efforts. By the same token, failure to deliver on structural reform commitments shall not affect EDP 
abeyance decisions, if/when effective action has been delivered. The Communication on Flexibility 
within the rules of the SGP(
116
) restated that the assessment of effective action remains as per the agreed 
methodology,117  which is focused on the delivery of the required budgetary effort At the same time, the 
lack of implementation of the agreed(118) structural reforms can constitute an aggravating relevant factor: 
                                                          
(116) COM(2015) 12:  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-
13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf 
(117) As endorsed by the ECOFIN Council in June 2014.  
(118) E.g. the implementation of structural reforms in the context of the European Semester, such as within the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure, as well as structural reforms detailed in the Economic Partnership Programme (see Section 3.1.2.2).  
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this could have a bearing at the margin of the careful analysis, in case of conflicting and not conclusive 
indication stemming from the top-down and bottom-up metrics.(
119
) 
The experience gained since the entry into force of the Six Pack in 2011 has shown that focusing on the 
evolution of the fiscal variables in a given year can lead to an asymmetry in the assessment of compliance 
with the recommendations. Therefore, since autumn 2014, the Commission has examined whether the 
fiscal effort over the correction period under scrutiny was delivered on a cumulative basis. In this way, a 
Member State cannot be unduly punished for a frontloaded effort. At the same time, this ensures that a 
Member State meeting its nominal target the first year without delivering the recommended annual fiscal 
effort would only be found compliant with the recommendation in the following years if it has delivered 
the cumulative fiscal effort over the correction period under scrutiny, in case the nominal deficit falls 
short of the recommended one thereafter. Thus, for the purposes of the assessment of effective action, the 
cumulative (adjusted) change in the structural balance and the annual amount of fiscal consolidation 
measures is compared with the cumulative (adjusted) change in the structural balance and the additional 
fiscal consolidation measures required in the recommendation. A numerical example of the assessment of 
effective action is presented in Annex 10. 
                                                          
(119) The implementation of reforms cannot be expected to shift per se the conclusion in favour of a positive assessment of effective 
action given that it can be assumed that the reform effort would have already been taken into account in the formulation of the EDP 








The top-down approach: the change in the adjusted structural balance 
Since the 2011 reform of the SGP, recommendations under Article 126(7) and notices under Article 
126(9) include annual nominal and structural targets, which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the 
recommendation, should be consistent with a minimum annual improvement in the structural balance of 
0.5% of GDP as a benchmark.(
120
) However, given the limitations by construction of the structural 
balance as a measure of fiscal effort,(
121
) the top-down approach adjusts the estimated change in the 
structural balance for the impact of revisions to potential output and revenue outturns with respect to the 
no-policy change scenario (see Box 1.5) forecast at the time of the recommendation (ΔS*). Thus, it 
provides a better estimate of whether a country has delivered on the policy commitments laid down in its 
                                                          
(120) EDP recommendations issued before the 2011 reform contained average targets for the overall correction period. 
(121) See for instance, Part III of the “Report on Public Finances in EMU 2013”, European Economy 4/2013 
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recommendation than a direct comparison of the estimated and the required change in the structural 
balance. See the decision tree presented in Graph 2.3. 
The change in the structural balance is adjusted (see annex 5 for more details) to net out: 
 The impact of revisions to potential output growth compared to the estimate underlying the 
recommendation, through the so-called α-parameter. In fact, a higher (or a lower) rate of potential 
output growth than estimated at the time of the recommendation would lead, in the absence of 
correction, to a higher (or a lower) estimate in terms of the change in the structural balance.  
 The impact of revisions to the composition of economic growth or of other windfalls/shortfalls in 
revenue, through the so-called β-parameter. This captures the fact that apparent revenue elasticities 
can differ from those underlying the EDP recommendations, for reasons outside the government's 
control.  
 The impact of other unexpected events under very unusual and significant circumstances, through the 
so-called γ-parameter.(122) 
These parameters are then brought together to yield ΔS*=ΔS-(α+β+γ), where ΔS is the estimated change 
in the structural balance.  
Thus, in any given year, the total structural adjustment recommended since the Article 126(7) 
recommendation (or Article 126(9) notice) was issued is compared with the adjustment delivered 
measured by the cumulative adjusted structural balance.  
All in all, the comparison between the adjusted and the unadjusted change in the structural balance gives 
rise to four possible situations set out in Graphs 2.4 and 2.5. A country that appears to be delivering the 
structural effort on the unadjusted measures (Graph 2.4) could be judged to be compliant or non-
compliant on the adjusted. Similarly, a Member State whose estimated change in the structural balance 
falls short of the recommended change, could show an adjusted structural balance signifying compliance 
(see Graph 2.5). 
                                                          
(122) Importantly, this parameter should include neither elements that affect potential growth (which will go through the parameter 
α), nor revenue elasticity (which would be already taken into account in the revenue gap β), nor one-off effects (which will not even 
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The bottom-up approach 
Since 2013, Article 126(7) recommendations contain an estimate of the amount of measures needed to 
attain the budgetary and structural deficit targets.(
123
) Notices under Article 126(9) contain a detailed 
amount of the measures to be taken to meet the annual structural budgetary targets as well as a timeline to 
implement them. As a result, the bottom-up assessment of effective action aims at identifying the 
budgetary impact of the additional fiscal measures implemented since the recommendation or notice was 
issued – measures introduced before that would already be included in the baseline scenario (see Box 
2.6). 
The methodology underlying the bottom-up assessment treats revenue and expenditure measures 
differently, reflecting the degree of control that governments typically have over them in the short-term. 
(
124
) While the total amount of revenues largely depends on endogenous factors beyond the direct control 
of the government (e.g. changes in the tax bases), expenditure can be considered as falling largely under 
the direct control of the government, except for a limited number of expenditure items.(125) Therefore, 
nominal changes in public expenditure can be broadly considered as resulting from autonomous decisions 
by the government, while on the revenue side the degree of government action is measured by the amount 
of discretionary measures effectively implemented. 
The annual bottom-up fiscal effort is defined as follows: 
    
    
          
    
           
(   
               
         )
    
           
 
     (revenue component)   (expenditure component) 
Where: 
    
          is the estimated budgetary impact of the discretionary revenue measures additional to the 
ones already included in the no-policy change scenario(
126
), as estimated at the time of the assessment, 
net of one-off measures(127) implemented in year t (or under the relevant sub-period of time under 
scrutiny).  
   
           is the change in total nominal expenditure in year t, net of one-off measures, non-
discretionary changes in interest payments, non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefits and 
public expenditures matched by EU funds as estimated at the time of the assessment as well as other 
country-specific effects in limited cases.  
                                                          
(123) For recommendations issued before 2013, a figure for the annual budgetary measures to be implemented was not included in 
the recitals. Therefore, it is not possible to compare the bottom-up assessment to any meaningful target; in those cases the 
assessment of effective action should be based on the top-down measure of fiscal effort as well as any other relevant considerations.  
(124) The different treatment also reflects the fact that for expenditures it is in many cases impossible to define a correct benchmark 
against which to evaluate the action by governments.  
(125) These are changes in unemployment benefits due to a change in the number of unemployed, changes in interest expenditure 
related to fluctuations in interest and exchange rates and the share of public expenditures matched by EU funds. 
(126) In the context of the bottom-up analysis, a “no-policy change scenario” can be also referred to as a “baseline scenario”, as it 
serves as point of reference to which the current forecast is compared. It is defined in the Staff Working Document accompanying 
the EDP recommendation. 
(127) One-off measures are by definition excluded from the calculation of the structural balance, and should therefore also not be 
taken into account in the bottom-up analysis, which presents a complementary view on effective action. For discussion on the one-
off measures, see: Public Finances in EMU 2015, chapter II.3: One-off measure – classification principles used for fiscal 




    
         is the change in the 'no-policy change' total nominal expenditure in year t, as stated in the 
EDP recommendation, corrected for statistical revisions, net of one-off measures, non-discretionary 
changes in interest payments, non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefits and public 
expenditure matched by EU funds as estimated at the time the recommendation was issued as well as 
other country-specific effects in limited cases. 
 GDPt
assesment
 is nominal GDP in year t as estimated at the time of the assessment of effective action. 
The resulting total fiscal effort delivered since the recommendation was issued is then compared to the 
annual amount of discretionary fiscal measures specified in the recitals of the Council recommendation or 
notice, on a cumulative basis. 
The assumptions underlying the recommendations are included in the Staff Working Document 
accompanying them. In order to further enhance transparency on the ex post assessment of effective 
action, the Staff Working Document, since 2015, also includes the forecast of key variables for the 
computation of the fiscal effort under the baseline (EDP) scenario. 
Bringing it all together: the careful analysis 
The careful analysis is warranted when the Member State concerned fails or it is at risk of failing to meet 
the headline deficit target and/or the required improvement in the structural balance. In order to determine 
the reasons of the shortfall and ultimately whether the country has delivered on the policy commitments 
laid down in the recommendation, the careful analysis first and foremost builds on the top-down and 
bottom-up measures of fiscal effort. If these indicators send conflicting messages, the careful analysis 
aims at disentangling the possible sources of the differences. Where relevant, any other considerations 
can also be taken into account. As already indicated, the lack of implementation of agreed structural 
reforms can constitute an aggravating relevant factor: this could have a bearing at the margin of the 
careful analysis, in case of conflicting and not conclusive indication stemming from the top-down and 
bottom-up metrics. 
Differences between the top-down and the bottom-up indicator of fiscal effort could arise for the 
following reasons:  
 The top-down and the bottom-up measures are based on different benchmark growth rates for 
structural expenditure. Namely, the baseline scenario estimated at the time of the recommendation 
which serves as baseline in the bottom-up approach and the nominal potential GDP growth rate 
corrected by the α parameter in the top-down assessment. Since the α parameter only brings a 
correction in real terms, surprises in inflation will affect the two benchmark growth rates, which are 
set in nominal terms.  
 The items excluded in the bottom-up indicator – in particular, interest payments and public 
expenditures matched by EU funds – , which remain in the computation of the top-down measure of 
fiscal effort could also explain the difference between both indicators.  
 The effect of the cycle on public expenditure, and more specifically on unemployment expenditure, is 
not measured in the same manner and may lead to slightly divergent indicators. 
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2.3.3. Cases for extending the deadline for correction – Effective action 
If a Member State is judged to have taken effective action and unexpected adverse economic events with 
major unfavourable consequences for government finances have occurred, the Commission may issue a 
recommendation for a revised Council recommendation to end the excessive deficit under Article 126(7). 
This new recommendation may extend the deadline for the correction of excessive deficit, usually by one 
year, although it could also issue new nominal and structural targets linked by a new underlying 
macroeconomic scenario, without extending the deadline. There is no obligation to extend the deadline. If 
the Commission does not choose to issue a revised recommendation, it may still do so in the future, 
provided that the Member State continues to be judged to have taken effective action. 
A conclusion of compliance or effective action should therefore lead to the following: 
 either the Commission considers that the Member State has acted in compliance with the Article 
126(7) recommendation (and when required informs the Council accordingly) and the procedure is 
placed in abeyance; 
 or the Commission considers that the Member State has taken effective action with regard to the 
Article 126(7) recommendation but that adverse unexpected events occurred. Then, the 
Commission communicates its view that effective action has been taken, and presents the Council 
with a recommendation for a revised Article 126(7) recommendation. Where this happens, the 
guidelines set out in Section 2.2.3 should be followed. 
 Alternatively, the Commission may conclude that effective action has been taken, but that no 
revised recommendation should be issued. In this case, no further action is taken and the procedure 
is put in abeyance. 
 
2.3.3.1 A general and severe downturn in the euro area or EU as a whole 
Regulation (EC) 1467/97 also includes the provision for a revised Article 126(7) recommendation (or 
notice) to be issued “in the case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a 
whole”, as long as the revised recommendation “does not endanger fiscal sustainability over the medium 
term”. This condition is a waiver to the obligation to show effective action and, a revised Article 126(7) 
or Article 126(9) may be issued. This exceptional provision is expected to be used only in the most 
unusual of circumstances. 
2.3.4. Continuous monitoring of the EDPs placed in abeyance and the correction of the 
excessive deficit 
After the initial assessment of effective action, which is the only one specifically required by the SGP, 
Member States' compliance with the recommendation (or notice(
128
)) is subject to a continuous 
monitoring. This embeds specific milestones to take stock of the situation for euro area countries which 
have had the regular reporting requirements activated, as explained in Section 2.3.1. Those countries will 
                                                          
(128) Notices under Article 126(9) include a series of deadlines with recommendations attached to them that will rhythm the pace of 




need to submit reports to the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee of the Council, 
every six months when subject an Article 126(7) recommendation or three months for Article 126(9) 
notices after the initial report on action taken as outlined in Section 2.3.1. These regular reports will cover 
the general government and its subsectors and present the in-year budgetary execution, the budgetary 
impact of discretionary measures taken on both the expenditure and revenue side, targets for government 
expenditure and revenues and information on the measures adopted and the nature of those envisaged to 
achieve the fiscal targets. The specification of the content of the regular reports has been laid down in 
Commission Delegated Regulation 877/2013(
129
) and the tables to be used are shown in Annex 13. 
The regular Commission forecast exercises (Box 1.5) provide a natural occasion to check whether 
Member States (whether subject to the regular reporting or not) are still on track with the correction of 
their excessive deficit. For euro area Member States, the Two Pack gave the Commission the possibility 
of issuing an autonomous recommendation to formally warn countries of a risk of non-compliance with 
the deadline for correction of their excessive deficit, before a lack of effective action has actually 
materialised. Box 2.8 provides more details. Where Member States are issued with a Commission 
autonomous recommendation, the assessment of whether they have complied with it should be taken into 
account in the assessment of compliance with the Council recommendation under Article 126(7) or notice 
under Article 126(9) as an aggravating or mitigating factor. 
A procedure in abeyance can be reactivated if the Commission forecasts show that the intermediary 
nominal targets set in the recommendation are at risk of not being achieved or if other information, 
including the reports transmitted by Member States, point to risks of the EDP deadline being missed. A 
planned breach of the intermediary nominal targets by the Member State itself can also lead to a 
procedure becoming active again. 
The assessment of compliance should be based on the methodology set out in Section 2.3.2. As in the first 
assessment, meeting the nominal target and the required improvement in the structural balance is 
sufficient to keep the procedure in abeyance. In the case of multi-annual EDPs, being on course to meet 
the intermediate nominal targets without delivering the required structural adjustment still entails risks for 
the future years since, if the nominal targets are later missed, it is likely that the cumulated fiscal effort 
will also be below the recommended one. This would lead to the procedure being stepped up.  
BOX 2.8: ISSUING AN AUTONOMOUS COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION TO EURO AREA MEMBER STATES AT RISK 
OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR EDP DEADLINE 
Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 473/2013 on 30 May 2013, the Commission may 
address euro area Member States it considers to be at risk of non-compliance with their EDP deadline 
with an autonomous recommendation, aiming at warning the concerned Member State of the implicit 
risks.(
130
) The autonomous recommendation can call for the full implementation of the measures in the 
Council recommendation under Article 126(7) or in the notice under Article 126(9), the adoption of other 
measures, or both, within a timeframe consistent with the deadline for correction of the excessive deficit.  
This autonomous recommendation is not meant to replace a stepping up of an EDP; instead its role is to 
warn Member States that can still meet the deadline for correcting their excessive deficits if the observed 
risks are catered for on time. The autonomous recommendation can serve in the case where there is a risk 
of the structural effort falling short of the one required, even if the nominal is on track as such a situation 
still entails risks.  
                                                          
(129) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:244:0023:0031:EN:PDF 
(130) This provision does not apply with regard to Member States under a macroeconomic adjustment programme.  
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An autonomous Commission recommendation for euro area Member States at risk of non-compliance 
with their EDP correction deadline can be issued at any time during an EDP. 
Once issued, the recommendation should be made public and presented to the Economic and Financial 
Committee and can be presented to the national Parliament of the Member State it is addressed to, at its 
request. The autonomous recommendation should contain a deadline for the Member State to report back 
to the Commission on the measures taken – for countries under regular reporting requirements the report 
on the measures taken in response to the autonomous recommendation should be presented at the next 
regular reporting date. The report on action taken should include the budgetary impact of all discretionary 
measures taken, targets for government expenditure and revenues, information on the measures adopted 
and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets, and information on the other actions being taken 
in response the Commission recommendation. The report will be made public and presented to the 
Economic and Financial Committee. On the basis of that report, the Commission will then assess whether 
the Member states has complied with the autonomous recommendation, which should be then taken into 
account in the assessment of compliance with its recommendation under Article 126(7) or notice under 
Article 126(9). 
Finally, the correction of the excessive deficit will lead to the abrogation of the procedure, if this 
correction is found to be lasting. Section 2.5 sets out the procedures to be followed. 
2.4. PROCEDURE FOLLOWING A LACK OF EFFECTIVE ACTION TO A COUNCIL EDP 
RECOMMENDATION OR DECISION TO GIVE NOTICE  
This Section looks at the procedures to be followed once the Council concludes, based on Article 126(8), 
that a Member State has not taken effective action to its Article 126(7) recommendation. Such conclusion 
leads to the stepping up of the EDP resulting in a Council decision to give notice under Article 126(9) and 
the imposition of additional sanctions for euro area Member States and in a revised Article 126(7) 
recommendation for non-euro area Member States. The only possible exception to this is in the case of a 
severe economic downturn in the euro area or the EU as a whole. The procedure following a lack of 
effective action by euro area Member States in response to a notice under Article 126(9), which consists 
of a stepping up following Article 126(11) with the imposition of sanctions and the issuance of a revised 
notice under Article 126(9), is also described in this Section. 
2.4.1. Issuing a Commission recommendation on a lack of effective action under 126(8) 
Where the Commission concludes, following the methodology set out in Section 2.3.2 that effective 
action has not been taken, it issues a recommendation for a Council decision establishing lack of effective 
action under Article 126(8). Following an Article 126(8) recommendation the Commission will then issue 
a recommendation for a Council decision giving notice under Article 126(9) for euro area Member States, 
or for a new Council recommendation under Article 126(7) for non-euro area Member States.  
As part of the follow-up to an Article 126(8) decision, the Commission may undertake surveillance 




for the purpose of on-site monitoring.(
131
) In this case, the Commission will report the findings of its 
mission to the Council and may use them to inform its assessment of effective action. 
2.4.2. Procedures following a lack of effective action in response to a recommendation under 
Article 126(7): Imposing sanctions to euro area member States and the application of 
macroeconomic conditionality 
Following the Council's adoption of a decision under Article 126(8) establishing a lack of effective action 
in response to the Article 126(7) recommendations, the Commission shall issue a recommendation for a 
Council decision requiring the euro area Member State to pay a fine equal to 0.2% of its previous year's 
GDP. The Commission shall issue its recommendation within 20 days of the Council's adoption of the 
Article 126(8) decision. The fine will be payable to the Commission and will be assigned to the European 
Stability Mechanism. If the Member State had already lodged a non-interest bearing deposit (see Section 
2.2.4), the latter will be converted into a fine and any difference in the applicable amount will be returned 
to the Member State or made up by it. 
The decision imposing a fine shall be considered adopted, unless the Council decides by a qualified 
majority to reject the Commission's recommendation within 10 days of the Commission's adoption. 
While the default position is for the Commission to ask for a fine equal to 0.2% of the previous year's 
GDP, the Commission may recommend that the Council reduce the amount or cancel the fine altogether. 
This can happen on the grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following the reasoned request 
by the Member State concerned, addressed to the Commission within 10 days of the Council's adoption of 
the Article 126(8) decision. Moreover, the Council may also amend the Commission's recommendation 
for a fine using qualified majority voting and adopt the amended text as a Council decision. 
In addition, all Member States, except the United Kingdom, could have a suspension of commitments – or 
payments – of the European Structural and Investment Funds, following an Article 126(8) decision. For 
(non-euro area) Member States subject to a second or subsequent Article 126(8) decision, the application 
of macroeconomic conditionality should involve an increase in suspensions. Box 2.9 explains this 
macroeconomic conditionality. 
BOX 2.9: EUROPEAN FUNDS CONDITIONALITY IN 2014-2020 
From 2014, a new regulatory framework has entered into force, which links the economic surveillance 
procedures to all the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI) for the first time. Previously, a 
macro-fiscal conditionality clause existed for the Cohesion Fund since its inception in 1994, linked to the 
fund original purpose to ensure growth-oriented investment necessary for real convergence while 
Member States were implementing budgetary consolidation with the aim of meeting the Maastricht 
criteria.  
Since 1 January 2014 the conditionality clause applies to the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and 
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. The extension of the macroeconomic conditionality to all the 
                                                          
(131) In accordance with Article 10a of amended Regulation 1467/97. 
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ESI Funds means that it now applies to all Member States, as all Member States are recipients of at least 
some of these funds.(132) Non-compliance with specific elements of the SGP can therefore lead to a 
suspension of funding in addition to the provisions contained in Regulation 1467/97 on the corrective arm 
and in sanctions Regulation 1173/2011 for euro area Member States. The idea underlying this 
macroeconomic conditionality is that the effectiveness of cohesion policy should not be undermined by 
unsound fiscal and macroeconomic policies. 
There are two mechanisms for suspending financing under the structural funds. The first is after a lack of 
effective action by the Member State following a Commission request to review and propose amendments 
to its Partnership Agreement and relevant programmes ('first strand'). Such a request can be made in order 
to support reforms addressing Council recommendations under the European Semester or the Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure, or to maximise the impact of the funds for countries receiving financial 
assistance.(
133
) This mechanism is therefore not directly linked to the quantitative assessments under the 
SGP, although it is linked to the Country-Specific Recommendations issued under the preventive arm of 
the SGP. In addition, following the commitment taken at the Statement of 20 December 2013(
134
), the 
Commission adopted a Communication in July 2014(
135
) which provides guidelines on how some of the 
provisions of this first mechanism linking effectiveness of ESI Funds to sound economic governance will 
be implemented.  
The second mechanism ('second strand') is both automatic and directly linked to the corrective arm of the 
SGP. It provides for suspensions of ESI Funds in the event of non-compliance with specific elements of 
the EDP, the Excessive Imbalances Procedure and adjustment programmes linked to financial assistance. 
In terms of the EDP, a Council decision on a lack of effective action under article 126(8) or 126(11) will 
automatically lead to a Commission proposal for the suspension of part or all of the commitments under 
the ESI Funds. In the case where immediate action is sought, or where there has been significant non-
compliance – the Commission may instead propose a suspension of part or all of the payments rather than 
commitments. 
A Commission proposal on the suspension of commitments is subject to Reverse Qualified Majority 
Voting (RQMV) in the Council.(
136
) It is deemed adopted unless a qualified majority of the Council 
decides to reject it within one month of its submission. Once adopted, it applies to commitments from 1 
January of the forthcoming year. Conversely, a Commission proposal on the suspension of payments is 
subject to normal qualified majority voting in the Council. Once adopted, it applies to requests for 
payment submitted after the date of the decision to suspend. 
Regulation 1303/2013 sets out specific conditions for both the scope and the level of suspensions that the 
Commission may propose: the principles of proportionality, equal treatment between Member States and 
the need to take the economic and social circumstances and the impact of the suspension on the economy 
of the Member State concerned will have to be taken into account. Annex III of the Regulation provides 
details on how these conditions should be applied.(
137
) 
For a decision to suspend commitments following a first decision on a lack of effective action under 
126(8), the suspension can be at most equal to 50% of the commitments or 0.5% of GDP and applies to 
                                                          
(132)The only exception to this is the United Kingdom, which by virtue of Article 23(13) is exempt from any suspensions of 
commitments or payments of the Funds, based in particular on Protocol 15 of the TFEU on certain provisions relating to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
(133) A request to re-programme can only be made between 2015 and 2019. 
(134) Statement by the European Commission on Article 23. OJ C375/2 of 20 December 2013. 
(135) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions; “Guidelines on the application of the measures linking effectiveness of the European Structural 
and Investment Funds to sound economic governance according to Article 23 of Regulation 1303/2013”, COM (2014) 494 final of 
30 July 2014. 





the year following the decision to suspend. These limits can increase gradually to 100% of the next year's 
commitments, following subsequent decisions on a lack of effective action, in line with the seriousness of 
non-compliance, and to 1% of nominal GDP in the case of persistent non-compliance with the EDP.  
The suspensions of commitments or payments should be lifted once the EDP is placed in abeyance or 
abrogated by the Council. In the case of suspension of commitments, it is the role of the Commission to 
lift the suspension, without delay. The suspended commitments are then budgeted. In the case of a 
suspension of payments, a Council decision based on a Commission proposal is necessary. 
2.4.3. Procedures following a lack of effective action in response to a notice under Article 126(9): 
Imposing sanctions to euro area Member States(138) 
Where the Commission concludes, following the methodology set out in Section 2.3.2 that effective 
action has not been taken, it will issue a recommendation for a Council decision establishing a lack of 
effective action under Article 126(11), which should impose/intensify sanctions. Following an Article 
126(11) recommendation the Commission will then issue a new recommendation for a Council decision 
giving notice under Article 126(9).  
The Commission recommendation under Article 126(11) should, as a rule, impose a fine on the Member 
State. The amount of the fine will comprise a fixed component equal to 0.2% of GDP and a variable 
component. The variable component should equal 1/10 the absolute value of the difference between the 
balance as a percentage of GDP in the preceding year and either the reference value for the government 
balance or, if non-compliance with budgetary discipline includes the debt criterion, the budget balance as 
a percentage of GDP that should have been achieved that year under the Article 126(9) notice. No fine 
should exceed 0.5% of GDP, annually. However, fines can be supplemented by other sanctions specified 
under Article 126(11), namely: 
 a requirement for the Member State concerned to make public additional information, to be 
specified by the Council, before issuing bonds and securities 
 an invitation to the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy towards the 
Member State. 
Each year after the imposition of such a fine, the Commission will assess whether the Member State has 
taken effective action in relation to its Article 126(9) notice and issue a recommendation to the Council to 
take a decision about effective or a lack of effective action according to the methodology set out in 
Section 2.3.2. Where the recommendation is for a lack of effective action decision, the Commission will 
recommend a new decision under Article 126(11) accompanied by a new notice under Article 126(9) and 
hence the imposition of another fine. Fines should therefore be paid every year until the EDP is placed in 
abeyance or abrogated. The fines will be assigned to the European Stability Mechanism (as per Article 16 
of Regulation 1467/97). 
In addition, the application of macroeconomic conditionality linked to the European Structural and 
Investment Funds should be widened, as set out in Box 2.9. With each decision on a lack of effective 
action, the Commission will recommend an increase in suspensions. 
                                                          
(138) Article 139(2) of the TFEU specify that the provisions of Articles 126(9) and 126(11) apply to those Member States whose 
currency is the euro.   
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2.5. ABROGATION OF THE EDP  
The conditions for abrogating the EDP(
139
) are included in the Code of Conduct on the SGP. In 
particular, abrogation should be based on notified (i.e. observed) data and the EDP should only be 
abrogated if the correction of the excessive deficit will be lasting and the debt will be compliant with the 
debt benchmark in its forward-looking specification. Therefore, an EDP can only be abrogated if both 
criteria – deficit and debt – are projected to be met on the basis of the Commission forecast.(
140
)  
For the deficit criterion, compliance with the nominal requirement is absolute, apart from the possibility 
to take into account the cost of pension reforms as set out in Box 2.4. Irrespective of the structural effort 
implemented, a “lasting correction” is deemed achieved if: 
(i) the notified data for the previous year show a deficit below 3% of GDP or a deficit close to 3% of 
GDP that has declined substantially and continuously and where the excess over the 3% threshold is fully 
explained by the net cost of the implementation of a multi-pillar pension system that includes a 
mandatory, fully funded pillar;  
and 
(ii) the Commission forecasts indicate that the deficit will not exceed the 3% of GDP reference value over 
the forecast horizon on a no-policy change basis (see Box 1.5) or where the excess over the 3% threshold 
is fully explained by the net cost of the implementation of a multi-pillar pension system that includes a 
mandatory, fully funded pillar. 
It should be noted that as abrogation takes place on the basis of achievement of the nominal targets, apart 
from the special case of pension reforms, the impact of one-off and temporary measures (including 
financial sector interventions) is not netted out of the figures considered, as it is in assessing effective 
action based on the calculation of the structural balance.  
For the debt criterion, the requirement is as follows: 
(i) the notified debt is below 60% of GDP and it is expected to remain so based on the Commission 
forecast.  
or, 
(ii) the debt is above 60% of GDP but the forward-looking element of the debt benchmark assessed for 
the year t+2 is met, based on the Commission forecast (on a no-policy change basis).  
It is worth emphasising that the need to respect both criteria implies that an EDP cannot be abrogated if 
the forward-looking debt benchmark is not complied with, even if the deficit is below 3% of GDP, 
irrespective of whether the EDP was opened on the basis of deficit criterion, debt criterion or both. 
Table 2.2 details possible cases in which an EDP abrogation can be considered, in relation to the 
fulfilment of the forward-looking element of the debt benchmark, for a deficit- or a debt-based EDP. One 
point deserves attention. When the forward-looking element of the debt benchmark is fulfilled, Member 
                                                          
(139) An excessive deficit may be deficit and/or debt based as indicated in section 2.2.1. 
(140) It should be noted that the provision for a transition period for the debt benchmark means that the EDPs that were open in 




States are assessed according to the position of their general government deficit vis-à-vis the 3% of GDP 
Treaty reference value. However, when the forward-looking element of the debt benchmark is not 
fulfilled, Member States are assessed according to the position of their general government deficit vis-à-
vis the target set in the recommendation for the final year: this can lead to a revised recommendation or to 
a stepping-up of the procedure (along with revised recommendation).  
The difference stems from the fact that, if the debt has achieved a path consistent with the forward-
looking element of the debt benchmark on the basis of the Commission forecast under a no-policy change 
assumption, there is no particular reason to require a further adjustment, provided the general government 
deficit is below the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value over the Commission forecast horizon. However, 
if the forward-looking element of the debt benchmark has not been complied with by the deadline, the 
above argument does not hold and the reference for the assessment of the general government deficit is no 
longer the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value, but the specific value set in the recommendation.  
Table 2.2 also confirms that this approach secures full consistency between EDPs opened on the basis of 
debt and deficit criteria. 
Following the abrogation of the EDP, a Member State that had lodged a non-interest bearing deposit 
should have the deposit returned to it. The Council (on a Commission recommendation) will also 
abrogate all outstanding sanctions, but any fines imposed will not be reimbursed. The suspensions of 
commitments or payments due to the macroeconomic conditionality condition of the European Structural 
and Investment Funds should also be lifted once the EDP is abrogated by the Council. In the case of 
suspension of commitments, it is the role of the Commission to lift the suspension, without delay. The 
suspended commitments are then budgeted. In the case of a suspension of payments, a Council decision 
based on a Commission proposal is necessary. 
 
 
Table 2.2: Decision matrix for the abrogation of deficit-based and debt-based EDPs, depending on the fulfilment of the forward-looking 




Below the nominal target set for the 
final year and below 3% over the 
forecast horizon

























revised recommendation  
and stepping-up
Below 3% in actual data and 
over the forecast horizon
Above 3% in actual data or over the 
forecast horizon
Above the nominal target set for the final 
year (possibly < 3%) or above 3% over the 
forecast horizon
Assessment of effective action Assessment of effective action
Forward-looking element of the debt benchmark
Fulfilled Not fulfilled
General government deficit General government deficit
 
3. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF BUDGETARY 




This Part focuses on the institutional context and is divided into two Sections. Section 3.1 considers the 
institutional dimension of the European side of budgetary surveillance, placing the SGP (with a special 
focus on the Draft Budgetary Plans) in the context of not just budgetary but also wider economic 
surveillance. Section 3.2 discusses the obligations on Member States in terms of their own budgetary 
processes, stemming from the Six Pack, the Two Pack, and the Fiscal Compact established by the inter-
governmental Treaty for Stability Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG). 
3.1. THE CYCLE OF INTEGRATED BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC SURVEILLANCE 
Between its adoption in 1997 and the start of the economic crisis in 2008, the SGP was amended once, in 
2005. The onset of the crisis prompted an all-encompassing reform of the EU economic governance 
structure with the institution of the European Semester and the entry into force of the so-called Six Pack 
and Two Pack legislative packages (as set out in Graph 0.1 in the Introduction Section). Outside of the 
EU framework, the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (TSCG), which includes the Fiscal Compact, was signed by 25 of the then 27 EU 
Member States.(
141
) The 2005 reform focussed on strengthening the economic rationale of the SGP while 
remaining strictly within the original framework. The reforms that followed branched out into new 
directions, increasing the interrelations between fiscal, macroeconomic and structural policy surveillance 
and completing the cycle of surveillance by reinforcing the links between the preventive and the 
corrective arms of the Pact and introducing requirements on Member States' national fiscal rules and 
frameworks that are central to the attainment of European goals.  
3.1.1. The integration of the preventive and the corrective arms and the annual cycle of 
monitoring 
At its inception the SGP envisaged that compliance with the preventive arm of the Pact would be assessed 
once a year on the basis of the Member States SCPs and in the corrective arm compliance would be 
assessed on an ad hoc basis depending on the timing of the opening of the EDP. Fiscal targets were 
originally set in nominal terms both in the preventive and in the corrective arm of the Pact. Once a 
Member State deficit came in below 3% a Member State was considered to have corrected its excessive 
deficit, remaining then subject to the preventive arm's requirement of progress towards a budgetary 
position of close to balance or in surplus. The requirements under both arms were brought closer together 
with the 2005 reform of the SGP, by which Member States were requested to deliver a determined fiscal 
effort – measured by the improvement of the structural balance – so as to ensure either a correction of its 
excessive deficit when in the corrective arm or the attainment of a medium-term objective (MTO) 
expressed in structural terms in the preventive arm.  
The interlinkages between the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP were further reinforced with 
the 2011 reform of the SGP – the so-called Six Pack. Compliance with the preventive and corrective arms 
                                                          
(141) Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013. 
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is now subject to continuous monitoring. The experience of the crisis highlighted the crucial importance 
of ensuring strong underlying public finances during good economic times. The Commission forecasts 
(see Box 1.5), which are issued three times a year – winter, spring and autumn –, constitute the key 
milestones for these regular fiscal assessments. For Member States in the corrective arm, should the 
Commission assessment conclude on non-compliance with the SGP requirements, this would lead to a 
stepping up of the EDP together with the issuance of revised recommendations or notice and likely 
financial sanctions for euro area countries (Section 2.4). For Member States under the preventive arm, a 
significant deviation from the adjustment path towards the MTO would trigger ex post a procedure for the 
correction of the significant deviation (Significant Deviation Procedure, as described in Section 1.4), 
while a breach of the deficit or debt criteria could lead to an EDP being launched (Section 2.2). 
Furthermore, Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the 
euro area states that for Member States having placed an interest-bearing deposit under the preventive 
arm, the latter is automatically turned into a non-interest-bearing deposit with the start of an EDP. Thus, 
linking non-compliance with the preventive arm to the sanctions system under the corrective arm.  
With the entry into force of the Two Pack in May 2013, the regular surveillance processes become 
formalised for euro area Member States. Regulation (EU) 473/2013 sets a common budgetary timeline, 
according to which all euro area Member States must prepare and make public their draft budget(
142
) for 
the forthcoming year by 15 October. By that date all euro area Member States – except those under a 
macroeconomic adjustment programme – must transmit a Draft Budgetary Plan (DBP) for the next year 
to the Commission and the Eurogroup.  
The Commission then assesses the DBPs for (ex ante) compliance with the Member State's obligations 
under the SGP, covering both the preventive and corrective arms of the Pact, as appropriate for each 
Member State. The methodology and the rationale used for the assessment of compliance of the DBPs is 
the same that applies to the assessment of the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) in spring, as 
outlined in Section 1.3.2.    
The resulting annual cycle of surveillance, which applies across both arms of the Pact for the euro area, is 
shown in Graph 3.1. The assessment of the SCPs occurs alongside the publication of the Commission 
spring forecasts, while the Commission opinion on the DBPs is issued alongside the Commission autumn 
forecasts. On the basis of the Commission winter forecasts, which are usually published around February, 
the Commission also checks whether Member States took into account the Commission Opinion on their 
DBP. Furthermore, the Commission can issue an autonomous recommendation when appropriate. All in 
all, the Two-Pack addresses the need for stronger surveillance mechanisms in the euro area given the 
higher potential for spillover effects of budgetary policies in the common currency area. 
                                                          




Graph 3.1: The annual cycle of surveillance for the euro area 
 
 
3.1.1.1 The Draft Budgetary Plans for the euro area 
With the entry into force of the Regulation (EU) 473/2013 in May 2013, euro area Member States must 
submit their Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs) by the 15 October every year.  
According to the Code of Conduct on the Two Pack,(143) if a Member State is ruled by a government not 
enjoying full budgetary powers according to the national constitutional rules and/or conventions at the 
time when the draft budget law should be submitted to the national parliament (e.g. caretaker government; 
end-of mandate government in reason of upcoming national elections), the incoming government should 
submit an updated draft budgetary plan to the Commission and to the Eurogroup once it takes office. This 
is without prejudice to the obligation of submitting a DBP by 15 October, as per Article 6(1) of 
Regulation 473/2013.(144) The Code of Conduct provisions are meant at preserving the Two-Pack spirit of 
enhanced budgetary cooperation, which aims at equipping the debate in the National Parliament with an 
independent Opinion from the Commission before the final approval of the budget, while allowing for the 
flexibility needed to cover different national processes and situations. The submission of the updated draft 
budgetary plan should as a rule take place at least one month before the draft budget law is planned to be 
adopted by the national parliament, except where this would prove not feasible due to the country specific 
parliamentary approval calendar. In the latter case, the submission should still take place in time to allow 
the Commission to adopt an informed opinion on the DBP and the Eurogroup to hold a proper discussion 
well before the draft budget law is planned to be adopted by the national parliament. 
The DBPs translate the SCP plans into concrete and detailed macro-fiscal projections and measures for 
the forthcoming year. They are synthetic documents that present the actual measures that the government 
is placing before national Parliament. In line with the requirements on the SCPs for euro area Member 
States, the DBPs should also be based on independently produced or endorsed macroeconomic forecasts. 
                                                          
(143) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/2014-11-07_two_pack_coc_amended_en.pdf  
(144) In this context, it can be considered a best practice to submit a DBP under the no-policy-change assumptions. 
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The DBPs are then examined by the Commission to check their compliance with the SGP requirements 
and the fiscal Country-Specific Recommendations issued under the European Semester. Section 3.1.1.2 
describes the relevant requirements. Then, as detailed in Section 3.1.1.3, the Commission issues an 
Opinion on each plan by the latest on 30 November – which is meant to allow changes to be made to the 
draft budget before its adoption.  
 
3.1.1.2 Assessing compliance with the reporting requirement for the Draft Budgetary Plans 
The content of the DBPs must comply with Regulation 473/2013 and the Code of Conduct on the Two 
Pack(
145
), which sets out guidelines on their content and format. Member States are expected to follow 
these guidelines, and to justify any departure from them. In order to facilitate comparisons across 
countries, Member States are expected, as far as possible, to follow the model structure for the plans 
presented in the Code of Conduct on the Two Pack, summarising quantitative information in a 
standardised set of tables. This standardisation of the format and content of the plans should ensure 
equality of treatment. The tables to be supplied are replicated in Annex 12. The DBPs should show 
whether the draft budget is consistent with the SGP. 
Economic and budgetary forecasts and plans 
The DBPs contains projections for the main variables relative to government finances as well as their 
relevant components, including a detailed description of the discretionary measures included in the draft 
budget.  
They should provide detailed information on the underlying macroeconomic scenario in order to allow 
their fiscal information to be assessed in the appropriate context. Crucially, since the entry into force of 
the Two Pack, national budgets – and consequently draft budgetary plans – should be based on 
macroeconomic forecasts either produced or endorsed by an independent body. From the fiscal side, they 
should contain general government budgetary targets broken down by subsector along with detailed 
information on the general government debt. These overall figures allow an assessment of compliance of 
the overall strategy with the SGP. General government expenditure and revenue projections should be 
given both at unchanged policy (explaining the assumptions, methodologies and relevant parameters) and 
in terms of targets along with a description of the discretionary measures taken by the central government 
(and other subsectors of the general government, where possible) that will bridge the gap between the 
targets and the unchanged policy figures, in order to assess possible risks associated to the attainment of 
such targets. The discretionary measures should be presented in terms of an exhaustive technical 
description of the measures taken by all sub-sectors, along with information concerning the motivation, 
design and implementation of the measures. The time profile of measures should be given in such a way 
as to distinguish between measures with a transitory budgetary effect that does not lead to sustained 
change in the inter-temporal budgetary position and those that have a permanent impact.  
In addition to these data, the DBPs should also indicate whether the budgetary targets for the forthcoming 
year are consistent with the Member State's obligations under the SGP and other surveillance procedures. 
A description and indication of how the discretionary measures in the draft budget contribute to the 
attainment of the Country-Specific Recommendations or the national targets in accordance with the 
Union's strategy for growth and jobs should be given. 





The DBPs should also contain a comparison of the general government net lending/borrowing figures 
both overall and on unchanged policies with the figures presented in the Stability Programme and 
distributional assessment of the main measures should also be given, where possible. The methodology, 
economic models and assumptions underpinning the information contained in the draft budgetary plans 
should be set out. 
As the aim of the DBPs should be to assess whether the forthcoming budget is consistent with the 
common European fiscal rules and to inform the national budgetary debate, the DBPs contain data for the 
year that is ending and the forthcoming year.  
Quality of the data 
The figures presented must be based on realistic and cautious macroeconomic forecasts, that have been 
produced or endorsed by and independent body – Section 3.2.2 provides more details. There is also a 
requirement for Member States to indicate whether their budgetary forecasts have been produced or 
endorsed by an independent body. 
The data used should be in line with the standards established at European level, in particular in the 
context of the European system of accounts (ESA) as set out in Regulation (EU) 549/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 as of September 2014. Moreover, the forecasts 
presented should be prepared in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of the Council Directive 
2011/85/EU of the 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. 
 
3.1.1.3 Preparing the Commission opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plans 
The Commission must issue an opinion on each DBP as soon as possible after its submission and at the 
latest by the 30 November. At the outset, it is important to realise that the assessment is done in two 
stages: (i) taking the DBP targets at face value after recalculating the structural balance based on the 
commonly agreed methodology(
146
), in order to detect possible deliberate deviations from the 
requirements, and (ii) taking into account the risks attached to the DBP scenario, as embodied in, for 
instance, the most recent Commission forecasts.  
The opinion will either indicate a positive assessment of the plan or will point out the underlying risks 
which could stem from the implementation of the plan for the forthcoming year. The Opinion will be 
based on the adequacy and likely impact of the discretionary measures included in the draft budget in 
meeting the Member State's obligation with respect to the SGP.  
Unlike the Country-Specific Recommendations under the European Semester, the Opinions on the DBPs 
are adopted by the Commission instead of the Council. Once adopted, these opinions will be made public 
and presented to the Eurogroup, alongside a Commission assessment of the overall budgetary situation 
and prospects in the euro area as a whole. This assessment may outline measures to reinforce the 
coordination of budgetary and macroeconomic policy at the euro area. Furthermore, the Commission 
should present its Opinion to the national Parliament of the Member State concerned at its request, after it 
has been made public. The opinion will serve as an additional element to be taken into account as a 
                                                          
(146)  For more details, see “The production function methodology for calculating potential growth rates and output gaps”, European 
Economy, Economic Papers No. 535, November 2014. This is implemented by the Commission services through the CONV 
simplified routine to recalculate the potential GDP/output gap submitted by the Member States in their plans. 
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relevant factor in any subsequent steps under the SGP, especially where an excessive deficit materialises, 
following risks identified in the opinion not being addressed by the Member State.  
In the case of particularly serious non-compliance with the SGP, an Opinion will be adopted requesting 
submission of a new plan according to the timetable set out in Table 3.1. In such cases, the Commission 
must consult the Member State within one week of receiving the DBP and will then adopt its Opinion 
requesting a new plan within two weeks of the submission of the DBP. According to the Code of Conduct 
on the Two Pack, if as a result of the consultation process the concerned Member State decides to modify 
the draft budget, notably through additional measures, to avoid being issued a negative opinion, the 
changes to the DBP should be publicly announced and ideally embedded, if feasible, in an updated DBP 
before the expiry of the two weeks deadline for the adoption of an opinion requesting a new DBP.  
In general, a revised draft budgetary plan should be submitted as soon as possible and in any event within 
three weeks of the date of the Opinion requesting the revision. Following the submission of the revised 
plan, the Commission will issue a new Opinion within three weeks of its receipt. This tight time schedule 
has been adopted to enable the Member State to submit a new draft plan and receive the Opinion on the 
new draft plan in view of the adoption of the budget law by the national Parliament before the end of the 
year. 
Table 3.1: Process for the autumn assessment of DBPs 
 
Deadline Actor Action 
15 October Member States 
Submission of the DBP to the Commission 
and the Eurogroup 
End-November at the latest Commission Adopts an Opinion on each DBP 
If Commission detects particularly serious non-compliance with SGP obligations in a DBP 
1 week of submission Commission Consults the Member State concerned  
2 weeks of submission Commission 
Adopts a negative Opinion requesting a 
revised DBP to be submitted within 3 weeks 
3 weeks of the date of 




Submits a revised DBP 
3 weeks of submission of 
revised DBP at the latest 
Commission Adopts a new Opinion on revised DBP 
 
 
According to Code of Conduct on the Two Pack, 'particularly serious non-compliance' could be found in 
the cases described below. These examples are non-exhaustive. Therefore, there may be other 
circumstances which represent a serious risk of non-compliance with the SGP and trigger a Commission 
Opinion requesting the submission of a new DBP: 






 for Member States in the preventive arm of the SGP, if the fiscal effort envisaged in the DBP falls 
clearly short of the fiscal effort recommended by the Council in accordance existing Council 
recommendation issued in accordance with Article 121(4) of the TFEU;  
 for Member States in the corrective arm of the SGP, if the fiscal effort envisaged in the DBP falls 
clearly short of the recommended fiscal effort by the Council in accordance with Article 126(7) or 
126(9) TFEU; 
 where the implementation of the initial budgetary plan would put at risk the financial stability of the 
Member State concerned or would risk jeopardizing the proper functioning of the economic and 
monetary union.  
3.1.2. The wider EU's annual cycle of economic surveillance 
3.1.2.1 The main steps of the European Semester 
Since the introduction of the European Semester in 2010, the surveillance of budgetary and economic 
policies takes place over the first six months of every year.  
The entry into force of the Six Pack continued along this road of integration of economic governance. The 
role of the European Semester was codified in the newly amended Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the 
preventive arm of the Pact, placing the submission and assessment of the SCPs within its context. It also 
introduced the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP), which is also conducted under the auspices 
of the European Semester.  
The European Semester is launched each year with the presentation of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 
by the Commission at the end of the previous year. In this document, the Commission presents its 
assessment of the economic situation in the European Union and sets out its priorities for the coming year 
in terms of the economic and budgetary policies and reforms to boost growth and employment. At the 
same time, the Commission produces the recommendations for the Euro area. This common timing 
reflects common challenges of the Euro area ahead of country specific discussions. In addition, an Alert 
Mechanism Report (AMR) is published under the macroeconomic of imbalances procedure (MIP), to 
identify which countries deserve closer attention through in-depth reviews that are integrated in country 
reports. At the end of February, the Commission releases the Country Reports (Staff Working 
documents). The Country Reports analyse Member States' economic and social developments. They 
identify key macroeconomic and structural challenges and assess progress in advancing reforms. They 
also analyse more specifically the existence and the extent of possible macroeconomic imbalances for 
those Member States which have been selected as requiring an In-Depth Review in the Alert Mechanism 
Report, which is published in the context of the MIP. 
The March European Council reports on its conclusions on the discussion of the AGS and issues general 
policy guidance for Member States. Following the adoption of the European Council conclusions, 
Member States submit their SCPs in April, preferably by mid-April and not later than 30 April to the 
Commission and the Council. These outline the public finance plans of Member States(
147
) and are 
submitted alongside the National Reform Programmes (NRPs), which outline economic plans and report 
on progress made over the past year. 
                                                          
(147) The SCPs are also the vehicle through which Member State can apply for the use of the structural reform clause or the 
investment clause under the preventive arm of the SGP (see annex  3). 
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Based on the Country Reports and upon examining the SCPs and NRPs the Commission proposes 
country-specific recommendations in the relevant policy areas. The Commission proposal includes its 
opinion for relevant Member States (all except Member States subject to a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme) on their Stability or Convergence Programme.  
Based on the Commission's proposals, the ECOFIN Council then adopts the country specific 
recommendations. The Council opinions on each Member State's Stability or Convergence Programme 
are usually reflected in the recitals and the recommendation n°1 of the Country Specific 
Recommendations. The recommendations for each Member State are discussed and are endorsed by the 
European Council in June before being adopted by the ECOFIN, which concludes the European 
Semester. In line with Article 2-ab of Regulation (EC) 1466/97 the Council is “expected to, as a rule, 
follow the recommendations and proposals of the Commission or explain its position publicly”. This is 
known as the “comply or explain” principle and is not just confined to the European Semester. It creates a 
strong presumption in favour of the Council's opinion following the Commission's line, unless any 
divergence from it can be backed up by strong public explanations.  
In addition to the documents submitted directly to the Commission and the Council, euro area Member 
States must also make public their national medium-term fiscal plans in the context of the European 
Semester. The national medium-term fiscal plans must contain at least all the information contained in the 
Stability Programmes and must be consistent with the framework for economic policy coordination in the 
context of the annual cycle surveillance, including the policy guidance issued at the beginning of the 
cycle and with recommendations issued under the SGP, the European Semester and the opinions on the 
Economic Partnership Programmes. 
BOX 3.1: EURO AREA COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES – A LIGHTENING OF THE BUDGETARY 
  SURVEILLANCE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TWO PACK FOR COUNTRIES UNDER A MACROECONOMIC 
  ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME 
Regulation (EU) 472/2013 of the Two Pack, which entered into force in May 2013, provides a 
framework for the surveillance of euro area Member States experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability. In doing so, it sets out the conditions under which 
countries can be placed under enhanced surveillance and the obligations that then apply to them, as 
well as the general framework within which the surveillance of countries under a macroeconomic 
adjustment programme will take place. In order to avoid overburdening countries through a replication 
of surveillance and monitoring exercises, the Regulation streamlines the requirements of the SGP for 
countries under a macroeconomic adjustment programme. 
In this way, euro area Member States that are under a macroeconomic adjustment programme are:  
 exempt from submitting a Stability Programme, as the content that would form the Stability 
Programme should be integrated in the macroeconomic adjustment programme. In addition, such 
Member States are exempt from the general monitoring and assessments under the European 
Semester. 
 exempt from submitting the reports on action taken for the first assessment after the issuance of 
the Article 126(7) recommendations or notice under Article 126(9) when under EDP, and from the 
regular monitoring envisaged by the EDP Regulation 1467/97 
 exempt from the enhanced regular surveillance when under EDP, as set up by the Two Pack, from 
the submission of an EPP when placed under EDP and from ad hoc information requests as part of 
their EDP 





3.1.2.2 Introducing concepts of structural policy into the SGP: the role of the Economic 
Partnership Programmes (EPPs)  
The institution of the European Semester and integration of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
(MIP) within it were a clear indication of the decision to treat economic and budgetary policy in a more 
unified manner, taking their interactions and interdependencies into account. The TSCG built on this 
through a commitment for signatories placed under EDP to “put in place a budgetary and economic 
partnership programme (EPP) including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put 
in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of its excessive deficit.” This 
commitment was subsequently put within the EU framework in Regulation (EU) 473/2013 of the Two 
Pack, which requires the submission of an EPP for all euro area Member States entering EDP. 
The introduction of EPPs is based on the fact that excessive public deficits may be rooted – at least in part 
– in structural weaknesses. If these weaknesses are not directly addressed, budgetary measures may be 
insufficient to produce a lasting correction of the deficit. Instead, addressing the underlying weaknesses is 
likely to be effective and more efficient from an economic point of view, over the medium and longer 
terms. The role of the EPP is to act as a roadmap for the fiscal structural reforms which Member States 
consider to be necessary to ensure the efficient and lasting correction of their excessive deficit and thus, 
they serve to complement the budgetary measures taken over the course of an EDP with a wider strategy 
aimed at avoiding the occurrence of excessive deficits. According to the Code of Conduct on the Two 
Pack, the EPPs should identify specific priorities enhancing competitiveness and long-term sustainable 
growth and addressing its structural weaknesses. In particular, EPPs should detail the main fiscal 
structural reforms, such as those referring to taxation, pension, health systems and budgetary frameworks 
that will be instrumental to correct the excessive deficit in a lasting manner. Where appropriate, the EPPs 
should also identify the potential financial needs and resources.  
The EPPs are drawn up by national authorities and submitted at the time of the report on action taken, 
following the opening of the EDP and the issuance of a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) of 
the Treaty. In drawing up its EPP, the Member State should base its approach on the existing surveillance 
instruments, such as the Country-Specific Recommendations issued on the basis of the Stability 
Programme and the National Reform Programmes, in order to identify the set of fiscal structural reforms 
and priorities that will best underpin a lasting correction of its deficit. As a general guide, the relevant 
CSRs might be those referring to taxation, social security and health systems and budgetary frameworks. 
The EPP should therefore act as a continuation and intensification of the coordination between budgetary 
and structural policies which takes place under the European Semester.  
Countries under the corrective arm of the MIP – known as the Excessive Imbalances Procedure (EIP) – 
will already have drawn up a comprehensive roadmap of reforms when entering the EIP, known as the 
Corrective Action Plan (CAP). As it would make little sense from the point of view of policy coherence 
to add another policy document on structural reforms, countries already under the EIP are not asked to 
submit an EPP. Instead their pre-existing CAP can be amended to ensure that there is sufficient focus on 
measures that can underpin healthy public finances. 
Similarly, the link between the EPP and the CAP is recognised for countries under the EIP once they are 
under EDP and have submitted and EPP. In these cases, the EPP should be incorporated in the new CAP, 
which then takes precedence in the monitoring. 
The EPP will be submitted at the time of the report on action taken, after the opening of an EDP. In this 
way, it will be assessed at the same time as the report on action taken, usually six months after adoption 
of the Council recommendations under Article 126(7). The EPP should be a one-off document detailing 
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the policy priorities and the fiscal structural strategy over time. As such, after its first assessment, its 
implementation should be monitored through the European Semester framework. 
The Commission will issue a proposal for a Council opinion on the EPP issued at the same time as the 
Commission assessment of the action taken in response to the Article 126(7) recommendations. In order 
to continue in the spirit of integration of various aspects of economic policy and to reduce the monitoring 
burden, the monitoring of EPPs' implementation will be based on Member States reporting in National 
Reform Programmes and/or the Stability Programme, as appropriate, within the context of the European 
Semester.  
3.2. NATIONAL BUDGETARY PROCESSES AND THE SGP 
While the European dimension of budgetary policy is set through overarching fiscal rules and associated 
sanctions, the detailed contour and implementation of budgetary choices remain the competence of the 
Member States. However, the Six-pack set of reforms has brought about a shift in the approach by which 
Member States conduct fiscal policy domestically. Starting in 2011 with the directive on national 
budgetary frameworks,(
148
) a series of legislative acts has set seminal requirements on Member States' 
budgetary policy arrangements. These reforms recognise the major impact that national arrangements – 
including fiscal rules and budgetary actors and processes – can have on the ability of EU countries to 
fulfil their obligations with respect to the SGP and deliver prudent and appropriate fiscal policy over the 
years. 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States set out 
minimum standards that Member States have to comply with in terms of their national budgetary 
framework, which is defined as comprising the arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions that 
underlie the conduct of budgetary policies. It establishes requirements on fiscal statistics and accounting, 
on the preparation of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, the setting up and monitoring of fiscal 
rules, the medium-term budgetary planning, and the transparency of general government finances. The 
choice of a directive – rather than a regulation as for the other five pieces of legislation making up the Six 
Pack – was made to reflect the diversity of the Member States' budgetary arrangements and in recognition 
of the fact that there is more than one way to ensure that national budgetary frameworks are able to 
deliver the desired results, but that countries can choose the most appropriate set-up given their own 
specific situation. The directive set a deadline of 31 December 2013 for Member States to ensure that all 
the requirements were in place. Within its competence of checking the application of EU law, the 
Commission is currently analysing the transposition of directive provisions across the Member States. 
By specifying that compliance with national fiscal rules should be overseen by an independent body or 
one with functional autonomy with respect to the fiscal authorities, the directive was the first piece of EU 
legislation giving a role to independent bodies in fiscal policy matters. Following on the heels of the 
directive, the Treaty for Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG) committed its signatories bound by the Fiscal Compact chapter(
149
) to introducing a balanced-
budget rule in structural terms – defined essentially as a country attaining its MTO – into their national 
law, with independent bodies being tasked with monitoring compliance with this rule. 
Regulation (EU) 473/2013 incorporated a large part of the TSCG requirements in the EU framework. 
Specifically, it legislated for the setting up of independent bodies to be involved in the budgetary process 
                                                          
(148) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32011L0085:EN:NOT  




– through the preparation or endorsement of forecasts and the monitoring of national fiscal rules 
(including in particular those incorporating the MTO in the national budgetary processes). Section 3.2.1 
considers the requirement of translating the MTO into national fiscal rules and Section 3.2.2 considers the 
role of independent bodies, in more detail. 
3.2.1  National balanced-budget rules and the MTO 
The TSCG commits its signatories bound by the Fiscal Compact to incorporating the medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO) and the adjustment path towards it, into national law through “provisions of 
binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully 
respected and adhered to throughout the budgetary process.” In addition, they should also put in place 
correction mechanisms to be triggered automatically in the event of significant deviations from the MTO 
or the adjustment path towards it, which should include an obligation for the Member State to implement 
measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. In this sense, the TSCG adds a national 
layer to European commitments, requiring Member States to integrate the requirements of the preventive 
arm of the SGP in the national legislation. The TSCG sets a deadline of 31 December 2013 for this to 
occur.  
The requirement to incorporate the MTO and the adjustment path towards it into national law aims to 
ensure that compliance with the MTO is at the heart of the budgetary decisions taken by national 
governments. The TSCG follows the specifications of the SGP in defining the MTO, including the 
requirement that compliance with the MTO be judged on the basis of the structural balance and the 
expenditure benchmark and that a temporary deviation from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it 
can be permitted in exceptional circumstances (known as the escape clause, as defined in the SGP). 
Importantly, it goes beyond the SGP by stipulating a tighter lower bound of -0.5% of GDP – compared to 
-1% of GDP in the SGP for euro area Member States – for all countries except those with debt 
significantly below 60% of GDP and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances 
are low, for which the lower bound is set at -1% of GDP. Given the methodology to set the minimum 
MTO (as set out in Section 1.2.1.1), there should be no contradiction between the SGP and the TSCG 
requirements in most cases.  
The TSCG tasked the European Commission with proposing “common principles” underlying the design 
of the requested corrective mechanisms. The Commission's Communication on Common principles for 
the national correction mechanisms was published on 20 June 2012(
150
) and the principles it presents are 
given in Box 3.2.  
In addition, the TSCG called for independent bodies to be put in place to monitor compliance with the 
national balanced-budget rules incorporating the MTO requirement and the operation of the related 
national correction mechanism. This requirement has also been incorporated into EU law via the Two 
Pack and Section 3.2.2 provides more details on the role and structure of such bodies. 
 
BOX 3.2: COMMON PRINCIPLES FOR THE NATIONAL CORRECTION MECHANISMS 
The common principles presented in the Commission's Communication of 20/6/2012 are: 
                                                          
(150) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0342:FIN:EN:PDF.  
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(1) Legal status: The correction mechanism shall be enshrined in national law through provisions of 
binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully 
respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes. The mechanism shall fully respect 
the prerogatives of national Parliaments. 
(2) Consistency with EU framework: National correction mechanisms shall rely closely on the concepts 
and rules of the European fiscal framework. This applies in particular to the notion of a 'significant 
deviation' and the definition of possible escape clauses. The correction, in terms of size and timeline, shall 
be made consistent with possible recommendations addressed to the concerned Member State under the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
(3) Activation: The activation of the correction mechanism shall occur in well-defined circumstances 
characterising a significant deviation from the medium-term objective (MTO) or the adjustment path 
towards it. The activation triggers may comprise EU-driven or country-specific criteria, to the extent that 
they meet the above condition. Subject to the same condition, both ex ante mechanisms that set budgetary 
objectives preventing the materialisation of deviations and ex post mechanisms that trigger corrections in 
reaction to prior deviations, may fulfil the requirements. 
(4) Nature of the correction: The size and timeline of the correction shall be framed by predetermined 
rules. Larger deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it shall lead to 
larger corrections. Restoring the structural balance at or above the MTO within the planned deadline and 
maintaining it there afterwards, shall provide the reference point for the correction mechanism. The 
correction mechanism shall ensure adherence to critical fiscal targets as set before the occurrence of the 
significant deviation, thereby preventing any lasting departure from overall fiscal objectives as planned 
before the occurrence of the significant deviation. At the onset of the correction Member States shall 
adopt a corrective plan that shall be binding over the budgets covered by the correction period. 
(5) Operational instruments: The correction mechanism may give a prominent operational role to rules on 
public expenditure and discretionary tax measures, including in activating the mechanism and 
implementing the correction, to the extent that these rules are consistent with attainment of the MTO and 
the adjustment path towards it. The design of the correction mechanism shall consider provisions as 
regards, in the event of activation, the coordination of fiscal adjustments across some or all sub-sectors of 
general government  
(6) Escape clauses: The definition of possible escape clauses shall adhere to the notion of 'exceptional 
circumstances' as agreed in the Stability and Growth Pact. This would include an unusual event outside 
the control of the concerned Member State with a major impact on the financial position of the general 
government, or periods of severe economic downturn as defined in the Stability and Growth Pact, 
including at the level of the euro area. The suspension of the correction mechanism in the event of an 
escape clause shall be on a temporary basis. The correction mechanism shall foresee a minimum pace of 
structural adjustment once out of the escape clause, with the requirement from the Stability and Growth 
Pact a lower limit. When exiting the escape clause, Member States shall adopt a corrective plan that shall 
be binding over the budgets covered by the correction period. 
(7) Independent bodies or bodies with functional autonomy acting as monitoring institutions: They shall 
support the credibility and transparency of the correction mechanism. These institutions would provide 
public assessments over: the occurrence of circumstances warranting the activation of the correction 
mechanism; of whether the correction is proceeding in accordance with national rules and plans; and over 
the occurrence of circumstances for triggering, extending and exiting escape clauses. The concerned 
Member State shall be obliged to comply with, or alternatively explain publicly why they are not 




already existing institutional setting and the country-specific administrative structure. National legal 
provisions ensuring a high degree of functional autonomy shall underpin the above bodies, including: i) a 
statutory regime grounded in law; ii) freedom from interference, whereby the above bodies shall not take 
instructions, and shall be in a capacity to communicate publicly in a timely manner; iii) nomination 
procedures based on experience and competence; iv) adequacy of resources and appropriate access to 
information to carry out the given mandate.  
3.2.2  The role of independent bodies in the national budgetary processes 
3.2.2.1 The mandates of the independent bodies 
Building on the Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for national budgetary frameworks and 
on the intergovernmental TSCG, Regulation (EU) 473/2013 gives independent bodies two key roles in 
euro area Member States. Independent bodies should be in place to: 
 monitor compliance with numerical fiscal rules, including those incorporating the MTO into the 
national budgetary process. The independent bodies will provide public assessments with respect to 
the national fiscal rules, including with respect to the activation and operation of the national 
correction mechanism and the escape clauses;  
 prepare or endorse the macroeconomic forecasts (and, if so chosen by the Member State, the 
budgetary forecasts) underlying the national medium-term fiscal plans (which may be the SCPs 
themselves) and the draft budgets. 
The Regulation leaves open the possibility that these two functions could be served by two – or even 
more – independent bodies, provided they fulfil requirements attesting to their independence. The 
Regulation defines independent bodies as bodies that are structurally independent or bodies endowed with 
functional autonomy vis-à-vis the budgetary authorities of the Member State, and which are underpinned 
by national legal provisions ensuring a high degree of functional autonomy and accountability, including:  
i. a statutory regime grounded in national laws, regulations or binding administrative provisions;  
ii. not taking instructions from the budgetary authorities of the Member State concerned or from any 
other public or private body;  
iii. the capacity to communicate publicly in a timely manner;  
iv. procedures for nominating members on the basis of their experience and competence;  
iv. adequate resources and appropriate access to information to carry out their given mandate. 
 
3.2.2.2 Key role in preparing the forecasts underlying the budgetary process 
The Two Pack requires that the macroeconomic forecasts underlying the national medium-term fiscal 
plans and the draft budgets be produced or endorsed by independent bodies. Member States should 
indicate in these documents whether the endorsement or production model has been chosen. In addition, 
they should indicate whether independent bodies have prepared or endorsed the budgetary forecasts, 
although they are free to choose neither of these two options. Given the link between the national 
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medium-term fiscal plans and the Stability Programmes(
151
) and between the draft budgets and the draft 
budgetary plans, the requirements relating to the involvement of independent bodies in the preparation of 
the forecasts effectively translate to the Stability Programmes and DBPs as well. 
In order to ensure that independent bodies are able to fulfil their task in preparing or endorsing the 
macroeconomic forecasts in line with the requirements on forecasts set out in the Directive 2011/85/EU, 
Member States should define and adopt transparent forecasting procedures, setting out specific criteria 
and procedural safeguards. The Code of Conduct on the Two-Pack(
152
) further specifies some 
considerations for national arrangements framing the involvement of independent bodies in the 
production or endorsement of macroeconomic forecasts.  
Specifically, in the case of macroeconomic forecasts produced by the independent body, the independent 
body should have in place a dedicated procedure for this purpose as set out in the directive, which should 
be consistent with the stages of the national budgetary process and related timetable. The Ministry of 
Finance should provide support to facilitate the production of the macroeconomic forecasts by the 
independent body, such as access rights to relevant budgetary information, including budgetary execution 
data. Additionally, the national legislation or the internal procedures of the Ministry of Finance should 
define rules governing the handling of forecasts received from the independent body.  
Analogously, for the macroeconomic forecasts produced by public sector entities and submitted for 
endorsement to the independent body, Member States should lay down implementing aspects of the 
endorsement process (including deadlines for action and the consequences arising from the forecast-
related decisions of the independent body), without prejudice to the independent assessment of the 
endorsing body. The independent body should make clear whether it endorses or not the forecasts and 
provide the underlying justifications. It is understood that, while the endorsement would enable the use of 
the respective forecasts for fiscal planning purposes, should the independent body decide that conditions 
are not met to endorse the macroeconomic forecasts underpinning the programme/plan, this would 
typically trigger a review of the forecasts in the light of comments issued by the independent body. A 
revised forecast may be produced and submitted for assessment to the independent body, which would 
have to issue a new decision.  
Irrespective of the choice of having forecasts produced or endorsed independently, Member States should 
have in place specific mechanisms to cope with situations in which there are different views between the 
independent body and the Ministry of Finance on the main variables of the forecast. These could, for 
example, take the form of arrangements to reach an agreement.(153) 
                                                          
(151) In fact, national medium-term fiscal plans and stability programmes may be the same document. 
(152) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/2014-11-07_two_pack_coc_amended_en.pdf 
(153) Beyond the aforementioned requirements deriving from EU legislation and the intergovernmental TSCG, national legislation in 
some  euro-area Member States has entrusted independent bodies with additional tasks (e.g. sustainability computations, costing, 
promotion of budgetary transparency) or provided a higher degree of specification of the tasks referred to in EU legislation. The 
exact nature and degree of detail of such tasks may depend on political appetite at the national level, which can itself be influenced 
by specific considerations, such as identified weaknesses in national fiscal-policy processes, the federal (or heavily decentralised) 
structure of some Member States, or severe fiscal consolidation challenges. 
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Regulation on the preventive arm of the SGP 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies 
Original from 1997: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1997:209:0001:0005:EN:PDF 
Consolidated following Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the 




Regulation on the corrective arm of the SGP 
Council Regulation No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure 
Original from 1997: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1997:209:0001:0005:EN:PDF 
Consolidated following Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending 





Treaty of the Functioning of European Union (including protocol 12) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (including 

































Other texts linked to the SGP or its application 
Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, Amsterdam, 17 June 1997 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997Y0802(01):EN:HTML 
European Council Presidency conclusions of 22-23 March 2005, endorsing and including the 




Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:145:0001:0009:EN:PDF 
Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:306:0001:0007:EN:PDF 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of 
the Member States 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:306:0041:0047:EN:PDF 
Code of Conduct: "Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and 
guidelines on the format and content of stability and convergence programmes", of 3 September 
2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/code_of_conduct_en.pdf 
Communication from the Commission on "Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing 
rules of the stability and growth pact", of 13 January 2015 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-
13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf 
Commonly agreed position on Flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14345-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
 
The macroeconomic imbalances procedure 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:306:0025:0032:EN:PDF 
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
























Legislation and other documents related to the Two Pack 
 
Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing 
or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:140:0001:0010:EN:PDF 
 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on 
common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of 
excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0473&from=EN 
 
Commission delegated regulation No 877/2013, supplementing Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, on 
reporting obligations of euro area Member states subject to the excessive deficit procedure 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:244:0023:0031:EN:PDF 
 
Code of Conduct: "Specifications on the implementation of the Two Pack and guidelines on the 
format and content of draft budgetary plans, economic partnership programmes and debt issuance 
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The preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact requires that Member States achieve and maintain 
their medium-term budgetary objectives (MTO) to ensure, inter alia, a sufficient safety margin against the 
risk of breaching the 3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty. This sufficient margin is a threshold value 
for the structural government deficit, called the minimum benchmark (MB), which ensures the respect of 
the 3% reference value under normal cyclical conditions. This is calculated by adjusting the 3% of GDP 
deficit threshold for the effect of a normal cyclical fluctuation (encapsulated by the representative output 
gap). The MB thus provides a lower bound for the determination of the MTOs. 
Formula: The standard formula for the computation of the minimum benchmark is 
MB = – 3 – ε*ROG  
where the two elements necessary for the calculation are the semi-elasticity of the budget to the output 
gap - ε - and the representative output gap - ROG.  
The representative output gap is a country-specific measure of cyclical conditions Member States 
typically experience. It reflects the fact that different countries typically experience different magnitudes 
of economic cycles, and this has an impact on the cyclical fluctuation of their public finances. Countries 
with larger cycles and therefore bigger negative values require larger safety margin for the MTO to 
ensure compliance with the 3% deficit limit under a normal economic cycle. The representative output 





















where P5% (country) represents the 5% percentile of the distribution of the country-specific output gap 
series and P5% (EU 27) the 5% percentile of output gap data for all countries. Ni and Nt stand for the 
number of country-specific and common annual observations available, respectively over a period of 25 
years. Nt is set at 25.  
The logic of this approach is to use the simplest and most direct statistical indicator which captures the 
idea of the representative output gap, i.e. a particularly low value of the output gap likely to be observed 
with a probability of 5%. The percentile is moreover computed after outlier values are deleted.(
154
)  
It should be noted that the relative weights of the common and country-specific component in equation 2 
above are different across countries, especially for the recently acceded Member States due to the limited 
availability of data before 1995. However, the weights will automatically converge to the same value 




                                                          
(154) Outliers are defined as observations of the distribution for the entire sample - including all Member States - below, and above, 
respectively, the 2.5% and the 97.5% percentiles. Exceptionally, the country-specific series have also been trimmed of their most 














BE -1.7 -1.7 
BG -1.7 -2.1 
CZ -1.7 -1.7 
DK -0.7 -0.9 
DE -1.5 -1.5 
EE -1.8 -1.7 
IE -1.2 -1.3 
EL -1.9 -2.1 
ES -1.5 -1.1 




IT -1.7 -1.5 
CY -1.8 -1.6 
LV -1.8 -1.7 
LT -1.8 -1.5 
LU -1.7 -1.5 
HU -1.5 -1.4 
MT -1.9 -1.8 
NL -1.4 -1.1 
AT -1.8 -1.6 
PL -1.9 -1.0 
PT -1.8 -1.6 
RO -1.8 -1.6 
SI -1.7 -1.4 
SK -1.5 -1.7 
FI -0.5 -1.1 
SE -0.9 -1.0 











Provision of data on variables in bold characters is a requirement. 
Provision of data on other variables is optional but highly desirable. 
The tables should be submitted to the Commission by means of the dedicated web application.  
 
Table 1a: Macroeconomic prospects 














Level rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
1. Real GDP B1*g       
2. Nominal GDP  B1*g       
Components of real GDP        
3. Private final consumption 
expenditure 
P.3       
4. Government final 
consumption expenditure 
P.3       
5. Gross fixed capital formation P.51g       
6. Changes in inventories and 
net acquisition of valuables (% 
of GDP) 
P.52 + P.53       
7. Exports of goods and services P.6       
8. Imports of goods and services P.7       
Contributions to real GDP 
growth 
       
9. Final domestic demand   -      
10. Changes in inventories and 
net acquisition of valuables  
P.52 + P.53 -      
11. External balance of goods 
and services  









Table 1b: Price developments 
 













 Level rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
1. GDP deflator 
       
2. Private consumption deflator 
       
3. HICP1 
       
4. Government consumption 
deflator        
5. Investment deflator  
       
6. Export price deflator (goods 
and services) 
       
7. Import price deflator (goods 
and services) 
       
1 Optional for stability programmes. 
 
 
       
Table 1c: Labour market developments 
 













 Level rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
rate of  
change 
1. Employment, persons1 
       
2. Employment, hours worked2 
        
3. Unemployment rate (%)3 
        
4. Labour productivity, 
persons4 
       
5. Labour productivity, hours 
worked5        
6. Compensation of employees 
D.1       
7. Compensation per employee 
    optional optional optional 
1Occupied population, domestic concept national accounts definition. 
2National accounts definition. 
3Harmonised definition, Eurostat; levels. 
4Real GDP per person employed. 
5Real GDP per hour worked. 
European Commission 







Table 1d: Sectoral balances 
 
% of GDP 











1. Net lending/borrowing vis-à-
vis the rest of the world 
B.9       
of which:        
- Balance on goods and services        
- Balance of primary incomes and 
transfers 
       
- Capital account        
2. Net lending/borrowing of the 
non-government sector 
B.9       
3. Net lending/borrowing of 
general government 
B.9       
4. Statistical discrepancy   optional optional optional optional  
        




























Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) 
(B.9) by sub-sector        
1. General government S.13       
1a. Central government S.1311       
1b. State government S.1312       
1c. Local government S.1313       
1d. Social security funds S.1314       
General government (S13)        
2. Total revenue TR       
3. Total expenditure TE1       
4. Net lending/borrowing B.9       
5. Interest expenditure  D.41       
6. Primary balance2 B.9+D.41       
7. One-off and other temporary 
measures3 
       
Selected components of revenue        
8. Taxes on production and imports  D.2     optional optional 
9. Current taxes on income, wealth, 
etc  
D.5     optional optional 





11. Social contributions  D.61     optional optional 
12. Property income  D.4     optional optional 
13. Other 4      optional optional 
14=2. Total revenue  TR       
p.m.: Tax burden 
(D.2+D.5+D.61+D.91-D.995)5 
       
Selected components of expenditure        
15. Compensation of employees + 
intermediate consumption 
D.1+P.2       
15a. Compensation of employees  D.1       
15b. Intermediate consumption  P.2       
16. Social payments (16=16a+16b)        
of which Unemployment benefits6        
16a. Social transfers in kind - purchased 
market production 
D.632       
16b. Social benefits other than social 
transfers in kind 
D.62       
17=5. Interest expenditure  D.41        
18. Subsidies  D.3       
19. Gross fixed capital formation  P.51g       
20. Capital transfers D.9        
21. Other7         
22=3. Total expenditure  TE1       
p.m.: Government final consumption 
expenditure (nominal) 
P.3       
1TR-TE=B.9.     
2The primary balance is calculated as B.9 (item 4) plus D.41 (item 5). 
3A plus sign means deficit-reducing one-off measures.  
4 P.11+P.12+P.131+D.39rec+D.7rec+D.9rec (other than D.91). 
5Including those collected by the EU and including an adjustment for uncollected taxes and social contributions (D.995), if 
appropriate. 
6 Includes social benefits other than social transfers in kind (D.62) and social transfers in kind via market producers (D.632) 
related to unemployment benefits. 














Table 2b: No-policy change projections
1
 
       












  Level % of  
GDP 
% of  
GDP 
% of  
GDP 
% of  
GDP 
% of  
GDP 
1. Total revenue at unchanged 
policies 
       
2. Total expenditure at unchanged 
policies 
       
1The projections shall start at the time when the Stability or Convergence Programme is drafted (please indicate the cut-off date) 
and show revenue and expenditure trends under a 'no-policy change' assumption. Therefore, figures for X-1 should correspond to 
actual data for revenue and expenditure. 
 















Level % of  
GDP 
% of  
GDP 
% of  
GDP 
% of  
GDP 
% of  
GDP 
1. Expenditure on EU 
programmes fully matched by 
EU funds revenue 
       




       
3. Effect of discretionary 
revenue measures 2 
       
4. Revenue increases mandated 
by law 
       
1Please detail the methodology used to obtain the cyclical component of unemployment benefit expenditure. It should build on 
unemployment benefit expenditure as defined in COFOG under the code 10.5 
2Revenue increases mandated by law should not be included in the effect of discretionary revenue measures: data reported in 









Table 3: General government expenditure by function 
 






    
1. General public services 1       
2. Defence 2       
3. Public order and safety 3       
4. Economic affairs 4       
5. Environmental protection 5       
6. Housing and community 
amenities 
6       
7. Health 7       
8. Recreation, culture and religion 8       
9. Education 9       
10. Social protection 10       
11. Total expenditure (=item 3=22 
in Table 2a) 
TE       
 
 
Table 4: General government debt developments 
 











1. Gross debt1        
2. Change in gross debt ratio        
Contributions to changes in 
gross debt 
       
3. Primary balance2 B.9+D.41       
4. Interest expenditure3 D.41       
5. Stock-flow adjustment        
of which:        
- Differences between cash 
and accruals4 
       
- Net accumulation of financial        
European Commission 








of which:        
- privatisation proceeds        
- Valuation effects and other6        
p.m.: Implicit interest rate 
on debt7 
       
Other relevant variables        
6. Liquid financial assets8        
7. Net financial debt (7=1-6)        
8. Debt amortization (existing 
bonds) since the end of the 
previous year 
       
9. Percentage of debt 
denominated in foreign 
currency 
       
10. Average maturity    - - -  
1As defined in amended Regulation 479/2009.  
2Cf. item 6 in Table 2a. 
3Cf. item 5=17 in Table 2a. 
4The differences concerning interest expenditure, other expenditure and revenue could be distinguished when relevant or in 
case the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the reference value.  
5Currency and deposits, government debt securities, government controlled enterprises and the difference between listed and 
unlisted shares could be distinguished when relevant or in case the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the reference value. 
6Changes due to exchange rate movements, and operation in secondary market could be distinguished when relevant or in case 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the reference value. 
7Proxied by interest expenditure divided by the debt level of the previous year. 
8 Liquid assets are here defined as stocks of AF.1, AF.2, AF.3 (consolidated for general government, i.e. netting out financial 










Table 5: Cyclical developments 
 











1. Real GDP growth (%)        
2. Net lending of general 
government 
B.9       
3. Interest expenditure  D.41       
4. One-off and other 
temporary measures1  
       
5. Potential GDP growth (%)        
contributions:        
- labour        
- capital        
- total factor productivity        
6. Output gap        
7. Cyclical budgetary 
component 
       
8. Cyclically-adjusted balance 
(2 - 7) 
       
9. Cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance (8 + 3) 
       
10. Structural balance (8 - 4)        

















Table 6: Divergence from previous update 
 











Real GDP growth (%)        
Previous update        
Current update        
Difference        
General government net 
lending (% of GDP) 
B.9       
Previous update        
Current update        
Difference        
General government gross 
debt (% of GDP) 
       
Previous update        
Current update        
Difference        
 
Table 7: Long-term sustainability of public finances 
 
% of GDP 2007 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
Total expenditure        
 Of which: age-related 
expenditures 
       
 Pension expenditure        
 Social security pension        
 Old-age and early pensions        
 Other pensions (disability, 
survivors) 
       
 Occupational pensions (if in 
general government) 
       
 Health care        





 Education expenditure        
 Other age-related 
expenditures 
       
 Interest expenditure        
Total revenue        
 Of which: property income        
Of which: from pensions 
contributions (or social 
contributions if appropriate) 
       
Pension reserve fund assets        
Of which: consolidated public 
pension fund assets (assets 
other than government 
liabilities) 
       
Systemic pension reforms1        
Social contributions diverted 
to mandatory private scheme2       
 
Pension expenditure paid by 
mandatory private scheme3 
       
Assumptions        
Labour productivity growth        
Real GDP growth        
Participation rate males (aged 
20-64)       
 
Participation rates females 
(aged 20-64)       
 
Total participation rates (aged 
20-64)       
 
Unemployment rate        
Population aged 65+ over total 
population       
 
1Systemic pension reforms refer to pension reforms that introduce a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory fully funded 
pillar. 
2Social contributions or other revenue received by the mandatory fully funded pillar to cover for the pension obligations it 
acquired in conjunction with the systemic reform 
3Pension expenditure or other social benefits paid by the mandatory fully funded pillar linked to the pension obligations it 












Table 7a: Contingent liabilities 
 




    
Public guarantees  Optional      
Of which: linked to the 
financial sector 
 Optional      
 
Table 8: Basic assumptions 
This table should preferably be included in the programme itself; if not, these assumptions should be 












Short-term interest rate1 
(annual average) 
       
Long-term interest rate 
(annual average) 
       
USD/€ exchange rate (annual 
average)  
(euro area and ERM II 
countries) 
       
Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
       
(for countries not in euro 
area or ERM II)  
exchange rate vis-à-vis the € 
(annual average)  
       
World excluding EU, GDP 
growth 
       
EU GDP growth         
Growth of relevant foreign 
markets 
       
World import volumes, 
excluding EU 
       
Oil prices (Brent, 
USD/barrel) 
       






ADDITIONAL TABLE FOR STABILITY AND CONVERGENCE PROGRAMMES OF MEMBER STATES APPLYING FOR USE OF THE 
STRUCTURAL REFORM CLAUSE 







In cases of ex-ante 
implementation 




























Yearly and cumulated effect on GDP and 












   




      
Employment       
Direct fiscal impact 
upon primary balance 
(10) 
      
Total impact upon 
primary balance (11) 
      
*The impact at X+25 is akin to the final impact in a steady-state economic environment. 
(1) This column should contain “Measure 1”, “Measure 2” etc and short titles e.g. labour market reform. 
European Commission 






(2) This column should include all relevant information on the analytical and methodological approach used in the empirical exercise. This would include: (a) 
the type of the model used/estimation technique (e.g. econometric estimations or simulation based assessments with DSGE/dynamic CGE/static CGE models, 
etc.); (b) data sources and the frequency of macroeconomic data used in the empirical exercise; (c) if available, the list of references related to the main 
methodological paper(s) that describes the structure of the country-specific model underlying the empirical exercise. 
(3) This column should encompass the main macroeconomic and simulation assumptions underlying the estimation including transmission channels and 
elasticities. 
(4) This column summarises the main macroeconomic variables involved as well as the quantitative results of the macroeconomic simulations exercise. 
(5) Specifically, this column contains the list of the macroeconomic variables which are assumed to be affected by the enacted or planned structural reforms 
presented in the programmes. The list reported in the reporting table is illustrative (but not exhaustive) and can be changed and/or broadened according to the 
type of reforms implemented at national level. 
(6) This column reports the quantitative impact of the structural reforms expressed as the yearly and/or cumulated effect on GDP and the other main 
macroeconomic variables involved in the simulation as well as the policy simulation horizon. The macroeconomic impact of structural reforms needs to take 
the form of a number expressing the difference (in percentage points) with respect to the reference scenario, i.e. the scenario that does not include the 
structural measures). 
(7) This column shall contain other relevant indicators that can also demonstrate economic impacts, for example resource efficiency indicators. This can also 
include information on the expected direct results from the measure (e.g. how many people are expected to be supported by a new ALMP measures; or which 
increase in the proportion of unemployed will be covered by an increase ALMP budget). 
(8) This column should set out the timeline for the adoption and implementation of any reform measures which justify an application for use of the structural 
reform clause on an ex-ante implementation basis as detailed in the dedicated structural reform plan adopted by Government.. 
(9) This column should set out the institutional plans and processes for the implementation of reform measures which justify an application for use of the 
structural reform clause on an ex-ante implementation basis  
(10) This row should contain the direct budgetary impact (budgetary savings minus budgetary costs) of reform measures, excluding any impact through 
associated changes to output. The effects should be shown as a percentage of GDP. 
(11) This row should contain the total budgetary impact of reform measures, including both direct fiscal effects and any indirect effects through associated 
changes to output. The effects should be shown as a percentage of GDP. 
ANNEX 4 
THE MEDIUM-TERM REFERENCE RATE OF POTENTIAL 
GROWTH AND THE CONVERGENCE MARGIN FOR THE 




 2015 2016(155) 
 
Medium-term 



















BE 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 0.0 
BG 2.1 1.4 0.0 2.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 0.7 
CZ 1.6 1.2 -0.7 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.5 
DK 1.1 0.9 -3.0 4.2 0.8 0.9 0.0 1.1 
DE 1.1 1.2 -3.9 5.0 1.3 1.2 -3.5 4.8 
EE 2.1 1.3 -0.4 2.5 1.8 1.2 1.0 1.1 
IE 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.6 1.9 1.5 1.8 0.1 
EL -1.6 1.2 0.0 -1.6 -2.3 1.1 0.5 -2.1 
ES 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.3 0.5 -0.1 
FR 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.6 
HR(157)     -0.1 1.1 0.5 -0.5 
IT 0.0 1.1 0.6 -0.5 -0.1 1.1 0.2 -0.2 
CY 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.2 -0.5 1.3 0.0 0.2 
LV 1.4 1.5 -1.0 2.4 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.5 
LT 1.9 1.5 0.5 1.4 1.9 1.5 1.5 0.4 
LU 1.1 1.2 -2.6 3.7 2.2 1.1 -0.2 2.4 
HU 0.1 1.1 1.2 -1.1 1.0 1.1 1.3 -0.3 
MT 1.8 1.3 1.5 0.3 2.7 1.2 1.4 1.3 
NL 0.9 1.0 -0.6 1.4 0.6 1.1 -0.4 1.2 
AT 1.1 1.0 -0.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 
PL 3.7 1.3 1.3 2.5 3.2 1.3 1.3 2.5 
PT -0.1 1.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 1.2 1.4 -1.5 
RO 2.5 1.4 0.1 2.4 2.1 1.5 0.9 1.6 
SI 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.3 -0.7 
SK 2.9 1.4 0.0 2.9 2.8 1.2 0.7 2.2 
FI 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.9 -0.1 
SE 1.9 1.0 -0.1 2.1 1.6 1.0 -0.1 2.0 
UK 1.2 1.1 1.3 -0.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 -0.2 
                                                          
(155) The reference rates in use for the budgetary figures of 2015 were computed on the basis of the Commission winter forecast 
2013. Following the introduction of yearly update of the reference rate (in spring 2015), a transitional arrangement was put in place, 
only for the assessment of 2016, according to which the less demanding reference rate between the old  and the updated one is used. 
(156) The recalibrated convergence margin can be obtained by dividing the conv. margin (column 2) by 0.5 and multiplying the result 
by the corrected (e.g. for the flexibility clauses) requirements of the preventive arm, as shown in Annex 14.  
(157) The reference rate for the assessment of 2015 were computed on the basis of the Commission winter forecast 2013, when 
Croatia had not yet accessed the EU.  
ANNEX 5 
CALCULATING THE TOP-DOWN FISCAL EFFORT  
 
140 
1) Correcting for revisions of potential output growth: α 
The α-parameter measures how revisions of potential growth (especially compared to the forecast 
underlying the Council recommendations) can affect the estimated change in the structural balance. 
Traditionally, changes in the CAB are used as an indicator of discretionary fiscal policy. The following 
shows that this reading needs to be qualified in the presence of higher or lower than expected growth. 




d R are the planned structural expenditure and revenue, respectively, in year t, 
and   
  is the expected potential output in year t. The ratio is conditional on the expected level of actual 
GDP, , as potential output is extracted from observed real GDP. 
Ex post, the ratio of structural expenditure to potential GDP in year t results from the implementation 
of expenditure plans, discretionary fiscal policy corrections and actual economic growth:  
 
where  and  are expected real potential output growth and expected inflation 
respectively. 
The actual ratio is conditional on real GDP in year t. In contrast to the ex-ante case, it is not expected 
real GDP but the actual level observed ex post. Hence, if the observed real GDP in year t differs from 
the forecast, it will also affect potential output and the output gap compared to what was expected ex 
ante. This affects both the denominator and the nominator of the ratio. 
In addition, lower or higher than expected growth affects potential output, not only in year t, but it also 
in previous years.  
As a result, assuming that the tax system is proportional, the ex post change in the CAB in year t with 
respect to year t-1 is: 
 
The observed change in the CAB will exclusively reflect discretionary fiscal policy interventions only 
if structural expenditure follows potential output growth. However, given that expenditure plans are 
fixed in advance based on economic projections, inertia in the budgetary processes or adherence to 
plans will lead to a departure from the projected change in the CAB ex-ante. This effect may be called 
































































































   tPtttPtt EE    11 11  a full implementation of expenditure plans results in a 
deterioration of the CAB, even in the absence of discretionary fiscal policy measures.  
Simplifying the notation, the difference between ex-ante and ex post changes in the CAB can be 
written as: 
  
ex post change in the CAB                ex-ante change in the CAB 
where is the discretionary fiscal policy intervention . Rearranging the 
difference between ex post and ex-ante yields 
 
Hence, if expenditure plans and discretionary fiscal policy measures are fully implemented in volume 
terms, the difference between ex-ante and ex post is a function of: 
 the effect of the revision of growth on the output gap and, in turn, on the discretionary 
component of the budget (first term). A revision in the output gap entails that budgetary items 
which ex-ante were thought to be cyclical, turn out to be structural or vice versa. Empirically, 
this term will tend to be fairly negligible; 
 the effect of the revision of growth on the level of potential output and, via the assumption of 
adherence to plans, on the size of the discretionary correction expressed in percent of potential 
GDP (second term); 
 the effect of the revision of growth on the level of potential output and, in turn, on the non-
cyclical expenditure to potential GDP ratio (third term). Numerically, this term clearly 
dominates as the non-cyclical expenditure to potential GDP ratio is generally around 0.4-0.6, 
whereas discretionary corrections tend to be comparatively small. 
The α-parameter controls for the impact of the potential growth outturn being different from that 















As a result, in case of negative surprises to real growth, the Commission adjusts upwards the observed 















































































































































































































































The way the α-parameter is defined implies that it does not incorporate the impact of an inflation 
surprise. Instead, it implicitly treats expenditure as being set in real terms. As the bottom-up approach 
is, by contrast, based on the assumption that expenditure plans are made in nominal terms, the careful 
analysis can allow to identify the impact of these assumptions and assess whether the policy response 
was appropriate. 
2) Correcting for revenue shortfalls or windfalls: β 
The β-parameter corrects the change in the structural balance for unexpected changes in revenues that 
are outside the control of government. It is the case when revenues turn out higher or lower than 
foreseen based on economic growth developments (resulting in revenue windfalls or shortfalls 
compared to what was expected at the time of the recommendation), because the relationship between 
revenues and growth differs from the standard assumed elasticity. 
The recommendations made under Art. 126(7), or the notice given under Article 126(9), are based on a 
fully-fledged macroeconomic forecast made under the usual no-policy change assumption. Among 
other things, this forecast implies an apparent revenue elasticity to GDP in year t, rec
t (where the 



























tR  is the forecast for the level of current revenues in year t, 
rec
tDM  is the level of 
discretionary revenue measures for year t that have been clearly specified and committed to by 
governments, ahead of the recommendation, relative to t-1, and rec
tGDP  is the forecast for the level of 
GDP in t. 
The Commission forecastCommission forecast for revenue developments in year t is then given by the 
following formula:  


























This apparent elasticity can, however, depart from the elasticity underlying the computation of the 
cyclically adjusted balance (ηR, which is close to one). In the short term, there could be reasons for the 
revenue elasticity to temporarily depart from its long-term value (e.g. if the composition of growth or 
the tax collection rate change), and the recommendation could therefore be based on a revenue 
elasticity that is different from its long-term value.  
In the calculation of the cyclically adjusted balance, the change in cyclically adjusted revenues is equal 
to(158): 
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)          





)  (    )      
                                                          
(158) It is recalled that all the displayed quantities are nominal, except the output gap which is expressed in real terms. 
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where    
   
    








    
    
 
        
        
 
    
    
 
                 
       
 
           
  
 
After adding and subtracting the discretionary measures introduced in year t, 
   
  
, we can decompose 
the change in CAR in order to isolate the discretionary part of the change in revenues-to-output ratio: 
      
   
  
 





)  (    )      
And after a further manipulation(159):  
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                 (i)                 (ii)                                         (iii) 
The change in structural revenues is thus broken down into three terms which can be interpreted as 
follows: 
 The first term, (i), measures the impact of discretionary revenue measures, expressed as a 
percentage of actual output.  
 The second term, (ii), corresponds to possible revenue windfalls or shortfalls, expressed as a 
percentage of actual output. The difference between the change in total revenue and the 
discretionary measures can be written as           
         , where   
  is the apparent 
revenue elasticity to GDP in year t, as explained above . The revenue windfall/shortfall term 
reflects the fact that the apparent elasticity   
  can depart, in the short term, from the long-term 
elasticity    which is used in the computation of the revenue semi-elasticity    (e.g. due to 
changes in the composition of growth or in the tax collection). 
 The third term, (iii), can be developed and rewritten as: 
(    )(       ) 
    
  
 (    ) (





)       
It captures two different effects. First, it reflects the fact that the nominal output growth    is 
generally different from the change in the output gap     , which is expressed in real terms. 
Second, it takes into account the difference between 
    
  




is used as a weight in the computation of   .  
While no correction is needed for term (i) as it reflects policy action, the β-parameter corrects for the 
difference between the ex-ante and ex post revenue windfalls/shortfalls described by term (ii), as well 
as for forecasting errors relating to term (iii) above. 
                                                          
(159) The intermediate step is: 
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The revenue windfall/shortfall that is observed ex post on the basis of actual data may differ from the 
ex-ante value, based on the Commission forecastCommission forecast. which underlies the 
recommendation. The difference between both values, the so-called “revenue gap”, is a forecast error 
and is outside the direct control of the authorities: 
(         
         )  (   
       
         
        
   )  
When assessing government's actions, this error can be corrected by subtracting the following term 
from the ex post value of     :  
(         
         )  (   
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As regards term (iii), its second element (    ) (





)       is virtually equal to zero, since it 
is the product of three very small terms. On the contrary, the first element (    )(       ) 
    
  
 
is not negligible and is therefore taken into account in the correction. In economic terms, this item can 
be interpreted as the automatic response of government revenue to nominal potential growth.(160)  
Including this term yields:  
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3)  The assessment of compliance for countries with pre-existing recommendations 
phrased in terms of average annual targets 
While all the new Article 126(7) recommendations have annual nominal and structural targets, before 
the Six Pack reform, the EDPs recommendations were phrased in terms of average annual figures over 
a multiannual time period. In these cases, assessing compliance with the recommendations required 
more judgment, particularly in assessing effective action before being close to the deadline. Without a 
specified path towards the correction, an apparent lack of effective action in early years of the 
consolidation path could be compensated by higher effort implemented by future budgets. However, 
lower effort in initial years compared to that recommended were normally be taken into account as an 
aggravating factor in case correcting by the deadline was at risk in the later years even if due to a 
deteriorated macroeconomic scenario in those years. 
Therefore, for the pre Six Pack EDP recommendations, the assessment of effective action was therefore 
adjusted for the specificities of the average target effort. When assessing the structural effort, it was 
important to consider the structural effort made since the start of the EDP, rather than just in the 
previous year. Similarly, in computing the adjusted fiscal effort, the change in the estimates of potential 
output and revenues windfalls/shortfalls was relative to the year when the EDP was issued rather than 
relative to the previous year.  
                                                          
(160)           
(    )               
  where    and   
  respectively are the inflation rate and (real) potential growth. 
 
ANNEX 6 
CALCULATING THE MINIMUM LINEAR STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT (MLSA) FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE DEBT 
CRITERION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD 
 
145 
Member States that were in EDP on the date that the Six Pack amendments to the SGP were adopted (8 
November 2011) are subject to transitional arrangements – concerning the debt rule – for the three years 
following the correction of their excessive deficit, in order to ensure that they have time to adapt their 
structural adjustments to the level needed to comply with the debt reduction benchmark. During those 
three years, compliance with the debt criterion is judged according to whether the Member State makes 
sufficient progress towards compliance. The concept of “sufficient progress towards compliance” is set 
out in the Code of Conduct on the SGP. It is defined as the Minimum Linear Structural Adjustment 
(MLSA) ensuring that – if followed – Member States will comply with the debt rule at the end of the 
transition period. 
COMPUTATION OF THE MLSA 
Two scenarios are considered for a Member State correcting its excessive deficit in year t0: a baseline 
scenario based on no adjustment and a counterfactual scenario based on a constant (linear) adjustment adj 
implemented for the three years of the transition period.  
Baseline scenario 
If no adjustment is implemented: the structural balance (sb) remains constant over the period(
161
) shown 
in Graph A6.1 below. This implies that during the transition period, which covers year t1 to year t3, the 
deficit:     
             with i=1,…5, evolves according to the cyclical balance (the cyclical 
components of the general government balance cb) and the one-off measures (o), while the debt-to-GDP 
ratio:   
  
  
    
     
       with i=1,…5 , evolves according to growth (g), the cyclical balance and 
the stock-flow adjustments (sfa.).  
 
                                                          
(161) Years t4 and t5 are taken into account as relevant for the forward-looking debt benchmark. 
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Counterfactual scenario  
A constant (linear) adjustment (adj) is implemented during the transition period, while keeping the 
structural balance constant after it.  
 




Thus, the trajectories for debt:    
  
    
           and deficit:                       with 
i=1,…5 , change accordingly under this scenario. In particular, for year t1-t5 the debt becomes:  
 in year t1:             
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   in year t2:             
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In order to identify the constant (linear) annual structural adjustment (adj) to be implemented during the 
transition period, the following equation has to be solved:  
  (   )     (                
               
    )           ( ) 
which implies finding that minimum adjustment that assures, at the end of the transition period, the 
respect with at least one of the configurations of debt benchmarks based on the counterfactual scenario. 
This is done in three steps:  
1. calculate the adjustment (BLadj) allowing closing the gap to the backward-looking debt benchmark: 
   = 60% + 0.95/3 (b2 - 60%) + 0.95
2/3 (b1 - 60%) + 0.95
3/3 (b0 - 60%) 
       
     
          
     
     
 
(     )  
     
 
(  
             )  
    
 
(  
          
   ) 
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where   
     
  is the gap to the backward-looking element of the debt reduction benchmark at the end of 
the transition period in the baseline scenario. 
2. calculate the adjustment (        ) allowing closing the gap between the cyclically adjusted debt(162), 
at the end of the transition period, 
and the backward-looking debt ratio: 
  
               
     
           
   
       
 
    
     
 
   
     
 
   




3.- calculate the adjustment (FLadj) allowing closing the gap to the forward-looking debt benchmark: 
    = 60% + 0.95/3 (b4 - 60%) + 0.95
2/3 (b3 - 60%) + 0.95
3/3 (b2 - 60%) 
        
         
  
     
 
   
     
 
   
     
 
   




Finally, the Minimum Linear Structural Adjustment needed to ensure compliance with the debt criterion 
at the end of the transition period results from: 
        (                     ) 
If the adjustment really implemented by the country under analysis in the first year (or second year) of the 
transition period, differs from the MLSA, one needs to follow the same logic, as presented above, and 
find the linear constant structural adjustment for the two (one) remaining years of the transition period 
assuring the respect of the debt rule at the end of the transition period. This implies to consider as a 
starting point a structural balance corresponding to year t2 (year t3) and a transition period lasting only 
two years (1 year).  
                                                          
(162)   
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        where g represents the nominal growth  g
pot the 
potential growth  and pthe GDP deflator growth 
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In all voting under the SGP, the Member State concerned does not vote. For the corrective arm of the 
Pact, non-euro area Member States do not participate in the voting on euro area countries. This is also the 
case in the preventive arm, for all the Council legal acts adopted within the context of a significant 
deviation procedure following a Commission warning and for the vote to impose an interest-bearing 
deposit on euro area countries.  
Unless otherwise specified, all votes are taken under qualified majority voting (QMV). From 1 November 
2014, the Lisbon definition of a qualified majority is applicable, although until the end of the transition 
period in 2017, any Member State can request that the Nice Treaty definition be used. The Lisbon 
definition considers that a qualified majority has been reached when 55% of Member States participating 
in the decisions comprising at least 65% of population of these States are in favour of a proposal. The 
Nice Treaty definition considers that a qualified majority is reached when 2/3 of concerned Member 
States weighted according to Protocol 36 to the Treaty, and representing 62% of the population, are in 
favour of a proposal.  
The exceptions to the use of qualified majority voting are the following: 
Reversed simple majority voting (RSMV) – whereby an unweighted majority of Member States is need to 
reject of Commission proposal for a Council decision – is used to vote on a Council decision establishing 
a lack of effective action to Council recommendations following a Commission warning in the preventive 
arm, the second time such a decision is recommended by the Commission. 
Reversed qualified majority voting (RQMV) – whereby a qualified majority of Member States is needed 
to reject a Commission proposal for a Council decision – is used: 
 To impose sanctions in the form of an interest-bearing deposit under the preventive arm 
 To impose or convert the interest-bearing deposit into a non-interest bearing deposit under the 
corrective arm, following an Article 126(6) decision 
 To impost a fine under the corrective arm, following an Article 126(8) decision on a lack of 
effective action 
 To suspend commitments under the European Structural and Investment Funds (applicable to 
commitments from 1 January of the forthcoming year), following a stepping up of the EDP 
procedure.  
It should be noted that the imposition of a fine with a variable component following an Article 126(11) 
decision on a lack of effective action to notice under Article 126(9) is decided using normal QMV. In a 
similar vein, a Commission proposal on the suspension of payments under the European Structural and 
Investment Funds is subject to normal qualified majority voting in the Council. 
The euro area Contracting Parties of the TSCG have committed themselves to voting on in line with the 
Commission's recommendations on all aspects of EDPs on the basis of the deficit criterion for euro area 
countries, as long as there is no qualified majority against the recommendations. This is a behavioral, 








1. The Contracting Parties shall apply the rules set out in this paragraph in addition and without prejudice 
to their obligations under European Union law: 
(a) the budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or in 
surplus; 
(b) the rule under point (a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general 
government is at its country-specific medium-term objective, as defined in the revised Stability and 
Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0,5 % of the gross domestic product at market 
prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term 
objective. The time-frame for such convergence will be proposed by the European Commission taking 
into consideration country-specific sustainability risks. Progress towards, and respect of, the medium-
term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a 
reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the 
revised Stability and Growth Pact; 
(c) the Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their respective medium-term objective or the 
adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances, as defined in point (b) of paragraph 3; 
(d) where the ratio of the general government debt to gross domestic product at market prices is 
significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, 
the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified under point (b) can reach a structural deficit of at 
most 1,0 % of the gross domestic product at market prices; 
(e) in the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path 
towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically. The mechanism shall include the 
obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures to correct the deviations over a 
defined period of time. 
2. The rules set out in paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties at the 
latest one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent 
character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to 
throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level 
the correction mechanism referred to in paragraph 1(e) on the basis of common principles to be proposed 
by the European Commission, concerning in particular the nature, size and time-frame of the corrective 
action to be undertaken, also in the case of exceptional circumstances, and the role and independence of 
the institutions responsible at national level for monitoring compliance with the rules set out in paragraph 
1. Such correction mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments. 
3. For the purposes of this Article, the definitions set out in Article 2 of the Protocol (No 12) on the 
excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the European Union Treaties, shall apply. 
The following definitions shall also apply for the purposes of this Article: 
(a) “annual structural balance of the general government” refers to the annual cyclically-adjusted balance 




(b) “exceptional circumstances” refers to the case of an unusual event outside the control of the 
Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general 
government or to periods of severe economic downturn as set out in the revised Stability and Growth 
Pact, provided that the temporary deviation of the Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal 
sustainability in the medium-term. 
ARTICLE 4 
When the ratio of a Contracting Party's general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 
% reference value referred to in Article 1 of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure, 
annexed to the European Union Treaties, that Contracting Party shall reduce it at an average rate of one 
twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 
7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, as 
amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011. The existence of an excessive 
deficit due to the breach of the debt criterion will be decided in accordance with the procedure set out in 
Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
ARTICLE 5 
1. A Contracting Party that is subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including 
a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an 
effective and durable correction of its excessive deficit. The content and format of such programmes shall 
be defined in European Union law. Their submission to the Council of the European Union and to the 
European Commission for endorsement and their monitoring will take place within the context of the 
existing surveillance procedures under the Stability and Growth Pact. 
2. The implementation of the budgetary and economic partnership programme, and the yearly budgetary 
plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Council of the European Union and by the European 
Commission. 
ARTICLE 6 
With a view to better coordinating the planning of their national debt issuance, the Contracting Parties 
shall report ex-ante on their public debt issuance plans to the Council of the European Union and to the 
European Commission. 
ARTICLE 7 
While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to supporting the proposals or 
recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the 
European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an 
excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not apply where it is established among the Contracting 
Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, without taking into account 
the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended. 
ARTICLE 8 
1. The European Commission is invited to present in due time to the Contracting Parties a report on the 
provisions adopted by each of them in compliance with Article 3(2). If the European Commission, after 
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having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its 
report that such Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union by one or more Contracting Parties. Where a Contracting Party 
considers, independently of the Commission's report, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply 
with Article 3(2), it may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice. In both cases, the judgment of the 
Court of Justice shall be binding on the parties to the proceedings, which shall take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court of Justice. 
2. Where, on the basis of its own assessment or that of the European Commission, a Contracting Party 
considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the 
judgment of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of 
Justice and request the imposition of financial sanctions following criteria established by the European 
Commission in the framework of Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If 
the Court of Justice finds that the Contracting Party concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may 
impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 
0,1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed on a Contracting Party whose currency is the 
euro shall be payable to the European Stability Mechanism. In other cases, payments shall be made to the 
general budget of the European Union. 
3. This Article constitutes a special agreement between the Contracting Parties within the meaning of 









This Section presents a calculation of the expenditure benchmark, in line with the methodology outlined 
in Box 1.11 in Section 1.3.2.6. The table at the end of this annex presents the data used for the calculation 
of the expenditure benchmark for an indicative country.  
As Box 1.11 sets out, the first data that enters the calculation is the government expenditure aggregate 
given in line 1. Interest expenditure (line 2), government expenditure on EU programmes fully matched 
by EU funds revenue (line 3), gross fixed capital formation for the year in question (line7) and cyclical 
unemployment benefit expenditure (line 9) are all subtracted from the government expenditure aggregate, 
while the average annual gross fixed capital formation for years t-3 to t (line 8) will be added. The table 
shows how the average is computed from the nominal figures for the four years in question, using the 
information from lines 4 to 7. The modified expenditure aggregate is then given in line 14. This is then 
corrected for discretionary revenue measures (given in line 12) and revenue measures mandated by law 
(13), in the countries where these latter apply. It is important to check that the increment of these figures 
relative to the previous year that is used  
The change in the net nominal expenditure is then computed in line 16 using the formula from Box 1.11. 
Note that in doing this, the corrected expenditure net of revenue measures in year t (line 15) is compared 
to the corrected expenditure for year t-1 that is not net of revenue measures (line 14). This is because the 
revenue measures from lines 12 and 13 are given on an incremental basis over the previous year. The 
nominal change is then converted to real terms using the deflator in line 17, which is calculated as the 
simple arithmetic average of the spring and autumn Commission forecasts from the previous year. The 
change in real terms in the net expenditure aggregate is given in line 18 according to the formula: 
real*deflator = nominal, which is to be used to judge compliance with the expenditure benchmark. 
In the example given in the table below, the country has an MTO of -0.45% of GDP for the entire period 
concerned and a structural balance of -1.1% in 2014 and -0.6% in 2015. Line 21 gives the reference rate 
for the country in question depending chiefly on whether it is at its MTO or not. If one aims at verifying 
compliance with the expenditure benchmark for instance for 2016, the first stage is to determine the initial 
position of this Member State at the start of the year (which implies comparing the structural balance in 
2015 with the country's MTO). This implies that at the start of 2016, the country in question is assessed to 
be at its MTO due to the 0.25% of GDP margin of tolerance (-0.6 vs. MTO=-0.45).  
If line 18 is at or below the level given in line 21, the country is compliant with the expenditure 
benchmark for a given year. Otherwise it is not compliant. Line 22 calculates the excess of the growth in 
expenditure over the reference rate, and converts into the national currency using the figure for the net 
expenditure aggregate. Using the figure for nominal GDP given in line 23, this difference of net 
expenditure growth relative to the reference rate is given as a share of GDP in line 24. 
The figure in line 24 gives the excess (if it is negative) of net expenditure growth over the reference rate 
to be used to assess whether the deviation is significant or not. If the deviation exceeds 0.5, it is judged to 
be significant. As the significance of deviation is judged both in each year and over two years, line 27 










      2013 2014 2015 2016 
1 General government expenditure  164.3 173.4 175.1 177.4 
2 Interest expenditure  8.4 8.1 7.9 7.8 
3 
Government expenditure on EU programmes fully 
matched by EU funds revenue  
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
4 Gross fixed capital formation t-3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.7 
5 Gross fixed capital formation t-2 9.2 9.2 9.7 9.7 
6 Gross fixed capital formation t-1 9.2 9.7 9.7 9.9 
7 Gross fixed capital formation t 9.7 9.7 9.9 10.1 
8 Annual average gross fixed capital formation t-3 to t 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.9 
9 Cyclical unemployment expenditure 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 
10 Discretionary measures current revenue 1.2 0.6 0.2 -1.9 
11 Discretionary measures capital transfers received 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12 Total discretionary revenue measures 1.2 0.6 0.2 -1.9 
13 Revenue measures mandated by law 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 14 
Corrected expenditure aggregate* (nominal) = (1) –(2) – (3) 
- ((7) – (8)) – (9) 155.1 164.6 166.2 168.8 
 15 
Corrected expenditure aggregate net of (12) and (13)* 
(nominal) = (14) – (12) – (13) 153.9 164.0 166.0 170.7 
 16 Net public expenditure annual growth in % (nominal)   5.7 0.8 2.7 
 17 
GDP deflator (% change) computed according to agreed 
methodology  
 
1.7 1.6 1.5 
 18 Net public expenditure annual growth in % (real) 
 
4.0 -0.8 1.2 
 19 MTO 
 
-0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
 20 Structural balance  
 
-1.1 -0.6 n.a. 
 21 Reference rate to be applied   -0.12 1.25 0.83 
 22 
Deviation in year t (in national currency) if negative, it is an 
excess over the benchmark = ((18)-(21))*(14 from the previous 
year)/100 
 
-1.4 3.7 -0.03 
 23 GDP (nominal) 
 
329.3 337.2 347.7 
 24 
Deviation in year t (in % GDP) if negative, it is an excess 
over the benchmark = (22)/(23)*100 
 
-1.5 1.09 -0.01 
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This annex presents an example of an assessment of effective action following an Article 126(7) 
recommendation or notice under Article 126(9). Assessing compliance with an Article 126(7) 
recommendation or an Article 126(9) notice implies a systematic economic judgement of the top-down 




Consider a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) to a country, setting a deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit as well as intermediate headline and structural deficit targets. For 
illustrative purposes only, we take as an example the recommendation that the Council addressed to 
Slovenia in June 2013. Slovenia was recommended to to reach a headline general government deficit of 
4.9% of GDP (3.7% of GDP without 1.2% of GDP one off expenditure to recapitalise the two largest 
banks as then estimated) in 2013, which was deemed consistent with an improvement in the structural 
balance of 0.7% of GDP and additional measures of 1% of GDP on top of the measures already known 
at the time of the recommendation and included in the baseline scenario. Tables A10.1 and A10.2 
below present the main variables used when defining the EDP adjustment path against which the 
assessment of effective action is undertaken. 
 








                                                          








Table A10.2: EDP scenario underpinning the recommendation  
 
 
The headline deficit (net of bank recapitalisations) reached 4.3% of GDP in 2013, above the 
corresponding EDP target of 3.7% of GDP, while the structural balance was estimated to have 
improved by 0.2% of GDP in 2013 (below the recommended 0.7% of GDP). This warranted an 
assessment of effective action, as detailed below. 
Assessment of effective action 
When corrected for an upward revision in potential growth (α = -0.3 pp., see Table A10.3) and revenue 
shortfalls (β = -0.7 pp., see Table A10.4), the estimated structural adjustment delivered in 2013 
increased to 0.5% of GDP, which was slightly below the recommended effort of 0.7% of GDP.  









growth at the time 









 (% of nominal 
potential GDP) 
 
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5)=(3)*(4)/100 
2013 -1.4 -0.6 -0.7 46.9 -0.3 
 




On the other hand, the amount of additional measures implemented by the country was estimated at 




Revenue gap (billion 
of national currency)*
Correction 
coefficient β (% 
of nominal 
potential GDP)
(1) (1') (2) (2') (3) (3') (4) (4')
(5)=[(1')-(2')-ε*(3')*(4')]-
[(1)-(2)-ε*(3)*(4)]
2013 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5 -0.6 -0.1 15.5 15.6 -0.2 -0.7
Change in current revenues (yoy) 
(billions of national currency)
Discretionary current revenue 
measures (billions of national 
currency)
Nominal GDP grow th assumptions 
(%)
Current revenues  in year t-1 









Table A10.5: Additional measures since EDP recommendation as per the bottom-up approach 
 
 
While the conclusion in terms of effective action is in most cases straightforward when the two 
indicators point in the same direction, it requires analysing the sources of the discrepancy when they 
deliver different messages. In cases like the one depicted in this example, as the top-down and bottom-
up indicators convey different messages, an analysis of the reasons behind is warranted in order to 
assess whether the country has taken effective action. This kind of analysis is country-specific, given 
that the factors that can explain the differences between the two metrics depend on the specific aspects 
affecting the budgetary execution on the revenue and the expenditure sides, respectively – as explained 
below.  
The careful analysis 
Analysing possible differences between the two indicators is therefore a crucial part of the assessment 
of effective action. In general, the difference between the two indicators can be explained by four main 
factors that help inform the careful analysis, one on the revenue side and three on the expenditure side: 
 Revenue side: 
1. The corrected change in structural balance can still be distorted by windfalls/shortfalls in capital 
revenues (as the correction brought by the β parameter concerns only windfalls/shortfalls in current 
revenues), while the bottom-up measure of the fiscal effort focuses directly on discretionary 
revenue measures.  
 Expenditure side: 
2. There may be a difference between the two benchmark growth rates for structural expenditure, 
namely the no-policy change scenario used as baseline in the bottom-up approach on the one hand, 
and the nominal potential GDP growth rate corrected by the α parameter in the corrected change in 
the structural balance, on the other hand. Since the α parameter only brings a correction in real 
terms, surprises in inflation will affect the two benchmark growth rates, which are set in nominal 
terms. 
3. Some expenditure items are excluded from the bottom-up indicator – in particular, interest 
payments and EU funds – while these are not excluded when computing the corrected change in 
structural balance. 
4. There may be a difference between the apparent and the conventional values of expenditure semi-
elasticities. To put it differently, the impact of cyclical conditions on public expenditure – and more 
precisely on unemployment expenditure – is not measured in the same way in both indicators. 
However, it is to be noted that, while the factors indicated above help identifying the source(s) of 
discrepancy between the two metrics, they do not necessarily point to which one is the relevant 
indicator to assess the delivery of effective action.  
Additional effort in 
revenue (% of GDP)
Additional effort in 
expenditure  (% of GDP)
Total annual 
additional effort (% 
of GDP)
Total cumulated 
additional effort (% 
of GDP)
Additional annual  
measures indicated in 
the recommendation (% 
of GDP)
2013 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0
ANNEX 11 
PARAMETERS UNDERLYING THE COMMISSION'S 




The cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB) corresponds to the deficit/surplus-to-GDP ratio that 
would prevail if the economy was running at potential. It is computed as the difference between the 











  (1) 
where R and G stand for the nominal government revenue and expenditure respectively and Y for 
nominal GDP. The nominal budget balance B is defined as the difference between the nominal 
government revenue and expenditure. The cyclical component of the budget balance is the product of a 
cyclical adjustment parameter (ε) and the output gap (OG). ε is often called semi-elasticity, which 
captures the reaction of the budget balance, as a percentage of GDP, to the output gap. This cyclical 
component is subtracted from the actual budget as a percentage of GDP (also called 'headline budget 
balance' in the fiscal literature) to obtain the CAB. It has the merit to be easily calculated and be clearly 
communicable to policymakers. 
The cyclical adjustment parameter, i.e. the budgetary semi-elasticity is computed based on the 
weighting parameters (
164
) and the recently revised individual elasticities of revenue and spending 
(
165
). As shown by Table 1, budgetary semi-elasticities are computed by weighting individual elasticities 
by the corresponding share of the individual revenue (expenditure) category in total revenue (expenditure) 
and by the corresponding revenue (expenditure) weight (in percentage of GDP). 




































where ηR and ηG denote respectively the elasticity of (total) revenue and expenditure with respect to the 
output gap. (ηR –1) and (ηG–1) correspond to the elasticity of the revenue-to-GDP ratio and the elasticity 
of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio respectively. Individual revenue/spending elasticities with respect to the 
output gap are computed using a two-step procedure (see Table 2): (i) the elasticity of the 
revenue/expenditure item with respect to its base         ., and (ii) the elasticity of the base with respect 
to output      . 
OGbasebaseROGR ///     (3) 
 
 
                                                          
(164) For more details, see G. Mourre, G-M. Isbasoiu, D. Paternoster and M. Salto, “The cyclically-adjusted budget balance used in 
the EU fiscal framework: a revised computation”, European Economy. Economic Papers, March 2013 
(165) For more details, see G. Mourrre, C. Astarita and S. Princen, “Adjusting the budget balance for the business cycle: the EU 
methodology”, European Economy. Economic Papers, November 2014 and Price, R. W, Dang T. and Guillemette Y. (2014), “New 
tax and expenditure elasticity estimates for EU budget surveillance”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1174 
  



















































Revenue Expenditure Budget balance
( a ) ( b ) c = a-1 d = b-1 ( e ) ( f ) g = c*e h = d*f i = g-h
BE 1.03 -0.17 0.03 -1.17 49.05 50.70 0.015 -0.591 0.605
BG 0.78 -0.03 -0.22 -1.03 37.75 38.10 -0.084 -0.391 0.308
CZ 0.97 -0.02 -0.03 -1.02 39.91 43.77 -0.012 -0.446 0.433
DK 1.00 -0.14 0.00 -1.14 55.75 54.34 -0.001 -0.620 0.619
DE 0.98 -0.21 -0.02 -1.21 44.00 46.45 -0.009 -0.560 0.551
EE 1.10 -0.10 0.10 -1.10 37.63 36.99 0.037 -0.406 0.443
IE 1.05 -0.24 0.05 -1.24 35.20 41.14 0.019 -0.508 0.528
EL 0.94 -0.05 -0.06 -1.05 39.93 48.06 -0.023 -0.506 0.483
ES 1.03 -0.28 0.03 -1.28 38.14 41.13 0.011 -0.528 0.539
FR 1.00 -0.11 0.00 -1.11 49.90 54.11 0.002 -0.601 0.603
HR 0.97 -0.02 -0.03 -1.02 40.48 46.96 -0.011 -0.479 0.467
IT 1.08 -0.03 0.08 -1.03 45.14 48.77 0.038 -0.501 0.539
CY 1.18 -0.04 0.18 -1.04 40.27 43.47 0.071 -0.452 0.523
LV 0.92 -0.07 -0.08 -1.07 35.08 38.26 -0.028 -0.408 0.380
LT 1.07 -0.08 0.07 -1.08 32.92 36.13 0.022 -0.391 0.413
LU 1.01 -0.08 0.01 -1.08 41.87 41.09 0.003 -0.442 0.445
HU 0.96 -0.01 -0.04 -1.01 44.97 50.33 -0.019 -0.511 0.492
MT 1.02 -0.03 0.02 -1.03 39.48 43.74 0.007 -0.449 0.456
NL 1.15 -0.22 0.15 -1.22 45.25 47.37 0.066 -0.579 0.646
AT 1.02 -0.12 0.02 -1.12 48.49 50.77 0.012 -0.569 0.580
PL 1.07 -0.13 0.07 -1.13 38.78 43.79 0.027 -0.494 0.521
PT 0.95 -0.13 -0.05 -1.13 41.08 46.42 -0.019 -0.525 0.506
RO 0.86 -0.04 -0.14 -1.04 32.97 36.78 -0.045 -0.384 0.339
SI 0.99 -0.04 -0.01 -1.04 43.46 46.49 -0.006 -0.483 0.477
SK 0.99 -0.03 -0.01 -1.03 34.23 38.62 -0.005 -0.398 0.393
FI 0.94 -0.18 -0.06 -1.18 53.13 51.08 -0.030 -0.604 0.574
SE 0.96 -0.15 -0.04 -1.15 53.99 53.13 -0.020 -0.609 0.590
UK 1.30 -0.03 0.30 -1.03 40.36 45.60 0.120 -0.471 0.591
Elasticity of: Weights (% of GDP) of: Semi-elasticity for:
Note: The total revenue and expenditure as a percentage of GDP (columns e and f) correspond to the 'Excessive Deficit Procedure' 



















































































































































j k = j * k l m = l * m n o = n * o p q = p * q r s = r * s
BE 1.62 0.81 1.31 1.62 1.53 2.48 1.15 0.61 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.70 -3.70
BG 1.11 1.04 1.15 1.81 1.18 2.13 0.93 0.66 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.91 -3.91
CZ 2.23 0.74 1.65 1.23 1.45 1.78 0.99 0.87 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -2.45 -2.45
DK 1.43 0.70 1.00 2.07 1.52 3.15 0.70 0.59 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -4.97 -4.97
DE 1.88 1.00 1.87 1.59 1.20 1.91 0.86 0.70 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.30 -3.30
EE 1.46 1.08 1.58 1.81 0.99 1.78 1.36 1.03 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -5.18 -5.18
IE 2.04 0.77 1.58 1.00 1.26 1.25 1.51 0.69 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -5.45 -5.45
EL 2.21 1.00 2.22 1.81 1.05 1.90 0.84 0.69 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.15 -3.15
ES 1.88 0.98 1.84 1.32 1.18 1.56 0.82 0.88 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -5.83 -5.83
FR 1.68 1.11 1.86 2.03 1.36 2.76 0.95 0.66 0.63 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.23 -3.23
HR 1.75 0.98 1.71 1.81 1.27 2.29 1.00 0.71 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -2.39 -2.39
IT 1.85 0.79 1.46 2.09 1.47 3.07 0.97 0.60 0.58 1.10 1.00 1.10 1.00 -2.29 -2.29
CY 2.25 1.01 2.28 1.93 1.17 2.26 1.00 0.91 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.08 -3.08
LV 1.31 1.14 1.50 1.89 1.05 1.99 1.00 0.81 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.94 -3.94
LT 1.46 1.23 1.79 1.68 0.99 1.67 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -5.60 -5.60
LU 2.24 0.60 1.34 1.81 1.30 2.36 0.89 0.44 0.39 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.06 -3.06
HU 1.80 0.96 1.73 1.81 1.22 2.21 0.99 0.77 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.25 -1.25
MT 2.11 0.98 2.07 1.81 1.17 2.11 0.92 0.76 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.96 -1.96
NL 2.00 1.19 2.37 2.81 1.11 3.13 0.86 0.73 0.62 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -5.76 -5.76
AT 1.97 0.84 1.66 1.90 1.44 2.74 0.92 0.70 0.65 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -4.71 -4.71
PL 1.93 0.98 1.88 2.30 1.27 2.92 0.97 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -6.18 -6.18
PT 2.15 0.91 1.97 1.07 1.24 1.33 1.00 0.79 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -6.04 -6.04
RO 1.36 0.95 1.29 1.81 1.11 2.02 0.99 0.62 0.62 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.91 -3.91
SI 2.14 0.76 1.63 2.72 1.38 3.76 1.00 0.66 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -2.81 -2.81
SK 2.43 0.79 1.93 1.24 1.28 1.58 1.19 0.75 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -2.98 -2.98
FI 1.48 0.95 1.41 1.63 1.25 2.03 1.00 0.77 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -3.66 -3.66
SE 1.42 0.93 1.32 1.19 1.30 1.56 0.95 0.75 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -4.42 -4.42
UK 1.49 1.12 1.68 2.89 1.35 3.92 1.20 0.50 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -4.21 -4.21
Personal income tax Corporate income tax Social security contributions Indirect taxes Unemployment-related expenditure
ANNEX 12 
MODEL STRUCTURE AND TABLES TO BE CONTAINED IN 





A. MODEL STRUCTURE FOR DRAFT BUDGETARY PLANS 
 
1. Macroeconomic Forecasts. 
 
2. Budgetary targets. 
 
3. Expenditure and revenue projections under the no-policy change scenario. 
 
4. Expenditure and revenue targets. General government expenditure by function. 
 
5. Discretionary measures included in the draft budget. 
 
6. Possible links between the draft budgetary plan and the targets set by the Union's Strategy for 
growth and jobs and CSRs. 
 
7. Comparison with latest Stability Programme.  
 
8. Distributional impact of the main expenditure and revenue measures. 
 
Annex: Methodological aspects, including the estimated impact of aggregated budgetary measures 











B. TABLES TO BE CONTAINED IN DRAFT BUDGETARY PLANS 
1. Macroeconomic forecasts  












   
Long-term interest rate (annual 
average) 
   
USD/€ exchange rate (annual 
average)  
   
Nominal effective exchange rate    
World excluding EU, GDP growth    
EU GDP growth     
Growth of relevant foreign markets    
World import volumes, excluding EU    
Oil prices (Brent, USD/barrel)    























Table 0.ii): Main assumptions. Non-exhaustive check list. (Similar information can be provided in different formats) 
 
 Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 
1. External environment  
a. Prices of commodities    
b. Spreads over the German 
bond 
   
    
2. Fiscal policy  
a.  General government net 
lending / net borrowing 
   
b. General government gross 
debt 
   
    
3. Monetary policy / Financial sector / 
interest rates assumptions 
 
a. Interest rates:    
i. Euribor    
ii. Deposit rates    
iii. Interest rates for 
loans 
   
iv. Yields to maturity 
of 10 year 
government 
bonds 
   
b. Evolution of deposits    
c.  Evolution of loans    
d. NPL trends    
    
4. Demographic trends  
a.  Evolution of working-age 
population 
   
b.  Dependency ratios    
    
5. Structural policies  









































rate of change 
1. Real GDP B1*g      
Of which   
1.1. Attributable to the  
estimated impact of  
aggregated budgetary  
measures on economic  
growth1 
 --- --- 
   
2. Potential GDP            
contributions:       
- labour      
- capital      
- total factor productivity      
3. Nominal GDP  B1*g           
Components of real GDP   
4. Private final consumption 
expenditure 
P.3 
     
5. Government final 
consumption expenditure 
P.3 
    
6. Gross fixed capital formation P.51g     
7. Changes in inventories and 




    
8. Exports of goods and 
services 
P.6 
    
9. Imports of goods and 
services 
P.7 
    




10. Final domestic demand    -    
11. Changes in inventories and 
net acquisition of valuables  
P.52 + 
P.53 
 -   
12. External balance of goods 
and services  
B.11 
 -   









Table 1.b.: Price developments 































1. GDP deflator            
2. Private consumption deflator       
3. HICP      
4. Public consumption deflator      
5. Investment deflator       
6. Export price deflator (goods 
and services) 
 
    
7. Import price deflator (goods 
and services) 
 
    
 




















1. Employment, persons1      
2. Employment, hours worked2      
3. Unemployment rate (%)3      
4. Labour productivity, persons4      
5. Labour productivity, hours worked      
6. Compensation of employees D.1     
7. Compensation per employee      
      
      
      
   -   
   -   
1/ Occupied population, domestic concept national accounts definition. 
2/ National accounts definition. 
3/ Harmonised definition, Eurostat; levels. 
4/ Real GDP per person employed. 
5/ Real GDP per hour worked.  
 
European Commission 


















1. Net lending/net borrowing vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world 
B.9 % GDP % GDP % GDP 
of which:  
- Balance on goods and services     
- Balance of primary incomes and 
transfers 
    
- Capital account     
2. Net lending/net borrowing of the 
private sector 
B.9    
3. Net lending/net borrowing of general 
government 
B.9    










2. Budgetary Targets 
 
Table 2.a.: General government budgetary targets broken down by subsector 
 











  % GDP % GDP % GDP % GDP % GDP 
Net lending (+) / net 
borrowing (-) ( B.9) by 
sub-sector1 
    
1. General government S.13         
1a. Central government S.1311    
1b. State government S.1312   
1c. Local government S.1313   
1d. Social security funds S.1314   
2. Interest expenditure D.41   
3. Primary balance2    
4. One-off and other 
temporary measures3 
         
5. Real GDP growth (%) 
(=1 in Table 1.a) 
    
6. Potential GDP growth 
(%) (=2 in Table 1.a) 
         
contributions:   
- labour    
- capital    
- total factor 
productivity 
   
7. Output gap (% of 
potential GDP) 
         
8. Cyclical budgetary 
component (% of 
potential GDP) 
         
9. Cyclically-adjusted 
balance (1 - 12) (% of 
potential GDP) 
   
 
10. Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance (13 + 6) 
(% of potential GDP) 
   
11. Structural balance 
(13 - 8) (% of potential 
GDP) 
         
1/ TR-TE= B.9. 
2/ The primary balance is calculated as (B.9, item 1) plus (D.41, item 2). 
3/ A plus sign means deficit-reducing one-off measures. 
European Commission 







Table 2.b.: General government debt developments 
 










  % GDP % GDP % GDP % GDP % GDP 
1. Gross debt1          
2. Change in gross debt ratio     
Contributions to changes in 
gross debt 
 
3. Primary balance (= item 3 in 
Table 2.a)  
   
4. Interest expenditure 
(= item 2 in Table 2.a) 
D.41   
5. Stock-flow adjustment          
of which:   
- Differences between cash and 
accruals2 
   
- Net accumulation of financial 
assets3 
   
of which:  
- privatisation proceeds    
- Valuation effects and other4    
p.m.: Implicit interest rate on 
debt5 
   
Other relevant variables  
6. Liquid financial assets6    
7. Net financial debt (7=1-6)    
8. Debt amortization (existing 
bonds) since the end of the 
previous year 
   
9. Percentage of debt 
denominated in foreign currency 
   
10. Average maturity    
1/ As defined in amended Regulation 479/2009.  
2/ The differences concerning interest expenditure, other expenditure and revenue could be distinguished when relevant or in case 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the reference value. 
3/ Currency and deposits, government debt securities, government controlled enterprises and the difference between listed and 
unlisted shares could be distinguished when relevant or in case the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the reference value. 
4/ Changes due to exchange rate movements, and operation in secondary market could be distinguished when relevant or in case the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is above the reference value. 
5/ Proxied by interest expenditure divided by the debt level of the previous year. 
6/ Liquid assets are here defined as stocks of AF.1, AF.2, AF.3 (consolidated for general government, i.e. netting out financial 















 % GDP % GDP 
Public guarantees   













3. Expenditure and Revenue Projections under the no-policy change scenario(166). 
 
Table 3.: General government expenditure and revenue projections at unchanged policies broken down by main components 
 




General government (S13)  % GDP % GDP 
1. Total revenue at unchanged policies TR   
Of which  
1.1. Taxes on production and imports  D.2   
1.2. Current taxes on income, wealth, etc  D.5   
1.3. Capital taxes  D.91   
1.4. Social contributions  D.61   
1.5. Property income D.4   
1.6. Other1    
p.m.: Tax burden  
(D.2+D.5+D.61+D.91-D.995)2 
   
2. Total expenditure at unchanged policies TE
3   
Of which  
2.1. Compensation of employees  D.1    
2.2. Intermediate consumption P.2   
2.3. Social payments  D.62+D.632   
of which Unemployment benefits4  
2.4. Interest expenditure  D.41    
2.5. Subsidies  D.3   
2.6. Gross fixed capital formation  P.51g   
2.7. Capital transfers D.9    






                                                          
(166) Please note that the no-policy change scenario involves the extrapolation of revenue and expenditure trends before adding the 









4. Expenditure and Revenue targets. 
 
Table 4.: General government expenditure and revenue targets, broken down by main components 
 




General government (S13)  % GDP % GDP 
1. Total revenue target TR   
Of which  
1.1. Taxes on production and imports  D.2   
1.2. Current taxes on income, wealth, etc.  D.5   
1.3. Capital taxes  D.91   
1.4. Social contributions  D.61   
1.5. Property income  D.4   
1.6. Other 1    
p.m.: Tax burden  
(D.2+D.5+D.61+D.91-D.995)2 
   
2. Total expenditure target TE
3   
Of which  
2.1. Compensation of employees D.1    
2.2. Intermediate consumption P.2   
2.3. Social payments  D.62+D.632   
of which Unemployment benefits4  
2.4. Interest expenditure (=item 2 in Table 2.a)  D.41    
2.5. Subsidies  D.3   
2.6. Gross fixed capital formation  P.51   
2.7. Capital transfers D.9    
2.8. Other5    
1/ P.11+P.12+P.131+D.39rec+D.7rec+D.9rec (other than D.91rec). 
2/ Including those collected by the EU and including an adjustment for uncollected taxes and social contributions D.995), if 
appropriate.  
3/ TR-TE = B.9. 
4/ Includes social benefits other than social transfers in kind (D.62) and social transfers in kind via market producers (D.632) related 
to unemployment benefits. 
5/ D.29pay + D.4pay (other than D.41pay) +D.5pay +D.7pay +P.52+P.53+NP+D.8. 
 
European Commission 




















  Level % GDP % GDP % GDP 
1. Expenditure on EU 
programmes fully matched by EU 
funds revenue 
     




     
3. Effect of discretionary revenue 
measures2 
     
4. Revenue increases mandated by 
law 
     
1/ Please detail the methodology used to obtain the cyclical component of unemployment benefit expenditure. It should build on 
unemployment benefit expenditure as defined in COFOG under the code 10.5. 
2/ Revenue increases mandated by law should not be included in the effect of discretionary revenue measures: data reported in 
rows 3 and 4 should be mutually exclusive. 
 
 
Table 4.c: General government expenditure by function 
 
4.c.i) General government expenditure on education, healthcare and employment 
 Year t Year t+1 
 % GDP % general government 
expenditure 
% GDP 




     
Healthcare
1
     
Employment
2
     
1/ These expenditure categories should correspond respectively to items 9 and7 in table 4.c.ii). 
2/ This expenditure category should contain, inter alia, government spending related to active labour market policies (ALMPs) 
including public employment services. On the contrary, items such as compensation of public employees or vocational training 














4.c.ii) Classification of the functions of the Government 




Year t Year t+1 
  % GDP % GDP 
1. General public services 1   
2. Defense 2   
3. Public order and safety 3   
4. Economic affairs  4   
4. Environmental protection 5   
6. Housing and community 
amenities 
6   
7. Health 7   
8. Recreation, culture and religion 8   
9. Education 9   
10. Social protection 10   
11. Total Expenditure (= item 2 in 
Table 4.a) 












5. Description of discretionary measures included in the draft budget 
 




































(1)          
(2)         
…         
 TOTAL     
1/ Please describe in further detail in case of major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spillover effects for other Member 
States in the Euro Area.  
 
 

































(1)          
(2)         
…         
 TOTAL     
1/ Please describe in further detail in case of major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spillover effects for other Member 




















































(1)          
(2)         
…         
 TOTAL     
1/ Please name whether State Government, Local Government and/or Social Security Funds. 
2/ Please describe in further detail in case of major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spillover effects for other Member 
States in the Euro Area.  
European Commission 







6. Indications on how the measures in the DBP address CSR and the targets set by the Union's 
Strategy for growth and jobs 
 
Table 6.a: CSR recommendations 
 
 




List of measures Description of direct relevance  
   
   
   
National 2020 headline targets List of measures 
Description of direct relevance to 
address the target 
National 2020 employment target […]   
National 2020 R&D target […]   
GHG emission reduction target […]   
Renewable energy target […]   
National energy efficiency target […]   
National early school leaving target […]   
National target for tertiary education […]   








7. Divergence from latest SP 
 


















Target general government 
net lending/net borrowing  
B.9  
Stability Programme     
Draft Budgetary Plan     
Difference     
General government net 
lending projection at 
unchanged policies  
B.9  
Stability Programme     
Draft Budgetary Plan     
Difference1     
1/ This difference can refer to both deviations stemming from changes in the macroeconomic scenario and those stemming from the 
effect of policy measures taken between the submission of the SP and the submission of the DBP. Differences are expected due to 












8. Distributional impact of the main expenditure and revenue measures 
In accordance with Article 6(3)(d) of Regulation 473/2013,Member States should provide, to the extent possible, qualitative 
information and quantitative estimations on the distributional effects of budgetary measures, presented as best fits each Member 
State's specific measures and available analytical frameworks.  
Quantifying the distributional impact of budgetary measures is a challenging task. For this reason no standardized table on this 
aspect of DBPs is included in this Annex. Quantitative estimations of the distributional impact of budgetary measures could be 
assessed by computing the expected changes in the Gini index, the S80/S20 indicator or the poverty rates as a result of them. This 
methodology could represent one possible way forward among others.  
 
 
Annex to the DBP: Methodology, economic models and assumptions underpinning the 
information contained in the DBP 
 
Table 8: Methodological aspects 
 
Estimation Technique 
Step of the budgetary 
process for which it was 
used1 
Relevant features of the 
model/ technique used 
Assumptions 
Tool n.1    
Tool n.2    
…    
 
1/ Modeling tools may have been used: 
 - when doing macro forecasts 
- when estimating expenditure and revenue under the no policy change scenario 
- when estimating the distributional impact of the main expenditure and revenue measures 
- when quantifying the expenditure and revenue measures to be included in the draft budget  








TABLES TO BE INCLUDED UNDER THE ADDITIONAL 




These tables are to be submitted in accordance with Article 10(3) of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 on 
common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of 
excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area. In all tables, year t corresponds to the year of 
submission of the report. Reporting for the items indicated in bold is compulsory. The conceptual 







































Table 1a: In-year quarterly budgetary execution on cash basisa for the general government and its sub-sectorsb 
 
EUR millions 
Year t * 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Overall balance by sub-sector (6-7) 
1. General government     
2. Central government     
3. State government     
4. Local government     
5. Social security funds     
For each sub-sector (please indicate which) 
6. Total revenue / inflows      
Of which (indicative list) 
Taxes, of which:      
 Direct Taxes      
 Indirect taxes, of which:      
 VAT      
Social contributions      
Sales      
Other current revenue      
Capital revenue      
Inflows from operations in financial instruments      
7. Total expenditure / outflows      
Of which (indicative list) 
Purchase of goods and services      
Compensation of employees      
Interest      
Subsidies      
Social benefits      
Other current expenditure      
Capital transfers payable      
Capital investments      
Outflows from operations in financial instruments     
* The reporting is mandatory up to the current quarter included. If the data for the current quarter is not available, 
please provide latest available monthly data, indicating which month it corresponds to. For the overall balance of the 
general government, please provide the information until the latest available quarter (i.e. q-1). The normal quality 
assurance and revision policy should apply. 
a Equivalent figures from public accounting may be provided if cash-based data are not available; please specify the 
accounting basis used to fill all the information provided in this table. 








Table 1b: In-year quarterly budgetary execution and prospects in accordance with ESA standards and seasonally non-adjusteda for the 
general government and its sub-sectors 
The data of budgetary execution provided in Table 1a and 1b should be consistent; a reconciliation table 
showing the methodology of transition between the two tables should be communicated. 
EUR millions ESA code 
Year t * 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Net lending (+)/ net borrowing (-)  
1. General government a S.13     
2. Central government S.1311     
3. State government S.1312     
4. Local government S.1313     
5. Social security funds S.1314     
For the general government (voluntary for the sub-sectors) 
6. Total revenue a TR     
Of which  
Taxes on production and imports  D.2     
Current taxes on income, wealth, etc.  D.5     
Capital taxes  D.91     
Social contributions  D.61     
Property income  D.4     
Otherb      
7. Total expenditure a TE
     
Of which  
Compensation of employees D.1      
Intermediate consumption P.2     
Social payments  D.62, 
D.632c 
 
   
Interest expenditure  D.41      
Subsidies  D.3     
Gross fixed capital formationa P.51     
Capital transfers D.9      
Otherd      
8. Gross debte      
* The reporting shall span until the end of the current Year t; quarterly prospects are not binding and reported as 
estimates (possibly subject to revisions) for informational and monitoring purposes. 
a For the general government, the items labelled with “a” are to be additionally provided in seasonally-adjusted terms; 
if it cannot be provided by the national authorities, the seasonal adjustment will be performed by Eurostat, in liaison 
with the Member State concerned.  
b P.11+P.12+P.131+D.39rec +D.7rec +D.9rec (other than D.91rec) . 
c Under ESA95: D6311_D63121_D63131pay; in ESA2010 D632pay 
d D.29pay+D.4pay (other than D.41pay) +D.5pay+D.7pay+P.52+P.53+K.2+D.8. 
e As defined in Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 
 
European Commission 







Table 1c: Annual budgetary targets in accordance with ESA standards for the general government and its sub-sectors 
 ESA Code Year t-1 Year t Year t + … * 
Net lending(+)/ net borrowing (-) by sub-sector (% GDP) 
1. General government S.13    
2. Central government S.1311    
3. State government S.1312    
4. Local government S.1313    
5. Social security funds S.1314    
General government (S.13) (% GDP)  
6. Total revenue  TR    
7. Total expenditure TE    
8. Interest expenditure D.41    
9. Primary balance
a     
10. One-off and other 
temporary measures
b 
   
 
 
 rate of change rate of change rate of change 
11. Real GDP growth  
    
12. Potential GDP growth  
    
contributions: 
- labour     
- capital     
- total factor productivity     
 




% potential GDP 
13. Output gap  
    
14. Cyclical budgetary 
component 




 (1 – 14) 
   
 
14. Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance (13 + 6) 
   
 
15. Structural balance (13 – 
10) 
   
 
* Following the request from the Commission to activate the reporting requirements provided for by 
Article 10(3) of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, the reporting starts from the year of the opening of the 
excessive deficit procedure in accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU, and spans until the excessive deficit 
is planned to be corrected, in accordance with the deadline set by the Council recommendation in 
accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU or decision to give notice in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. 
a The primary balance is calculated as (B.9, item 8) plus (D.41, item 9). 








Table 2: Targets for the expenditure and revenues of the general government (S.13) in accordance with ESA standards 
% GDP ESA Code Year t-1 Year t Year t+1 Year t + … 
* 
1. Total revenue target  
(= table 1c. 6) 
TR     
Of which   
1.1. Taxes on production and 
imports  
D.2     
1.2. Current taxes on income, 
wealth, etc.  
D.5     
1.3. Capital taxes  D.91     
1.4. Social contributions  D.61     
1.5. Property income  D.4     
1.6. Othera      
p.m.: Tax burden  
(D.2+D.5+D.61+D.91-D.995)b 
     
2. Total expenditure target  
(= table 1c.7) 
TEc     
Of which   
2.1. Compensation of employees  D.1      
2.2. Intermediate consumption P.2     
2.3. Social payments  D.62, D.6311, 
D.63121, 
D.63131f 
    
 of which  
 Unemployment benefitsd 
     
2.4. Interest expenditure  D.41      
2.5. Subsidies  D.3     
2.6. Gross fixed capital formation  P.51     
2.7. Capital transfers D.9      
2.8. Othere      
* Following the request from the Commission to activate the reporting requirements provided for by Article 10(3) of 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, the reporting starts from the year of the opening of the excessive deficit procedure in 
accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU, and spans until the excessive deficit is planned to be corrected, in accordance 
with the deadline set by the Council recommendation in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU or decision to give 
notice in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. 
a P.11+P.12+P.131+D.39rec+D.7rec+D.9rec (other than D.91rec). 
b Including those collected by the EU and including an adjustment for uncollected taxes and social contributions 
D.995), if appropriate.  
c TR-TE = B.9. 
d Includes cash benefits (D.621 and D.624) and in kind benefits (D.631) related to unemployment benefits. 
e D.29+D.4 (other than D.41) +D.5+D.7+P.52+P.53+K.2+D.8. 
f
 In ESA2010: D.62, D.632 
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Table 3a: Budgetary measures adopted and envisaged by the general government and its sub-sectors on both the expenditure and the 
revenue side to achieve the targets presented in Table 2 
 





















Incremental budgetary impact (EUR 
million) on year 
 
t-1 t  t+1 t+2 
t + 
* 
           
          
          
 TOTAL      
* Year when the excessive deficit is planned to be corrected, in accordance with the deadline set by the 
Council recommendation in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU or decisions to give notice in 
accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. 
a Only measures sufficiently detailed and credibly announced should be reported. 
b Including reporting on which sub-sector is taking the measure.  
c By default, the impact of the measures will be reported on accrual basis, but, if impossible and reporting 
is in cash, it should be indicated explicitly. The impact is to be recorded in incremental terms – as 
opposed to levels – compared to the previous year's baseline projection. Simple permanent measures 
should be recorded as having an effect of +/- X in the year(s) they are introduced and zero otherwise (the 
overall impact on the level of revenues or expenditures must not cancel out). If the impact of a measure 
varies over time, only the incremental impact should be recorded in the table. By their nature, one-off 
measures should be always recorded as having an effect of +/-X in the year of the first budgetary impact 
and -/+ X in the following year, i.e. the overall impact on the level of revenues or expenditures in two 
consecutive years must be zero.  
 






In-year reporting for measures having an effect on 




budgetary impact for year 
t  
(EUR million) 
(= Table 3a) 
Quarterly observed 






since the start of the 
year (EUR million)  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
       
       
TOTAL       
a Select the measures reported in Table 3a which have a budgetary impact in year t. 
b Filling one of the two alternatives is mandatory: quarterly reporting (estimates possibly subject to 
revisions) at least until the current quarter and/or sum of the observed budgetary impact until the current 
date. 
c Indicate for each quarter whether the data reported corresponds to observed data; the reporting is 








Table 4: General government (S.13) debt developments and prospects 
 
  Year t-1 Year t Year t + … * 
 ESA Code % GDP % GDP % GDP 
1. Gross debt
a  
(=Table 1b.8 for the general government) 
    
2. Change in gross debt ratio     
Contributions to changes in gross debt  
3. Primary balance  
(= Table 1c. 9)  
    
4. Interest expenditure  
(= Table 1c.8) 
D.41    
5. Stock-flow adjustment     
of which:  
- Differences between cash and accrualsb     
- Net accumulation of financial assetsc     
of which:  
- Privatisation proceeds     
- Valuation effects and otherd     




    
Other relevant variables  
6. Liquid financial assetsf     
7. Net financial debt (7=1-6)     
8. Debt amortization (existing bonds) 
since the end of the previous year 
    
9. Percentage of debt denominated in 
foreign currency (%) 
    
10. Average maturity (years)     
11. Real GDP growth (%)  
(= Table 1c row 11) 
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* Following the request from the Commission to activate the reporting requirements provided for by Article 10(3) of 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, the reporting starts from the year of the opening of the excessive deficit procedure in 
accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU, and spans until the excessive deficit is planned to be corrected, in accordance 
with the deadline set by the Council recommendation in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU or decision to give 
notice in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. 
a As defined in Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 
b The differences concerning interest expenditure, other expenditure and revenue could be distinguished when 
relevant or in case the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the reference value. 
c: Liquid assets (currency), government securities, assets on third countries, government controlled enterprises and 
the difference between quoted and non-quoted assets could be distinguished when relevant or in case the debt-to-
GDP ratio is above the reference value. 
d Changes due to exchange rate movements, and operation in secondary market could be distinguished when relevant 
or in case the debt-to-GDP ratio is above the reference value. 
e Proxied by interest expenditure divided by the debt level of the previous year. 
f Liquid assets are here defined as AF.1, AF.2, AF.3 (consolidated for general government, i.e. netting out financial 
positions between government entities), A.F511, AF.52 (only if quoted in stock exchange). 
 
ANNEX 14 
ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE PREVENTIVE ARM OF 




Member States' compliance with the requirements of the preventive arm of the SGP is summarised in 
Table A14.1, based on the assessments undertaken at the time of the 2014 and 2015 spring forecasts, 
respectively. 
 
Table A14.1: An overview of the 2013-2014 assessment in the light of the spring Forecast 2014-2015 
  
    2013(167) 2014(168) 
BE 
At MTO at the start of the year? Not at MTO Not at MTO 
MTO 0.75 0.75 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -3.0 -2.8 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -2.2 -2.3 






n.a. in EDP in 2013 
0.5 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 0.5 
ΔSB (SF2015) -0.1 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.6 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.2 
Conclusion overall assessment 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
n.a. in EDP in 2013 






At MTO at the start of the year? YES YES 
MTO -1.0 -1.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -0.6 -2.6 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -0.8 -1.5 
Requirement based on matrix (ΔSB)  0.0 
                                                          
(167) Based on Commission spring forecast 2014. 
(168) Based on Commission spring forecast 2015. 
(169) Bulgaria is eligible to an investment clause in 2013-2014. 
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Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)**  
 
 
Above the MTO 
-0.3 
ΔSB (SF2015) -1.7 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-1.5 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
1.0 
Conclusion overall assessment 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
-0.5 
EB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
0.8 
Conclusion overall assessment 
    2013 2014 
CZ 
At MTO at the start of the year? Not at MTO YES 
MTO -1.0 -1.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -1.6 -1.0 
SB (used to define the initial position)* 0.2 -0.7 







n.a. in EDP in 2013 
Compliant 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 
ΔSB (SF2015) 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
Conclusion 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
n.a. in EDP in 2013 




At MTO at the start of the year? YES YES 








SB (at the time of the assessment) 0.6 0.4 
SB (used to define the initial position)* 1.1 1.2 








n.a. in EDP in 2013 
Above the MTO 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 
ΔSB (AT THE TIME OF THE 
ASSESSMENT) 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
Conclusion 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
EB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
Conclusion 
  2013 2014 
DE 
At MTO at the start of the year? YES YES 
MTO -0.5 -0.5 
SB (at the time of the assessment) 0.3 1.2 
SB (used to define the initial position)* 0.8 1.2 







Above the MTO 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 
ΔSB (SF2015) 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
Conclusion 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
EB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
European Commission 








  2013 2014 
EE 
At MTO at the start of the year? YES YES 
MTO 0.0 0.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) 0.0 0.2 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -0.2 0.2 
Requirement based on matrix (ΔSB) 0.0 0.0 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 0.0 0.2 
ΔSB (SF2015) -0.3 0.9 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.4 0.7 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.7 -2.0 
Conclusion overall assessment overall assessment 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
0.0 0.2 
EB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
-0.1 -1.4 
Conclusion overall assessment overall assessment 
IT 
At MTO at the start of the year? 
Not at MTO 
Not at MTO 
MTO 0.0 0.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -1.5 -0.9 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -0.5 -0.8 
Requirement based on matrix (ΔSB) 0.0 0.0 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 0.0 0.0 
ΔSB (SF2015) 0.6 -0.1 















Conclusion Compliance overall assessment 















At MTO at the start of the year? YES YES 
MTO -1.0 -1.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -0.1 -1.6 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -1 -1.4 








Above the MTO 
0.0 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** -0.5 
ΔSB (SF2015) -0.6 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.1 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.3 
Conclusion overall assessment 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
0.2 
EB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
-0.8 
Conclusion overall assessment 
LT 
At MTO at the start of the year? Not at MTO Not at MTO 
MTO -1.0 -1.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -2.9 -1.2 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -2.1 -1.2 
                                                          
(170) Latvia is eligible to a pension reform clause from 2013. 
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Requirement based on matrix (ΔSB) 0.5 0.5 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 0.5 0.5 
ΔSB (SF2015) 0.8 1.1 








Conclusion compliance compliance 








    2013 2014 
LU 
At MTO at the start of the year? YES YES 
MTO 0.5 0.5 
SB (at the time of the assessment) 1.7 1.6 
SB (used to define the initial position)* 2.5 1.6 








Above the MTO 
Above the MTO  
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 
ΔSB (SF2015) 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
Conclusion 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
EB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
Conclusion 








MTO -1.7 -1.7 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -0.8 -2.5 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -1.1 -2.2 
Requirement based on matrix (ΔSB)  
 
 
Above the MTO 
0.0 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** -0.9 
ΔSB (SF2015) -1.3 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.4 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
0.3 
Conclusion overall assessment 





n.a. in EDP in 2012 
0.3 




    2013 2014 
MT 
At MTO at the start of the year? Not at MTO Not at MTO 
MTO 0.0 0.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -3.9 -2.6 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -2.6 -2.6 

















n.a. in EDP in 2014 
 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 
ΔSB (SF2015) 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
Conclusion 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
European Commission 














    2013 2014 
NL 
At MTO at the start of the year? Not at MTO YES 
MTO -0.5 -0.5 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -2.7 -0.2 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -0.6 -0.2 









n.a. in EDP in 2013 
0.0 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 0.1 
ΔSB (SF2015) 0.4 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
0.3 




ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 




At MTO at the start of the year? Not at MTO Not at MTO 
MTO -0.45 -0.45 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -1.6 -0.4 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -1.1 -0.4 







Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 0.6 
ΔSB (SF2015) 0.7 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
0.1 











n.a. in EDP in 2013 Conclusion overall assessment 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
n.a. in EDP in 2013 EB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
Conclusion 
    2013 2014 
RO 
At MTO at the start of the year? Not at MTO Not at MTO 
MTO -1.0 -1.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -2.5 -1.0 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -1.4 -1.0 
Requirement based on matrix (ΔSB) 0.1 0.0 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)**  0.0 
ΔSB (SF2015) 0.7 0.4 








Conclusion compliance compliance 





n.a. in EDP in 2012 
0.5 







At MTO at the start of the year? Not at MTO Not at MTO 
MTO -0.5 -0.5 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -3.9 -2.0 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -1.4 -2.0 
                                                          
(171) Slovakia is eligible to the investment clause in 2014. 
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n.a. in EDP in 2013 
0.0 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** -0.4 
ΔSB (SF2015) -0.6 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.2 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
0.8 
Conclusion overall assessment 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
n.a. in EDP in 2013 EB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
Conclusion 
    2013 2014 
FI 
At MTO at the start of the year? YES YES 
MTO -0.5 -0.5 
SB (at the time of the assessment) -1.0 -1.6 
SB (used to define the initial position)* -0.6 -0.9 








Above the MTO 
0.0 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 0.0 
ΔSB (SF2015) -0.8 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
-0.8 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
0.3 
Conclusion overall assessment 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 
0.2 














    2013 2014 
SE 
At MTO at the start of the year? YES YES 
MTO -1.0 -1.0 
SB (at the time of the assessment) 0.3 -1.1 
SB (used to define the initial position)* 0.5 -0.9 








Above the MTO 
Corrected requirement  (ΔSB)** 
ΔSB (SF2015) 
ΔSB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
EB: deviation from required 
adjustment 
Conclusion 
ΔSB: 2-year average deviation from 
required adjustment 





SB - structural balance; ΔSB: change in structural balance 
EB: expenditure benchmark; ΔEB: change in expenditure benchmark. 
*The maximum of the structural balances (i.e. most favourable) estimated by the Commission since the 
freezing (at spring t-1) based on COM forecast vintages. The value at t-1 is used to define the Member 
State`s position vis-à-vis the MTO.  
**Requirement corrected for the clauses (investment, pension), the allowed deviation and the margin (if 
applicable).  
Compliance = the adjustment required or a higher adjustment is being observed. 
Some deviation = a deviation from the requirement is being observed but it is below the 
threshold for significance 
Significant deviation = deviation which has reached or breached the threshold for a significant 
deviation (i.e. 0.5 pp. of GDP over one year, 0.25 pp. of GDP over two years on average). 
European Commission 







Guide for reading the table  
Please note, that ex post assessment (for 2013) is carried out on the basis of Commission 2014 spring 
forecast (i.e. assessment is frozen). Consistently the change in the structural balance is indicated based on 
the Commission 2014 spring forecast for 2013. Please also note, that the average deviation from the 
requirement over two years cannot be directly used to determine the additional fiscal effort to ensure 
compliance.  
Let us consider, for example, the case of EE in 2014:  
The first stage is to consider if this Member State reached or not its MTO and so to identify the 
applicable requirements. Then we compare the structural balance in 2013 with the country's MTO. In 
order to identify the initial SB position, at each forecast round the most favourable SB at t-1 (where t is 
the year assessed) coming from the forecasts since the freezing for a given year - named SB (used to 
define initial position) in our table - is taken as a basis.  
In our example this refers to 2013 spring forecast, as the SB estimated for 2013 at that time was -0.2% of 
GDP. 
This implies that at the start of 2014, EE is at its MTO thanks to the tolerance of margin: 0-(-0.2) <0.25 
Step 1: Assessment of budgetary execution for year 2014:  
- first pillar (ΔSB): the structural balance improves by 0.9 of GDP (ΔSB = 0.9% of GDP). As the 
corrected requirement is equal to 0.2 this implies the effort impmeneted is larger than required by 0.7% of 
GDP. EE is assessed to be compliant by 0.7% of GDP (green cell). 
- second pillar (EB): EE is assessed to breach the threshold of significance (0.5) on the expenditure 
benchmark (-2.0 % of GDP, red cell). 
 Conclusion: overall assessment (which can lead to a significant deviation) 
Step 2: A two-years average assessment of budgetary execution in 2013-2014 is then conducted: 
- first pillar (ΔSB): Based on the average of the annual deviation from required adjustment (i.e the 
average of the annual deviation identified in 2013 and 2014) EE is assessed to be compliant by 0.2%of 
GDP (green cell);  
- second pillar (EB): Based on the average of the yearly deviation from the expenditure benchmark (i.e 
the average of the annual deviation identified in 2013 and 2014) EE is assessed to breach the threshold of 
significance (0.25) on the expenditure benchmark (-1.4% of GDP, red cell) 
 2. Conclusion: an overall assessment is required (which can lead to a significant deviation) 
3. step: If any of the steps above point to significant deviation conclude for significant deviation
ANNEX 15 
A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF THE FLEXIBILITY CLAUSES IN 




The aim of this annex is to guide the reader through the use of "flexibility" clauses within the rules of the 
SGP. It illustrates how the adjustment path towards the MTO or the adherence to the MTO is impacted by 
the temporary deviation allowed under i) the structural reform clause (introduced in Section 1.3.2.3) , ii) 
the investment clause (introduced in Section 1.3.2.4 ) and iii) the cumulation of both clauses. 
The methodology applied to determine the eligibility to the clauses and the impact of flexibility clauses 
on the achievement of the MTO is displayed in the two Sections mentioned above. These conditions are 
summarized in the table below. 
 
Table A15.1: Overview of conditions displayed in Section 1.3.2.3 and 1.3.2.4 related to the Structural reform clause and the Investment 
  Clause 
  
 
Structural Reform Clause Investment Clause 
Eligibility 
criteria 
 Remain in the preventive arm  
 Safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value for the deficit 
(minimum benchmark) 
 Major structural reform 
with positive long-term 
budgetary effects 
 Negative GDP growth or output gap 
inferior to -1.5% of GDP 
  
 Additionality principle: total public 
investments are not reduced, i.e. co-
financed expenditure should not 




 Achievement of the MTO within the 4-year horizon of the current SCP 
should be sought (less than 1.5% deviation from MTO in initial year) 








 The deviation cannot 
exceed 0.5% of GDP, 
except in the case of 
pension reforms 
introducing a mandatory 
fully-funded pillar 
 The deviation cannot exceed 0.5% of 
GDP  
 Applies to national expenditure on 
projects co-financed by the EU under 
the Structural and Cohesion policy 
(including the YEI), TEN, CEF, 
EAFRD, EMFF and the EFSI 
 The cumulated deviation for the two clauses cannot exceed 0.75% of GDP 
 The temporary deviation remains valid over a period of three years 
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1. The low output gap condition: el igibi l ity criterion specif ic to the Investment 
Clause 
While the temporary deviation stemming from the structural reform clause does not depend on the 
economic situation of a Member State, this is not the case for the investment clause. The application of 
the investment clause is only possible for a Member State in bad (or worse) economic times (output gap 
below -1.5% of GDP or negative growth).  
2. The safety margin (i .e. respect of the minimum benchmark): a constraint on the 
temporary deviation for both clauses  
When benefitting from the temporary deviation, Member States should preserve a safety margin with 
respect to the 3% reference value. This means that the structural balance should always be equal to or 
above the minimum benchmark, a measurement which is detailed in Annex 2.(
172
) In other words, the 
temporary deviation stemming from the application of the clauses should not imply that the structural 
balance goes below the minimum benchmark. According to the 2015 European Commission spring 
forecast, only 8 Member States in the preventive arm were fulfilling this criterion in 2016 before any 
temporary deviation is even applied.  
 
Table A15.2: Respect of the safety margin and available fiscal scope – spring forecast 2015 (forecast available when assessing  
  eligibility of the clauses at the occasion of the 2015European Semester) 
  
 
Source : European Commission spring forecast 2015. Note: Minimum benchmarks as updated in 2012. 
3. The Maximum initial distance to the MTO: the start ing point for considering 
eligibi l ity to both clauses 
In order to respect the requirement to return to the MTO within the four year timeframe, while assuring 
for a maximum deviation of 0.5% of GDP under the Structural Reform Clause, it is necessary to introduce 
                                                          
(172) The minimum benchmark is a level of structural balance which takes into account past output volatility and budgetary 











BE -1.7 -2.1 No 0.0
BG -1.7 -2.4 No 0.0
CZ -1.7 -1.4 Yes 0.3
DK -0.7 -1.4 No 0.0
DE -1.5 0.7 Yes 2.2
EE -1.8 0.2 Yes 2.0
IE -1.2 -2.1 No 0.0
IT -1.7 -1.5 Yes 0.2
LV -1.8 -1.9 No 0.0
LT -1.8 -1.4 Yes 0.4










HU -1.5 -2.6 No 0.0
MT -1.9 -1.7 Yes 0.2
NL -1.4 -1.4 No 0.0
AT -1.8 -1.0 Yes 0.8
PL -1.9 -2.6 No 0.0
PT -1.8 -2.3 No 0.0
RO -1.8 -2.7 No 0.0
SI -1.7 -2.5 No 0.0
SK -1.5 -2.0 No 0.0
FI -0.5 -1.5 No 0.0








a maximum initial distance that a Member State's structural balance can be from the MTO when applying 
for the clause. The following considerations must be allowed for in determining this distance:  
The year that a Member State is required to reach their MTO will be a function of, amongst other things, 
the adjustment that they are required to make in each individual year as defined by the matrix (displayed 
in Box 1.6). Consequently, it is not possible to define ex-ante a year in which a Member State, whether 
availing of the structural reform clause or not, must reach their MTO. It was therefore proposed to make 
the simplifying assumption that the requirement to return to MTO within the four year timeframe should 
be based on the benchmark adjustment being applied.  
On this basis, the maximum initial distance which the structural balance of a Member State applying for 
the structural reform clause can be from the MTO is 1.5% of GDP in year t. This limit will ensure that, in 
the benchmark case of an annual adjustment of 0.5% of GDP, the Member State can regain its MTO 





Benchmark simulation: Member State with a Structural balance of -1.5% of GDP the year prior to 




                                                          
(173)  For the investment clause, the maximum initial distance to the MTO is set at 1.5% of GDP, in order to ensure consistency with 
the structural reform clause. However, benefiting from the investment clause is only possible in bad economic times, which is 
associated with a lower fiscal effort stemming from the matrix. This may imply that a maximum initial distance from the MTO of 
1.5% of GDP does not necessarily ensure the attainment of the MTO within the SCP time frame.  
When both clauses are cumulated, the maximum initial distance to the MTO is also set 1.5% of GDP for consistency purposes. Such 
cumulation is only possible in bad economic times (otherwise the investment clause cannot apply), implying here again that the 
maximum initial distance from the MTO of 1.5% does not necessary ensure the attainment of the MTO within the SCP time frame. 
 
European Commission 







4. Underlying working assumptions for further simulations  
To undertake credible simulations, some working assumptions are necessary. 
a. The MTO 
The MTO is illustratively set at 0% of GDP. 
b. The size of the temporary deviation 
For the structural reform clause, the illustrative requested temporary deviation (by a Member State) has 
been set at 0.5% of GDP. 
For the investment clause, the illustrative requested temporary deviation (by a Member State) has been set 
at 0.5% of GDP. 
For the cumulation of the Structural Reform Clause and the Investment Clause, the illustrative requested 
temporary deviation (by a Member State) has been set at 0.75% of GDP. 
In the three cases, the requested temporary deviation corresponds to the maximum temporary deviation 
that can be granted and corresponds to the individual caps of 0.5% of GDP (for the structural reform 
clause and the investment clause) and to the cap on the cumulated temporary deviation (0.75% of GDP). 
These assumptions are conservative as the temporary deviation could be lower. 
c. The benchmark adjustment stemming from the Matrix 
The benchmark adjustment represents the adjustment path stemming from the Matrix and which should 
be implemented when adjusting towards MTO. It depends on the level of debt and the cyclical conditions.  
For the structural reform clause, the benchmark adjustment has been set at 0.5% of GDP for each and 
every year under consideration. This corresponds to the situation of a Member State with low debt and in 
normal economic times. 
For the investment clause as well as for the cumulation of both clauses, the benchmark adjustment has 
been set at 0% of GDP the year the clause(s) apply and 0.5% of GDP for the other years. This reflects the 
fact that a Member State needs to be in bad economic times in order to benefit from the investment clause 
or the cumulation of both clauses. Being in bad economic conditions implies a lower adjustment effort 
stemming from the Matrix. 
These adjustments have been chosen for illustrative purposes. Member States with high debts (above 
60%) can be subject to higher adjustment requirements under the Matrix. The underlying assumptions are 
here again conservative: the benchmark adjustment from the Matrix could thus be higher in practice than 
in the simulations below.  
5. The simulations 
A set of four simulations are displayed. They aim at covering a wide range of potential cases under 








The simulations are performed for four initial level of structural balances ( -1.5%, -1%, -0.5% and 0%). 
This aims at illustrating the impact of the initial position of the structural balance on the adjustment path 
towards MTO both with and without the application of the clauses. In economic terms, this sets out the 
adjustment path towards MTO for two different types of Member States:  
 Member States faced with a relatively deteriorated fiscal situation with respect to their MTO ( SB of 
-1.5% , -1% and -0.5% of GDP) 
 Member States with sound public finances, i.e. Member States at MTO (SB of 0% of GDP).  
Each simulation takes into account the need to preserve the safety margin with respect to the 3%. For 
illustrative purposes, the minimum benchmark is assumed to be at -1.5% of GDP, which is the average 
minimum benchmark for the European Union.In the simulations, the clause is applied for in year t+0 with 
the temporary deviation to be implemented in t+1. 
 
Simulation 1: Member State with a Structural balance of -1.5% of GDP the year prior to the application of the clause 
  
Structural reform clause (benchmark simulation) Investment clause /Cumulated clauses 
  
Comment: 
1. Maximum initial distance to the MTO: the initial structural balance is at the maximum initial 
distance from the MTO in t+0 (1.5% of GDP). The Member State is eligible for the clauses on this 
basis. 
2. Safety margin: the temporary deviation 
stemming from the application of the clause in t+1 
does not imply that the structural balance goes 
below the minimum benchmark. The Member 
State preserves the safety margin. 
3. Integrity of the MTO: Following the new 
adjustment path, the MTO is reached in t+4 instead 
of t+3. 
2. Safety margin: the temporary deviation 
stemming from the application of the clause in 
t+1 implies that the structural balance goes 
below the minimum benchmark. The Member 
State would not preserve the safety margin. 
3. Integrity of the MTO : The adjustment path 
remains unchanged and the MTO is reached in 
t+4 (consequence of the absence of adjustment 












Simulation 2: Member State with a Structural balance of -1% of GDP the year prior to the application of the clause 
  
Structural reform clause Investment clause 
  
Comment: 
1. Maximum initial distance to the MTO : The Member State is eligible for the clauses on this basis. 
2. Safety Margin : The Member State preserves the safety margin. 























1. Maximum initial distance to the MTO : The Member State is eligible for the clauses on this basis. 
2. Safety Margin : : the temporary deviation stemming from the application of the clause in t+1 implies 
that the structural balance goes partly below the minimum benchmark. To preserve the safety margin, 
the cumulated deviation needs to be limited to 0.5% of GDP (i.e. the difference between the structural 
balance, -1% of GDP, and the minimum benchmark, -1.5% of GDP. 
3. Integrity of the MTO: Following the new adjustment path, the MTO is reached in t+4 instead of t+3. 
 
 
Simulation 3: Member State with a Structural balance of -0.5% of GDP the year prior to the application of the clause 
  




1. Maximum initial distance to the MTO : The Member State is eligible for the clauses on this basis. 
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2. Safety Margin : The Member State preserves the safety margin. 
3.Integrity of the MTO: Following the new adjustment 
path, the MTO is reached in t+4 instead of t+1. 
3.Integrity of the MTO: Following the new 
adjustment path, the MTO is reached in t+4 





1. Maximum initial distance to the MTO : The Member State is eligible for the clauses on this basis. 
2. Safety Margin : The Member State preserves the safety margin. 
















Simulation 4: Member State with a Structural balance at MTO (Structural balance at 0% of GDP) the year prior to the application of 
  the clause 
  




1. Maximum initial distance to the MTO : The Member State is eligible for the clauses on this basis. 
2. Safety Margin : The Member State preserves the safety margin. 
3.Integrity of the MTO: Following the new adjustment 
path, the MTO is reached in t+4 while it would have 
remained at the MTO without a temporary deviation. 
3.Integrity of the MTO: Following the 
new adjustment path, the MTO is 
reached in t+5 while it would have 




The MTO would be met in t+4 or before in most of the cases presented. 
In a limited number of cases, the MTO would be met in t+5. This is the case when a Member States is 
allowed to cumulate both clauses and benefits from the maximum allowed temporary deviation (0.75% of 
GDP), while at the same time having sound public finances, i.e. initial structural balance close to (-0.5% 
of GDP) or at MTO.  
All in all, the simulations show that under some specific circumstances, it is possible to extend the 
deadline to reach the MTO by one year. This is justified by the need to encourage structural reforms and 
preserve public investments in Member States faced with difficult economic conditions (sole eligible to 
the investment clause and consequently allowed to cumulated clauses). 
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The Commission Communication of 13 January 2015 on “Making the best use of the flexibility within the 
existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact”, provided additional guidance on how the Commission 
would operationalise the so-called 'structural reform clause' of Regulation 1466/97. On this basis, the 
Council decided on the implementation of the flexibility within the SGP, as reflected in the commonly 
agreed position confirmed by the ECOFIN Council of 12 February 2016.  
Under the Regulation, Member States implementing major structural reforms with positive long-term 
budgetary impacts are allowed to deviate temporarily from the MTO or from the adjustment path towards 
it.  
An intuitive way to formalize the eligibility criterion for Member States applying for use of the structural 
reform clause is to require that the reform produces significant sustainability gains in net present value 
terms, taking into account both the direct fiscal impact of the reform (including savings and/or costs, 
where applicable) and their indirect budgetary effects via higher output.  
Noting that: 
 Bj represents the direct primary budgetary savings in period j, while Cj denotes the possible 
budgetary costs, the direct net savings thus amounts to Bj-Cj; 
 Aj denotes the possible output effect of a reform in period j, implying indirect budgetary effects 
essentially on the revenue side. Given a semi-elasticity of the budget balance equal to τ, the indirect 
budgetary gain is thus τAj; 
A reform would yield a net gain Dj = τAj+Bj-Cj for the primary balance in period j (assuming a horizon of 
25 years and that the reform kicks in in the first period). Noting βj the actualisation rate(
174), the inter-
temporal sum of these effects is equivalent in actuarial terms to a permanent annuity Z: 
Z = (ΣjβjDj) / Σjβj 
A major reform could then be expected to result in a significant improvement in the long-term 
sustainability of a Member State's public finances as measured by Z. 
Box 1 provides further detail on how to get some preliminary order of magnitude associated with the 
effect of structural reforms. This is presented with an illustrative purpose and does not limit the kind of 
reforms that can be considered nor the models or the parameter values used to assess their impact. It 
should be highlighted that the translation of a specific reform into a policy shock that can be incorporated 
by the model may remain the most significant challenge. Therefore any assessment by the Commission 
will have to be of qualitative nature and will necessarily build on elements of judgment over the 
plausibility of the estimates of the reforms. The plausibility exercise may help in some cases to frame this 
judgement. In particular, it could be the case when the measure being considered appears to be far below 




                                                          
(174) The actualisation rate is: βj = 1/Пk=1,..,j(1+rk), with rk the growth corrected interest rate (i.e. the difference between the nominal 
interest rate and the nominal growth rate) at date k. Figures for the growth and interest rates can be taken from the Aging Working 








BOX 1.:  HOW TO CALCULATE THE INDIRECT IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS? A METHOD FOR A  
  PLAUSIBILITY ASSESSMENT  
Beyond their direct effect, structural reforms can have an indirect impact on the budget balance, via 
their effect on potential output. The purpose of this box is to outline a transparent methodology to 
provide some first order of magnitude of this indirect effect. 
First, we focus on the lasting effect of the reforms on GDP, which corresponds more technically to the 
impact of the reforms on potential output. Therefore, we do not consider the short-term effects on 
GDP, which are transitory by nature and difficult to measure, owing to implementation lags and 
complex dynamics in domestic demand. As a result, we estimate the effects of reforms on GDP as of 5 
years and then every 5 years (10, 15 and 20 years). Between these years, we interpolate the effects 
linearly.  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table A16.1: Effect of stylised structural reforms on GDP (% deviation from baseline)  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
Second, we simulate the impact of a set of stylised structural reforms using the DSGE model QUEST 
for the whole EU. This is technically captured by the parameter A referred to above. These reforms are 
standard policy “shocks” affecting key economic parameters in the product market, the labour market 
or knowledge and innovation (see Röger et al., 2008 for more details) . Some of these parameters 
correspond to performance indicators (e.g. tangible capital costs), while others refer to policy 
instrument indicators, such as a tax shift of 1% or R&D wage subsidies of 0.1% GDP. Every concrete 
reform planned by Member States would then need to be “translated” into one (or several) of these 
policy shocks, which would require a judgement - or analysis - on how the reform is expected to 
modify these parameters. This translation of concrete reforms into standard shocks could be very tricky 
in practice, especially for some concrete measures and would anyway require some informed 
judgement on the impact of the measure on the performance of labour, product or innovation markets. 
Moreover, the standard policy shocks are not fully comparable across types of reforms and the 
estimates are surrounded by large uncertainties and should be interpreted with a great deal of caution. 
For instance, the estimates could vary from country to country and depend on baseline values of 
structural reform indicators or on the macroeconomic conditions (e. g. monetary policy stance and size 
of public debt). However, they provide a ballpark proxy of significant reforms in each of the areas 
considered, which can be used in the context of this plausibility exercise. As set out in the table above, 
some reforms, in particular those reducing the cost of tangible capital, improving the functioning of the 
labour market (leading to a wage mark-up reduction) or increasing competition (reflected by a cut in 
the final good mark-up), seem to lead to a long- term increase in potential GDP by around 1% or more, 
compared with a no policy change baseline. These reforms already display some non-negligible effects 
after 5 years. Some other reforms have more moderate effects, such as a reduction in the benefit 
replacement rate or in firms' administrative burden, a tax shift from labour to indirect taxes or an 
5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years
Product market
Reduction of the final goods market mark-up -1 p.p. 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9
Reduction of the intermediate goods market mark-up -1 p.p. 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
Reduction in final good firms' administrative burdens 10% 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Reduction of tangible capital costs -50 b.p. 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.4
Reduction of intangible capital costs -50 b.p. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Labour market
Reduction in the benefit replacement rate 5 p.p. 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Wage mark-up reduction 5 p.p. 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Tax shift from labour to VAT 1% GDP 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Knowledge and innovation
Wage subsidy to the R&D sector 0.1% GDP 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Increase of the share of medium skilled workers 1 p.p. 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Increase of the share of high skilled workers 1 p.p. 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Stylised policy impulse Size
GDP effect (%  deviation from baseline)
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increase in the share of low- and medium-skilled workers. The effects of the other stylised reforms 
appear more marginal, although slightly positive. 
Third, we compute the reaction of the output effect to the budget balance. This corresponds to the 
parameter τ above, with Aτ being the indirect effect of a structural reform. This parameter differs 
slightly from country to country. The approach presented below largely builds on the methodology to 
compute the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (see Mourre et al., 2014) . We compute the semi-
elasticity of the budget balance, which measures the change in the budget balance brought about by a 
1% increase in GDP. Four relevant factors influence the results. First, all tax elasticities (which are 
different across countries in the short term) are assumed to converge to unity after 10 years, which is in 
line with the theoretical expectation of revenue moving along with economic activity after some time. 
Second, we assume that non-tax revenue follows GDP as well after 5 years. These two assumptions 
mean that, in the long term, structural reforms are neutral regarding the revenue-to-GDP ratio. Third, 
public spending (except the unemployment-related expenditures) is frozen in real terms, only following 
inflation. Therefore, an increase in output due to a reform would automatically decrease the spending-
to-GDP ratio, by raising the denominator, which leads to a reduction in the budget balance. As shown 
in Mourre et al. (2014), this effect increases with the size of public spending as percentage of GDP in a 
given country. Fourth, the reduction of unemployment-related expenditure in case of output increase 
will add slightly to this effect. This additional impact depends upon the share of unemployment-related 
expenditures in GDP and upon the reactivity of unemployment to output. We assume for simplicity 
that the elasticity of unemployment to potential output is the same as the reaction of unemployment to 
short-term output fluctuation. An alternative method, more complicated, would have been to estimate 
the impact of each structural reform on unemployment. This may be done as a robustness check. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table A16.2: Reaction of the output effect to the budget balance (varying across countries)  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 





























Semi-elasticity of the budget balance
ANNEX 17 
A COMMONLY AGREED POSITION ON FLEXIBILITY WITHIN 




The annex contains the text of the "Commonly agreed position on Flexibility within the SGP", which the 
ECOFIN Council formally endorsed on 12 February 2016.(175) This text builds on the interpretative 




On 13 January 2015 the Commission adopted its Communication on flexibility within the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). Between January and April 2015, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) and 
the EFC-Alternates (Alternates) discussed three Commission notes on the operationalisation of the 
Communication, namely on the new matrix of required adjustment under the preventive arm, the 
structural reform clause and the investment clause. On 7 April, the Council Legal Service provided to the 
EFC its Opinion on flexibility in the SGP. At the meeting of the EFC on 8 April 2015, the President noted 
that for the preparation of the 2015 European Semester Council Recommendations, the Commission 
would use its interpretation of the rules of the SGP as expressed in its Communication on flexibility. On 
29 April 2015, the EFC agreed that the EFC-Alternates would work on preparing a commonly agreed 
position on the flexibility in the SGP for cyclical conditions, structural reforms, and government 
investments aiming at, ancillary to, and economically equivalent to major structural reforms. The 
commonly agreed position should preferably be reflected in an updated Code of Conduct (CoC).  
This document presents the commonly agreed position on flexibility in the SGP, as agreed by the EFC on 
27 November 2015, taking into account the Commission Communication and the Commission notes on 
the operationalisation of the Communication, the above-mentioned discussions by the Alternates and the 
members of the EFC between January and April 2015, and the opinion of the Council Legal Service on 
flexibility in the SGP. The concession of such flexibility is without prejudice to the requirement for 
Member States to reduce their government debt at a satisfactory pace, thereby contributing to the long-
term sustainability of their public finances, in accordance with Article 126.2 of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union and Article 2 of Regulation 1467/97. This document is intended to 
serve as a basis for the codification in the Code of Conduct of a commonly agreed position on flexibility 
in the SGP.  
 1. Introduction  
A commonly agreed position on flexibility in the SGP would provide guidance on the best possible use of 
the flexibility that is built into the existing rules of the preventive arm of the SGP, without changing or 
replacing the existing rules. The preventive arm aims at guaranteeing a sound budgetary position in all 
Member States: its core is the attainment by each Member State of its medium-term sound budgetary 
position (so-called Medium-Term Objective or MTO), which is established according to the commonly 
agreed principles set out in Sub-section A(1) of Section I of the Specifications on the Implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact177 (hereafter “the Code of Conductˮ).   
                                                          
(175) http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14345-2015-INIT/en/pdf  
(176) Communication from the Commission  Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, COM(2015) 12 of 13.01.2015: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/2015-01-
13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf 
177 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economIC_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/code_of_conduct_en.pdf  
European Commission 







The corrective arm of the Pact deals with situations in which the government deficit and/or the debt are 
above the reference values set in the Treaty: in these cases, Member States are then subject to an 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (“EDP”), which entails stricter conditions and monitoring. The commonly 
agreed principles on the implementation of the corrective arm of the SGP remain those established in the 
Code of Conduct endorsed by the ECOFIN in September 2012 and complemented by the effective action 
methodology endorsed by the ECOFIN in June 2014. 
 Subject to the rules of the SGP and without modifying existing legislation, the commonly agreed position 
clarifies how three specific policy dimensions can best be taken into account in applying the rules. These 
relate to: (i) cyclical conditions; (ii.) structural reforms; and (iii.) government investments aiming at, 
ancillary to, and economically equivalent to major structural reforms.  
2. FLEXIBILITY FOR CYCLICAL CONDITIONS 
2.1 MATRIX SPECIFYING THE ANNUAL FISCAL ADJUSTMENT TOWARDS THE MEDIUM-TERM OBJECTIVE  
Member States should achieve a more symmetrical approach to fiscal policy over the cycle through 
enhanced budgetary discipline in periods of economic recovery, with the objective to avoid pro-cyclical 
policies and to gradually reach their medium-term budgetary objective, thus creating the necessary room 
to accommodate economic downturns and reduce government debt at a satisfactory pace, thereby 
contributing to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Member States that have not yet reached their MTO should take steps to achieve it over the cycle. Their 
adjustment effort should be higher in good times; it could be more limited in bad times. In order to reach 
their MTO, Member States of the euro area or of ERM-II should pursue an annual adjustment in 
cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off and other temporary measures, of 0.5 of a percentage point of 
GDP as a benchmark. In parallel, the growth rate of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures in 
relation to the reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth should be expected to yield an annual 
improvement in the government balance in cyclically adjusted terms net of one-offs and other temporary 
measures of 0.5 of a percentage point of GDP. 
The following matrix clarifies and specifies the fiscal adjustment requirements under the preventive arm 
of the Pact. This matrix is symmetrical, differentiating between larger fiscal effort to be undertaken 












Matrix for specifying the annual fiscal adjustment  
towards the Medium-Term Objective (MTO)  
under the preventive arm of the Pact 
  Required annual fiscal adjustment* 
 
Condition 
Debt below 60 and  
no sustainability risk 




Real growth < 0  
or output gap < -4 
No adjustment needed 
Very bad times 
-4 ≤ output  
gap < -3 
0 0.25 
Bad times 
-3 ≤ output  
gap < -1.5 
0 if growth below potential, 
0.25 if growth above 
potential 
0.25 if growth below 
potential, 0.5 if growth 
above potential 
Normal times 
-1.5 ≤ output  
gap < 1.5 
0.5 > 0.5 
Good times 
output gap  
≥ 1.5 
> 0.5 if growth below 
potential, ≥ 0.75 if growth 
above potential 
≥ 0.75 if growth below 
potential, ≥ 1 if  growth 
above potential 
* all figures are in percentage points of GDP 
Given the volatility of the output gap estimates and of the structural balance level, the requirements for 
annual fiscal adjustment will be frozen on the basis of the vintage data available at spring t-1.  
In order to avoid unwarranted consequences in the event of worsened economic conditions or when it is 
not necessary anymore to progress towards the medium-term objective (MTO), the following shall apply: 
‒  first, in case the actual data signal a worsening of the economic situation so that the country is 
considered to be in either exceptionally (OG <-4% or negative real growth) or very bad times 
(OG < -3%),  the requirements based on the most recent data will prevail over the frozen 
requirements, allowing to consider exceptionally and very bad economic circumstances; 
‒  second, in case the actual data are revised so that the country has already achieved its MTO in 
year t, the assessment of the country as being at or above its MTO will prevail over the frozen 
requirements. 
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‒  The "sustainability risk" in the matrix specifying the annual fiscal adjustment refers to the 
medium-term overall debt sustainability as measured by the S1 indicator, among other 
information178. 
Progress towards the MTO is assessed on the basis of two pillars, with the structural balance being 
complemented by the expenditure benchmark. The expenditure benchmark establishes a maximum 
growth rate (i.e. the reference rate) for government spending net of discretionary revenue measures. The 
medium-term reference rate (as well as the share of government primary expenditure used in the 
convergence margin) will be updated on a yearly basis, as from spring 2015. In practice, this means that 
each spring of year t, when setting the required adjustment towards the MTO for the year to come t + 1, 
an updated medium-term reference rate is computed as the 10-year average potential GDP growth on the 
period [t-5, t+4]. The budgetary process in some MS requires identification of the reference rate for the 
expenditure benchmark before spring. A Member State may ask the Commission to provide for indicative 
purposes an update of its reference rate for the expenditure benchmark already in the winter of year t. 
However, the Commission assessments and recommendations under the framework of the European 
Semester will be based on the reference rate for the expenditure benchmark as calculated in the spring of 
year t. Should significant differences between the winter and spring computations of the reference rate 
materialise, these would be taken into account as appropriate in the ex post analysis under the preventive 
arm of the SGP. 
2.2  Review of the flexibility clause for cyclical conditions 
The Commission shall submit a review report to the Council before 30 June 2018 on the effectiveness of 
the matrix specifying the annual fiscal adjustment towards the Medium-Term budgetary Objective 
(MTO). In particular, the review will examine the success of the matrix in promoting counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies and the achievement by the Member States of their MTOs, thereby creating the necessary 
room to accommodate economic downturns. The review will also assess whether the new matrix has 
ensured a reduction in government debt at a satisfactory pace, thereby contributing to the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, in line with the requirements under the debt rule as specified in Sub-
section B(1) of Section I of the Code of Conduct. 
3.  Structural Reforms 
In order to enhance the growth oriented nature of the Pact, structural reforms will be taken into account 
when defining the adjustment path to the medium-term objective for countries that have not yet reached 
this objective and in allowing a temporary deviation from this objective for countries that have already 
reached it.  
 
3.1  Criteria for eligible reforms 
To be fully operational, the “structural reform clause” has to rely on well-defined principles regarding the 
eligibility of such reforms. The Commission and the Council will base their assessment on the following 
criteria: 
 
                                                          
178 S1 shows the adjustment effort required, in terms of a steady improvement in the structural primary balance to be introduced till 









(i) The reforms must be major. While there are some individual reforms with a major positive 
impact on growth and the long-term sustainability of public finances, such as pension reforms, 
well-designed and comprehensive packages of reforms addressing structural weaknesses may 
also have a major positive impact. This is notably the case when the reforms reinforce each 
other's impact through an appropriate choice of policy mix and sequencing of implementation. 
The assessments by the Commission and the Council on whether a reform or set of reforms can 
be considered as major will take into account available Commission quantitative estimates on 
the long-term positive budgetary effects of those reforms. In any case the Commission will 
provide an explanation of its judgement that the reforms are to be considered as major. 
(ii) The reforms must have direct long-term positive budgetary effects, including by raising 
potential sustainable growth, and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sustainability 
of public finances. The sustainability effects can stem either from direct budgetary savings 
from the reforms (such as in pensions or healthcare), or from the increased revenues drawn in 
the medium to long-run from a more efficient economy with a higher potential output (e.g. due 
to lower structural unemployment or an increased labour force), or from a combination of both 
kinds of effects. The long-term positive budgetary effects could be measured as the 
improvement in the primary budget balance in net present value equivalent terms. The 
budgetary effects of the reforms over time are assessed by the Commission and the Council in 
a prudent way, making due allowance for the margin of uncertainties associated to such an 
exercise.  
iii) The reforms must be fully implemented. The reforms must be adopted by the 
national authorities through provisions of binding force, whether legislative or 
not, in accordance with the applicable domestic laws and procedures. In case 
the structural reform is not yet fully implemented, the Member State should 
also submit a dedicated structural reform plan – subsumed, as relevant, in the 
National Reform Programme (NRP) or Corrective Action Plan (CAP). A plan 
announcing upcoming reforms as a simple manifestation of political intentions 
or of wishes would not fulfil the requirements for the application of Article 
5(1) of Regulation 1466/97. While it is understood that all the reforms should 
be adopted through provisions of binding force before being considered as 
eligible for the clause, it is also true that the effective implementation of 
adopted reforms may take time and may be subject to delays and setbacks. This 
raises the question of introducing strong safeguards against the risk of 
implementation failures. 
3.2  Activation of the structural reform clause 
Member States that want to benefit from the structural reform clause should apply for it in their Stability 
or Convergence Programmes (SCPs). The flexibility is granted in the context of the assessment of the 
SCPs, specifically in the relevant Country Specific Recommendation. This Country Specific 
Recommendation could make the granting of flexibility conditional on the subsequent fulfilment of 
certain eligibility criteria (e.g. the respect of the safety margin). Euro area Member States may request to 
benefit from the Structural Reform Clause at the time of the Draft Budgetary Plans to be submitted by 15 
October. Non-euro area Member States may also apply for the structural reform clause by 15 October 
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through an ad hoc application179. The structural reform clause may be granted provided it is endorsed by 
the Council in the autumn of the same year as an updated Country Specific Recommendation.  The 
Commission and the Council will consider that the criterion related to the implementation of reforms is in 
part fulfilled ex ante when: 
  The Member State presents a medium-term structural reform plan which is comprehensive and 
detailed and includes well-specified measures and credible timelines for their adoption and 
delivery. The implementation of the reforms will be monitored closely in the context of the 
European Semester.  
 
  In the specific case of a Member State in the Excessive Imbalances Procedure (EIP), it has 
submitted a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) providing the necessary information. The 
implementation of the reforms will then be monitored through the EIP. 
In both cases, Member States will be expected to provide in-depth and transparent documentation, 
providing quantitative analysis of the short-term costs – if any – and of both their medium-term budgetary 
and potential growth impact. The documentation must also include details on the timetable of 
implementation of the reforms. Concurrently, Member States will provide an independent evaluation of 
the information provided to support their application for a temporary deviation under the reform clause, 
including on the estimated short and medium-term impact on the budgetary position and on the timetable 
for the implementation of the reforms. Alternatively, Member States should provide comprehensive 
independent information to support the estimated impact and planned timetable. The Commission will 
when possible also provide to the Council its estimate of the quantitative impact of the reforms on the 
long-term positive budgetary effects and on potential growth.  
3.3  Operationalisation of the structural reform clause 
In the specific case of pension reforms consisting in introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a 
mandatory, fully-funded pillar, the methodology to allow them to be taken into account in the preventive 
arm of the Pact is outlined in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. 
For other structural reforms, the Commission and the Council will base themselves on the information 
contained in the dedicated structural reform plan (or Corrective Action Plan). In this case, the Council 
will grant eligible Member States additional time to reach the MTO, hence allowing temporary deviations 
from the structural adjustment path towards it, or to deviate temporarily from the MTO for Member 
States that have reached it, provided that: 
(i) the reforms meet the above criteria; 
(ii) the temporary deviation does not exceed 0.5 % of GDP; 
(iii)   the cumulative temporary deviation granted under the structural reform clause and the 
investment clause (see Section 4) does not exceed 0.75 % of GDP; 
                                                          
179 In order to ensure equal treatment of all Member States, the Commission and the Council shall have regard to the different 
budgetary year of the United Kingdom, with a view to taking decisions with regards to the United Kingdom at a point in its 








(iv.)   In case the structural reform is planned but not yet fully implemented, the Commission and the 
Council - when setting via the CSR the required structural effort for the year t+1 - will base 
themselves on the requirements as per the matrix of the preventive arm, i.e. without any 
deviation from the adjustment path from the MTO or from the MTO itself. However, the CSR 
will also state that if the planned reform is fully implemented, the ex post assessment of 
compliance with the requirements of the preventive arm will incorporate the allowed deviation, 
i.e. by subtracting it from the requirement set  by matrix of adjustment;  
 (v.)   the MTO is reached within the four year horizon of the Stability or Convergence Programme of 
the year in which the clause is activated. In order to ensure that, in the benchmark case of an 
annual adjustment of 0.5% of GDP, the Member State can regain their MTO within the 
required four year timeframe, the maximum initial distance which the structural balance of a 
Member State applying for the structural reform clause can be from the MTO is 1.5% of GDP 
in year t; 
(vi.) the application of the structural reform clause is restricted to one single time per period of 
adjustment towards the MTO. In other words, once a Member State has benefitted from the 
structural reform clause, it will not be allowed to benefit from the clause again until it has 
attained its MTO. This restriction maintains the integrity of the MTO as the central target of 
the Preventive Arm of the Pact, as to allow multiple or concurrent applications of the clauses 
could effectively negate the requirement for Member States to achieve their MTO in the 
medium-term. This conclusion is supported by the record of Member States since the inception 
of the SGP evidencing in several cases a 100% failure rate in terms of achieving the MTO; 
(vii.) an appropriate safety margin is continuously preserved so that the deviation from the MTO or 
the agreed fiscal adjustment path does not lead to an excess over the 3 % of GDP reference 
value for the deficit.  
While the Pact does not provide the tools for monitoring the enforcement of structural reforms, the legal 
framework in which the Pact operates – notably the European Semester process and the new Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure (EIP)  – allows the Commission and the Council to assess challenges and 
imbalances requiring structural reforms, and for monitoring action taken by the Member States. When a 
Member State is granted a temporary deviation under the reform clause, the Commission shall prepare an 
assessment of the progress or full adoption and delivery of the reforms in line with the agreed timetable of 
implementation.  
The Council shall grant the temporary deviation after the Commission assessment confirms the full 
implementation of the agreed reforms. In case a Member State fails to implement or reverses the agreed 
reforms, the temporary deviation from the MTO, or from the adjustment path towards it, will be 
considered as not warranted. If such a failure results in a significant deviation from the MTO or the path 
towards it, the Commission will apply the procedure envisaged in Article 6(2) and Article 10(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. This means that the Commission will issue a warning to that Member State, 
followed by a proposal for a Council recommendation, to ensure that the Member State takes the 
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appropriate policy measures within five months to address that deviation. For euro area Member States, 
continued failure to comply can ultimately lead to a requirement to lodge an interest-bearing deposit180. 
3.4  Trajectory of the temporary deviation 
Member States qualifying of the structural reform clause will be granted a temporary deviation of up to 
0.5% of GDP in year t+1 which permits their structural balance to worsen by this amount from the 
balance that would have prevailed in the absence of the structural reform clause. In order to provide 
equality of treatment among Member States that are both at and on a path towards the MTO, it is 
necessary to require the Member States to adjust on a trajectory that is parallel to their original path, but 
to halt that adjustment if, while being entitled to the deviation, they reach the point where they are within 
0.5% of GDP of their MTO (i.e. their MTO minus the temporary deviation). In the fourth year of the 
adjustment period covered by the structural reform clause, the deviation is no longer applied and the 
Member State is then required to adjust according to the matrix. In the benchmark case, this will return 
the Member State to its MTO. Therefore, a Member State which is at the MTO will be allowed to depart 
from the MTO for three years.  A Member State that starts out at 1.0% of GDP from the MTO in the year 
the clause is applied for, will not be required to adjust in year t+1, implement an adjustment in year t+2, 
apply no adjustment in year t+3 and finally adjust again in year t+4. A Member State that starts out at 
1.5% of GDP from the MTO in the year the clause is applied for will not be required to adjust in year t+1 
and will implement the adjustment in years t+2, t+3, and t+4. 
4. Government investments aiming at, ancillary to, and economically equivalent to the 
implementation of major structural reforms 
Under the preventive arm of the Pact, some investments aiming at, ancillary to, and economically 
equivalent to the implementation of major structural reforms may, under certain conditions, justify a 
temporary deviation from the MTO of the concerned Member State or from the adjustment path towards 
it.  
4.1  Legal framework  
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, in Article 5(1) and Article 2a of the Regulation, recognises "major 
structural reforms" and "public investment" as two different concepts. 
Article 5(1) of Regulation 1466/97 (also known as the "flexibility clause") provides that “When defining 
the adjustment path to the medium-term budgetary objective for Member States that have not yet reached 
this objective, and in allowing a temporary deviation from this objective for Member States that have 
already reached it, provided that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value 
is preserved and that the budgetary position is expected to return to the medium-term budgetary objective 
within the programme period, the Council and the Commission shall take into account the 
implementation of major structural reforms which have direct long-term positive budgetary effects, 
including by raising potential sustainable growth, and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term 
sustainability of public finances." 
                                                          








Article 2a of Regulation (EC) 1466/97 states that "The medium-term budgetary objectives shall ensure the 
sustainability of public finances or a rapid progress towards such sustainability while allowing room for 
budgetary manoeuvre, considering in particular the need for public investment." Such a room of 
manoeuvre is however limited by the Code of Conduct to Member States with relatively low debt. 
Public investments cannot be assimilated "tout court" as structural reforms, unless it is duly shown that 
they are instrumental to the achievement and implementation of the said reforms. It is not legally feasible 
to establish ex ante that all co-financing expenditure by Member States in investment projects amounts to 
structural reforms and that such expenditure qualifies for the application of Article 5(1) of Regulation 
1466/97.  
Government investments that can be eligible for a temporary deviation must be national expenditures on 
projects that are to a large extent financed by co-funding by the EU under the European Structural and 
Investment Funds181, Trans-European Networks and the Connecting Europe Facility, as well as national 
co-financing of projects also co-financed by the European Fund for Strategic Investments. The temporary 
deviation for such investments will be subject to a plausibility assessment by the Commission and the 
Council, where consideration is given to whether the priority or project in question aims at, is ancillary to, 
and economically equivalent to the implementation of structural reforms. An investment can be 
considered economically equivalent to a major structural reform only if it can be shown that the 
investment has a major net positive impact on potential growth and on the sustainability of public 
finances.  
The Commission's plausibility assessment will be based on the detailed information on the contribution of 
the investment projects to the implementation of structural reforms and their economic equivalence to a 
structural reform, including on the positive, direct and verifiable long-term budgetary effect of the 
expenditure covered by the temporary deviation. This information is necessary to ensure compatibility 
with Article 5(1) and Article 9(1) of Regulation 1466/97, i.e. the SGP provisions which allow temporary 
deviations from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it to accommodate structural reforms with 
positive, direct and verifiable effect on fiscal sustainability, including via potential growth. Therefore the 
Member State should present information by main category of projects co-financed by the EU (including 
the EFSI), the size of the expenditure involved, the key features and objectives of the investment project 
and specifying how it will contribute to boost potential growth and the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. 
4.2  European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) 
On 25 June 2015, the Council adopted a regulation on a European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) 
aimed at stimulating the economy.  The Fund will offer a new risk-bearing capacity which will allow the 
EIB to invest in equity, subordinated debt and higher risk tranches of senior debt, and to provide credit 
enhancements to eligible projects. An initial contribution to this risk-bearing capacity will be made from 
the EU budget, in the form of a new guarantee fund, and from the EIB's own resources. The use of this 
EU guarantee and of EIB funds has no impact on the deficit or debt levels of Member States. 
                                                          
181 See Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
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The capacity of the EFSI can be further increased through additional financial contributions from 
Member States. In addition to contributing to the EFSI, Member States will have the possibility to co-
finance individual projects also co-financed by it.  
4.2.1  Financial contributions from Member States to the EFSI  
In their assessment of the necessary fiscal adjustment under the preventive and corrective arms, the 
Council and the Commission will consider that: 
 Initial deficit increasing contributions into the EFSI can be considered as one-off 
expenditures. Under the preventive arm of the Pact, one-off expenditures will not affect the 
MTO or the required fiscal adjustment towards it, as these are set in structural terms. 
 Under the corrective arm of the Pact (the EDP), compliance with the fiscal adjustment effort 
recommended by the Council would not be affected, since this is also measured in structural 
terms. A contribution to the EFSI should therefore not lead to a Member State being found 
non-compliant with its EDP recommendation. 
 In case of a non-respect of the deficit reference value, when preparing the report envisaged 
under Articles 126(3) and 126(4) TFEU, the Commission and the Council will consider the 
contribution to the EFSI to be a “relevant factor” in line with Article 2(3) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1467/97. This means that an EDP will not be launched if this non-respect is due to 
the contribution, and if the excess over the reference value is small and is expected to be 
temporary. 
 In case of a non-respect of the debt reference value, when preparing the report envisaged 
under Articles 126(3) and 126(4) TFEU, the Commission and the Council will consider the 
contribution to the EFSI to be a “relevant factor” in line with Article 2(3) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1467/97. This means that an EDP will not be launched if the non-respect is due to 
the contribution. 
4.2.2 Co-financing by Member States of investment projects also co-financed by the EFSI 
From the point of view of the implementation of the Pact, the Commission and the Council will take into 
account national co-financing of investment projects that are to a large extent financed by co-financing by 
the EFSI in the application of a temporary deviation under the conditions set out in Section 4.3 below. 
4.3  Criteria for eligible investments under the EFSI and other investment under the preventive 
arm of the Pact 
Under the preventive arm of the Pact, some other investments aiming at, ancillary to, and economically 
equivalent to the implementation of major structural reforms may, under certain conditions, justify a 
temporary deviation from the MTO of the concerned Member State or from the adjustment path towards 
it. An investment can be considered economically equivalent to a major structural reform only if it can be 









For such investments, a Member State will benefit from a temporary deviation of up to 0.5% of GDP 
from the structural adjustment path towards the MTO, or from the MTO for Member States that have 
reached it, if the following conditions are met: 
(i.) its GDP growth is negative or GDP remains well below its potential (resulting in a negative 
output gap greater than 1.5 % of GDP); 
(ii.) the deviation from the MTO or the agreed fiscal adjustment path towards it does not lead to an 
excess over the reference value of 3 % of GDP deficit and an appropriate safety margin is 
preserved; 
(iii.) subject to a total maximum temporary deviation of 0.5% of GDP for an application for 
flexibility for investment by a Member State, the deviation is equal to the national expenditure 
on eligible projects that are to a large extent financed by co-funding by the EU under the 
European Structural and Investment Funds 182, Trans-European Networks and Connecting 
Europe Facility, and to national co-financing of eligible investment projects also co-financed 
by the EFSI, which have direct long-term positive and verifiable budgetary effects; 
(iv.) the cumulative temporary deviation granted under the structural reform clause and the 
investment clause does not exceed 0.75 % of GDP; 
(v.) co-financed expenditure should not substitute for nationally financed investments, so that total 
public investments are not decreased. In order to evaluate the respect of this condition, the 
Commission will assess the change in gross fixed capital formation for the year of the 
application of the clause on the basis of the Commission forecasts to check that there is no fall 
in overall investment; 
(vi.) the Member State must compensate for any temporary deviations and the MTO must be 
reached within the four-year horizon of its current Stability or Convergence Programme.  
(vii.) As with the Structural Reform Clause, in order to preserve the integrity of the MTO, the full 
temporary deviation (corresponding to the total amount of the national part of eligible co-
financed expenditure but not exceeding 0.5% of GDP) will be granted for one single time per 
period of adjustment towards the MTO. For the following years, only positive incremental 
changes would be added to the initial temporary deviation. In other words, once a Member 
State has benefitted from a total temporary deviation of 0.5% of GDP under the "investment 
clause", it will not be allowed to benefit from the clause again until it has attained its MTO.  
The trajectory of the temporary deviation stemming from the application of the "investment clause" 
should be established in line with the "structural reform clause".  
The country-specific temporary deviation will depend on several factors. Ex-ante, the potential deviation 
will depend on the commitments of the EU structural funds towards each Member State as well as on the 
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level of planned co-financing. Ex-post, the allowed deviation will depend on the effective payments of 
EU structural funds and on the correspondent effective co-financing. In case the actual co-financing falls 
short of projected co-financing, a correction will be added to the required change in the structural balance, 
which could potentially lead to the opening of a significant deviation procedure. 
4.4  Activation of a temporary deviation for eligible investments  
The "investment clause" (IC) is activated ex-ante upon request from Member States in their Stability or 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs). The flexibility is granted in the context of the assessment of the SCPs, 
specifically in the relevant Country Specific Recommendation. This Country Specific Recommendation 
could make the granting of flexibility conditional on the subsequent fulfilment of certain eligibility 
criteria (e.g. the respect of the safety margin). Euro area Member States may request to benefit from the 
"investment clause" also at the time of the Draft Budgetary Plans to be submitted by 15 October. Non-
euro area Member States may also apply for the "investment clause" by 15 October through an ad hoc 
application183. The "investment clause" may be granted provided it is endorsed by the Council in the 
autumn of that same year as an updated Country Specific Recommendation. The application should be 
submitted in the year ahead of the application of the clause. That is, in the SCP or at the time of the DBP 
(or the ad hoc application by a non-euro area MS) submitted in year t for an application of the clause in 
year t+1.  
Ex-ante, the Commission will assess the eligibility of such investments where on the basis of the detailed 
information provided by the Member  States (see Section 4.1 above), consideration is given to whether 
the priority or project in question aims at, is ancillary to, and economically equivalent to the 
implementation of structural reforms. The Commission will conclude that an investment can be 
considered as being economically equivalent to a major structural reform if it can be shown that the 
investment has a major net positive impact on potential growth and on the sustainability of public 
finances. The Commission will also assess ex-ante whether the projects satisfy the requirement that they 
are to large extent financed by EU co-funding.  
Ex-ante, the Commission will also assess eligibility to the IC with respect to the spring forecast of year t 
and will factor it in the ex-ante guidance it provides at the occasion of the European Semester. Ex-post 
assessment will be based on outturn data available in year t+2, as it is usually the case. The temporary 
deviation will be reviewed in order to reflect the effective co-financing of the Member States. The 
(downward) revision of this temporary deviation shall not imply that a Member State implements an 
effort superior to the one necessary to reach its MTO. 
When requesting the application of the IC, Member States should include in their SCPs the following 
information (for the years t to t+4): 
  The forecast path of co-financing expenditure, including for EFSI projects (as a % of GDP).  
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  The corrected path of its structural balance resulting from the application of the IC, while 
planning to reach the MTO within the timeframe of the SCP. Member States shall also take due 
consideration of the annual fiscal adjustment requirements towards the MTO as defined in 
Section 2.1 given their projections for GDP and the output gap in their SCPs. 
  As specified in Section 4.1, detailed information on the contribution of the investment projects to 
the implementation of structural reforms and their economic equivalence to a structural reform, 
including the positive, direct and verifiable long-term budgetary effect of the expenditure 
covered by the temporary deviation. This information is necessary to ensure compatibility with 
Article 5(1) and Article 9(1) of Regulation 1466/97, i.e. the SGP provisions which allow 
temporary deviations from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it to accommodate structural 
reforms with positive, direct and verifiable effect on fiscal sustainability, including via potential 
growth.  
  Member States will provide an independent evaluation of the information provided to support 
their application for a temporary deviation under the investment clause, including on the 
estimated long-term impact on the budgetary position. Alternatively, Member States should 
provide comprehensive independent information to support the estimated impact. 
  The Member State should demonstrate that the eligible co-financed investment does not 
substitute for nationally funded investments, so that the total share of public capital expenditure 
is not decreased. 
  Member States who have benefitted from the IC will also report in the SCPs on the actual level 
of co-financing, including for EFSI projects, following the year of application. 
5.  Review of the structural reform clause and the investment clause  
By the end of June 2018, the Commission will carry out a review on the application of the structural 
reform and investment clauses, taking full account of the economic situation at that time and the 
achievement of its objectives. The review will examine the achievement by the Member States of their 
MTOs, thereby creating the necessary room to accommodate economic downturns. The review will 
examine to what extent the projects eligible for the investment clause were co-funded by the EU and 
whether the investment clause led to new investments. The review will also examine the implications of 
the continuation of the investment clause.  The review may, as appropriate, be accompanied by proposals 
to the Economic and Financial Committee for a possible modification of the commonly agreed position 








Automatic stabilisers Features of the tax and spending regime which react automatically to the economic 
cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a result, the budget balance in percent of GDP tends to improve in 
years of high growth, and deteriorate during economic slowdowns. 
Bottom up fiscal effort A quantification of the fiscal impact of measures introduced, obtained by 
summing up the impact of the individual measures.See Top down fiscal effort. 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) Annual guidelines for the economic and budgetary 
policies of the Member States. They are prepared by the Commission and adopted by the Council of 
Ministers responsible for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN). 
Budget balance The balance between total public expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a 
positive balance indicating a surplus and a negative balance indicating a deficit. For the monitoring of 
Member State budgetary positions, the EU uses general government aggregates. See also structural 
budget balance, primary budget balance, and primary structural balance. 
Budgetary sensitivity The variation in the budget balance in percentage of GDP brought about by a 
change in the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated to be 0.5 on average. 
Close-to-balance requirement A requirement contained in the 'old' Stability and Growth Pact, according 
to which Member States should, over the medium term, achieve an overall budget balance close to 
balance or in surplus; was replaced by country-specific medium-term budgetary objectives in the 
reformed Stability and Growth Pact. 
Code of Conduct Policy document setting down the specifications on the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact and the format and content of the Stability and Convergence programmes. 
Convergence programmes Medium-term budgetary strategies and monetary policies presented by 
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. They are updated annually, according to the provisions 
of the Stability and Growth Pact. See also stability programmes. 
Crowding-out effects Offsetting effects on output due to changes in interest rates and exchange rates 
triggered by a loosening or tightening of fiscal policy. 
Cyclical component of budget balance That part of the change in the budget balance that follows 
automatically from the cyclical conditions of the economy, due to the reaction of public revenue and 
expenditure to changes in the output gap. See automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing and structural budget 
balance. 
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance See structural budget balance. 
Defined-benefit pension scheme A traditional pension scheme that defines a benefit, i.e. a pension, for 
an employee upon that employee's retirement is a defined benefit plan. 
Defined-contribution pension scheme A scheme providing for an individual account for each 
participant, and for benefits based solely on the amount contributed to the account, plus or minus income, 
gains, expenses and losses allocated to the account. 
Demand and supply shocks Disturbances that affect the economy on the demand side (e.g. changes in 
private consumption or exports) or on the supply side (e.g. changes in commodity prices or technological 




Direct fiscal costs (gross, net) of a financial crisis The direct gross costs are the fiscal outlays in support 
of the financial sector that increase the level of public debt. They encompass, for example, 
recapitalisation, purchase of troubled bank assets, pay-out to depositors, liquidity support, payment when 
guarantees are called and subsidies. The direct net costs are the direct gross cost net of recovery 
payments, such as through the sale of acquired assets or returns on assets. Thus, the net direct fiscal costs 
reflect the permanent increase in public debt. 
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget balance and in its components under the control of 
government. It is usually measured as the residual of the change in the balance after the exclusion of the 
budgetary impact of automatic stabilisers.  
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) Formerly the Monetary Committee, the EFC is a 
Committee of the Council of the European Union set up by Article 134 of TFEU. Its main task is to 
prepare and discuss (ECOFIN) Council decisions with regard to economic and financial matters. 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) Group of senior government officials whose main task is to prepare 
discussions of the (ECOFIN) Council on structural policies. It plays an important role in the preparation 
of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, and it is active on policies related to labour markets, methods 
to calculate cyclically adjusted budget balances and ageing populations. 
ESA2010 / ESA95  European accounting standards for the reporting of economic data by the Member 
States to the EU. As of September  2014, ESA2010 has replaced the earlier ESA95 standard with regard 
to the comparison and analysis of national public finance data. 
European Financial Stability Facility is a company owned by Euro Area Member States created 
following the decisions taken in May 2010 by the Council. EFSF is able to issue bonds guaranteed by 
euro area Member States to lend to euro area Member States in difficulty, subject to conditions negotiated 
with the European Commission in liaison with the European Central Bank and International Monetary 
Fund and to be approved by the Eurogroup. 
European semester is the yearly cycle of economic policy coordination which takes place over the first 6 
months of the year. The European Commission undertakes a detailed analysis of EU Member States' 
programmes of economic and structural policies and the European Council and the Council of ministers 
provide policy advice before Member States finalise their draft budgets. 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) A procedure according to which the Commission and the Council 
monitor the development of national budget balances and public debt in order to assess and/or correct the 
risk of an excessive deficit in each Member State. Its application has been further clarified in the Stability 
and Growth Pact. See also stability programmes and Stability and Growth Pact. 
Expenditure rules A subset of fiscal rules that target (a subset of) public expenditure. 
Fiscal consolidation An improvement in the budget balance through measures of discretionary fiscal 
policy, either specified by the amount of the improvement or the period over which the improvement 
continues. 
Fiscal governance Comprises all arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions that underlie the 
conduct of budgetary policies of general government. The terms fiscal governance and fiscal frameworks 
are used interchangeably in the document. 
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(Numerical) Fiscal rule A permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary 
indicator of fiscal performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major 
component thereof. See also expenditure rules. 
General government As used by the EU in its process of budgetary surveillance under the Stability and 
Growth Pact and the excessive deficit procedure, the general government sector covers national 
government, regional and local government, as well as social security funds. Public enterprises are 
excluded, as are transfers to and from the EU Budget. 
Government contingent liabilities Obligations for the government that are subject to the realization of 
specific uncertain and discrete future events. For instance, the guarantees granted by governments to the 
debt of private corporations bonds issued by enterprise are contingent liabilities, since the government 
obligation to pay depend on the non-ability of the original debtor to honour its own obligations. 
Government implicit liabilities Government obligations that are very likely to arise in the future in spite 
of the absence of backing contracts or law. The government may have a potential future obligation as a 
result of legitimate expectations generated by past practice or as a result of the pressure by interest 
groups. Most implicit liabilities are contingent, i.e., depend upon the occurrence of uncertain future 
events. 
Indirect taxation Taxes that are levied during the production stage, and not on the income and property 
arising from economic production processes. Prominent examples of indirect taxation are the value added 
tax (VAT), excise duties, import levies, energy and other environmental taxes. 
Integrated guidelines A general policy instrument for coordinating EU-wide and Member States 
economic structural reforms embedded in the Lisbon strategy and which main aim is to boost economic 
growth and job creation in the EU. 
Interest burden General government interest payments on public debt as a share of GDP. 
Maastricht reference values for public debt and deficits Respectively, a 60 % general government 
debt-to-GDP ratio and a 3 % general government deficit-to-GDP ratio. These thresholds are defined in a 
protocol to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. See also Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Medium-term budgetary framework An institutional fiscal device that lets policy-makers extend the 
horizon for fiscal policy making beyond the annual budgetary calendar (typically 3-5 years). Targets can 
be adjusted under medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBF) either on an annual basis (flexible 
frameworks) or only at the end of the MTBF horizon (fixed frameworks). 
Medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) According to the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, 
stability programmes and convergence programmes present a medium-term objective for the budgetary 
position. It is country-specific to take into account the diversity of economic and budgetary positions and 
developments as well as of fiscal risks to the sustainability of public finances, and is defined in structural 
terms (see structural balance). 
Minimum benchmarks The lowest value of the structural budget balance that provides a safety margin 
against the risk of breaching the Maastricht reference value for the deficit during normal cyclical 
fluctuations. The minimum benchmarks are estimated by the European Commission. They do not cater 
for other risks such as unexpected budgetary developments and interest rate shocks. They are a lower 




One-off and temporary measures Government transactions having a transitory budgetary effect that 
does not lead to a sustained change in the budgetary position. See also structural balance. 
Output gap The difference between actual output and estimated potential output at any particular point in 
time. See also cyclical component of budget balance. 
Pension fund A legal entity set up to accumulate, manage and administer pension assets. See also private 
pension scheme. 
Potential GDP The level of real GDP in a given year that is consistent with a stable rate of inflation. If 
actual output rises above its potential level, then constraints on capacity begin to bind and inflationary 
pressures build; if output falls below potential, then resources are lying idle and inflationary pressures 
abate. See also output gap. 
Primary budget balance The budget balance net of interest payments on general government debt. 
Primary structural budget balance The structural budget balance net of interest payments. 
Private pension schemes The insurance contract specifies a schedule of contribution in exchange of 
which benefits will be paid when the members reach a specific retirement age. The transactions are 
between the individual and the insurance provider and they are not recorded as government revenues or 
government expenditure and, therefore, do not have an impact on government surplus or deficit. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy A fiscal stance which amplifies the economic cycle by increasing the structural 
primary deficit during an economic upturn, or by decreasing it in a downturn. A neutral fiscal policy 
keeps the cyclically-adjusted budget balance unchanged over the economic cycle but lets the automatic 
stabilisers work.  
Public debt Consolidated gross debt for the general government sector. It includes the total nominal 
value of all debt owed by public institutions in the Member State, except that part of the debt which is 
owed to other public institutions in the same Member State. 
Public investment The component of total public expenditure through which governments increase and 
improve the stock of capital employed in the production of the goods and services they provide. 
Significant divergence/deviation A sizeable excess of the budget balance over the targets laid out in the 
Stability or Convergence programmes, that triggers the warning procedure of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. 
 ‘Snow-ball’ effect The self-reinforcing effect of public debt accumulation or decumulation arising from 
a positive or negative differential between the interest rate paid on public debt and the growth rate of the 
national economy.  
Sovereign bond spread The difference between risk premiums imposed by financial markets on 
sovereign bonds for different states. Higher risk premiums can largely stem from (i) the debt service ratio, 
also reflecting the countries' ability to raise their taxes for a given level of GDP, (ii) the fiscal track 
record, (iii) expected future deficits, and (iv) the degree of risk aversion. 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Approved in 1997 and reformed in 2005 and 2011, the SGP clarifies 
the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the surveillance of Member State budgetary policies and 
the monitoring of budget deficits during the third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two Council 
Regulations setting out legally binding provisions to be followed by the European Institutions and the 
European Commission 
Vade mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact 
 
228 
Member States and two Resolutions of the European Council in Amsterdam (June 1997). See also 
Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Stability programmes Medium-term budgetary strategies presented by those Member States that have 
already adopted the euro. They are updated annually, according to the provisions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. See also Convergence programmes. 
Stock-flow adjustment The stock-flow adjustment (also known as the debt-deficit adjustment) ensures 
consistency between the net borrowing (flow) and the variation in the stock of gross debt. It includes the 
accumulation of financial assets, changes in the value of debt denominated in foreign currency, and 
remaining statistical adjustments. 
Structural budget balance The actual budget balance net of the cyclical component and one-off and 
other temporary measures. The structural balance gives a measure of the underlying trend in the budget 
balance. See also primary structural budget balance. 
Sustainability A combination of budget deficits and debt that ensure that the latter does not grow without 
bound. While conceptually intuitive, an agreed operational definition of sustainability has proven difficult 
to achieve. 
Tax elasticity A parameter measuring the relative change in tax revenues with respect to a relative 
change in GDP. The tax elasticity is an input to the budgetary sensitivity. 
Top down fiscal effort A quantification of the fiscal impact of government policy, obtained by looking at 
the overall change in the structural balance. This may differ from the bottom up measure due to the 
incomplete coverage of the latter, second-order economic effects or different assumptions about the non-
policy change assumption. 
 





BE  Belgium 
BG  Bulgaria 
CZ  Czech Republic 
DK  Denmark 
DE  Germany 
EE Estonia 
EI  Ireland 
EL  Greece 
ES  Spain 
FR  France 
IT  Italy 
HR     Croatia 
CY  Cyprus 
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LT  Lithuania 
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HU  Hungary 
MT  Malta 
NL  The Netherlands 
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PT  Portugal 
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AGS  Annual Growth Survey 
AMECO  Macro-economic database of the European Commission 
CAPB  Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
COFOG Classification of the functions of government 
DG ECFIN  Directorate-General Economic and Financial Affairs 
ECB   European Central Bank 
ECOFIN  Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
EDP   Excessive deficit procedure 
EFC   Economic and Financial Committee 
EFSF   European Financial Stability Facility 
EMU   Economic and Monetary Union 
EPC   Economic Policy Committee 
ESA(2010) European System of National and Regional Accounts 
ESM   European Stability mechanism 
GDP   Gross domestic product 
LTC   Long-term budgetary cost of ageing 
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